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A

DISCOURSE

Concerning the

DOCTRINE

OF

Christ's Satisfaction;

OR,

The True Reasons of his Sufferings;

WITH

An ANSWER

TO THE

SOCINIAN OBJECTIONS.

BIBLIOTHECA TANNERIANA

To which is added

A *Sermon* concerning the *Mysteries of the Christian Faith*; Preached *April* 7. 1691.

With a *Preface* concerning the *True State* of the Controversie about *Christ's Satisfaction.*

By the Right Reverend Father in GOD,
EDWARD Lord Bishop of *Worcester.*

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T. T.

THE

PREFACE.

THE *Deſign of the following Diſcourſe, is to vindicate the Doctrine of* Chriſt's Satisfaction *from the* Socinian Objections. *Which, that I might do more effectually, I ſet my ſelf to conſider the Force and Strength of all that* Crellius *had produced in his elaborate Anſwer to* Grotius. *For I have always endeavoured to underſtand the right ſtate of a Queſtion, before I undertook it; and when I had done that, I have taken as much Care, as I could, to repreſent it truly to others. Which made me not a little ſurprized, when I found our modern* Socinians *in their late Pamphlets to charge Me as well as others, with* not reading their Books upon this Queſtion, and wholly miſtaking the State of the Queſtion between the Church and them. *Whereas, if I had not read their Books*

Conſiderations on the Explications of the Trinity in the Archbiſhop's Sermons, *&c.* p. 31.

I might peradventure have entertained a more favourable Opinion of them, than I now have. But it was upon a diligent Conſideration of the utmoſt I could find was ſaid by their beſt Writers, that I ſo long ſince ſatisfied my ſelf, that if the Books of the New Teſtament *are to be our Rule of Faith, they were extreamly miſtaken. Indeed, our* Unitarians (*as they call themſelves*) *ſeem to go another way to work; which is, by undermining the Authority of theſe Books, and ſo to introduce* Deiſm *among us;* (*of which I hope to give an Account in another Diſcourſe.*) *But my preſent buſineſs is to lay open the true ſtate of this Controverſie between us. In their Anſwer to my Sermon* (*which is here Re-*

Anſw. to Serm. p 12. *printed*) *they ſay,* That the Unitarians never denied, as I fancy, that Jeſus Chriſt made himſelf a voluntary Sacrifice for Expiation of the Sins of Mankind. *If this be true, I confeſs, I have miſtaken them; but if the contrary prove very true from their own Writings, what do theſe Men deſerve, for denying that which they know to be true? For it is hardly poſſible to ſuppoſe ſuch bold Undertakers, as they are, ſhould be ignorant that* Socinus *abſolutely denied,* That Chriſt made himſelf a voluntary Sacrifice for Expiation

Expiation of the Sins of Mankind. *For in his Anſwer to* Volanus, *he ſaith*, That he and moſt others are greatly miſtaken when they ſay, that Chriſt offered up himſelf to God, when his Blood was ſhed upon the Croſs: *And he poſitively affirms*, That the Sacrifice which Chriſt offered was not upon the Croſs, but in Heaven. *Theſe Paſſages gave great offence to one* Niemojevius, *a Friend of his, who in his firſt Epiſtle to him, calls it*, A horrid Paradox, and directly contrary to Scripture, and wonders what he meant to write ſo confidently againſt the plain Teſtimonies of Scripture. Socinus *in anſwer to him, ſaith*, It is no more than himſelf had aſſerted ſome Years before, *in his Book* De Servatore; and others of their Party before him. *And he lays down, as his Concluſion, which he deſires his Friend to bring his Arguments againſt, viz.* That the Expiatory Sacrifice of Chriſt for our Sins was not performed on the Croſs, but in Heaven. Niemojevius *brings expreſs places of Scripture againſt this Opinion; and ſaith*, He could by no means excuſe ſuch plain Oppoſition to the words of Scripture. Socinus *in his Reply perſiſts in ſaying*, That there was no Expiatory Sacrifice for Sin

Socin. Op. T. 1 p. 391.

Socin. Epiſt. p. 196. Ed. Racov.

p. 204.

p. 224.

p. 226.

in the Death of Chriſt; and that it ought
p. 254. to be conſidered as an Intervening Condition in order to the Expiation in Hea-
p. 265. ven, and not otherwiſe; *but he will by no means allow* any Proof of any Sacrifice of the Expiation on the Croſs. *And ſo the Diſpute ended. With what face can they now ſay,* That the Unitarians never denied this, *when* Socinus *not only doth it, but defends it, to the laſt, and ſaith,* That others had done it before him: *Which ſhews, that it was no ſingular Opinion of his own, but that which had been received among the* Unitarians *before him.*

But ſay they, The *Unitarians* ever acknowledged that the Lord Chriſt was an Expiatory Sacrifice for our Sins, as may be ſeen in the *Racovian Catechiſm. This is indeed a wonderfull Proof,* they ever acknowledged it, as may be ſeen in the *Racovian Catechiſm: Were there no* Unitarians *before the* Racovian Catechiſm? *And was that always the ſame? Suppoſe the* Unitarians *before, were of another Opinion; ſuppoſe the* Racovian Catechiſm *it ſelf hath been altered in this matter: how can any man of Senſe be ſatisfied with ſuch kind of Arguments as theſe? One would think, they wrote onely for ſuch as would take their Words; they joyn ſo much Confidence with*

ſo

ſo very little appearance of Reaſon. All that know any thing of theſe Matters, know very well, that the Racovian Catechiſm *was firſt framed by* Smalcius, *a ſtrict Follower and Defender of* Socinus, *from whoſe Opinions he did not vary at all as to this matter, as will appear from all the old Editions of it. In which the Queſtion is put,* What is the Reaſon of the Sufferings of Chriſt? *The Anſwer is two fold;* 1. To be an Example of Patience. 2. To confirm the Truth of God's Promiſes. Catech. Racov. c. 8. q. 4.

And after theſe are explained, another Queſtion is asked, Is there no other Cauſe of the Death of Chriſt? *The Anſwer is very ſhort*, Nulla prorſus, None at all. Q. 12.

And in the Concluſion of that Chapter a Queſtion is put about Sacrifices, and the Anſwer is, That the Death of Chriſt was no Sacrifice, but only a Preparation to it, and a kind of Introduction to it, for the Sacrifice was offered in Heaven and not before. Q. 38. *Have we not now great Evidence to believe from the* Racovian Catechiſm, *that* Jeſus Chriſt made himſelf a voluntary Sacrifice for Expiation of the Sins of Mankind? *But beſides the* Racovian Catechiſm, *they referr me to* Schlictingius *and* Ruarus. *For what, I pray? For what the* Unitarians *always*

held? That is impoſſible, when there is ſuch evident Proof to the contrary. I ſuppoſe their meaning is, That the Racovian Catechiſm, being reviewed by them ſpeaks otherwiſe. *And is this a good Proof, that they were always of that mind, becauſe from hence it is evident they have changed it? And ſo it will appear to any one that will compare the latter Editions with the former. In the laſt Edition I have ſeen, as it is review'd by* Schlictingius, Ruarus, *and others, there is a Preface, wherein they confeſs it is changed in ſeveral things from what it was, when it was firſt publiſhed by* Moſcorovius, *A. D.* 1609, *and yet the* Unitarians *were ſtill of the ſame mind, although ſome more ſoftning Expreſſions were for meer ſhame thought fit to be inſerted. In this Correct Edition, the Queſtion is put,* Why was it neceſſary for Chriſt to ſuffer as he did? *And the Anſwer is twofold;* 1. That Chriſt ſuffered for our Sins by God's appointment, and underwent a cruel Death as a Sacrifice of Expiation. *Who could imagine this to be the* Racovian Catechiſm *ſtill?* 2. Becauſe thoſe who are to be ſaved by him are ſubject to the like Sufferings. *This is ſomewhat a dark Reaſon; but the former is that which we are to conſider.*

Catech. Racov. Staurop. A.D. 1680.

p. 141.

Chriſt,

Chriſt, *ſay they*, ſuffer'd for the ſins of Mankind, and was a Sacrifice of Expiation by his Death. *What can we deſire more? ſhall we always maintain diſputes about Words, when we agree in Senſe? No, that is not the Caſe, but we may ſeem to agree in Words and differ in Senſe. That therefore muſt be more ſtrictly examined. But becauſe they ſometimes ſeem to be diſpleaſed that* we take their Opinion from foreign Writers, (*ſince they here ſet up for themſelves and are ſo able to expreſs their own Senſe*) *and becauſe they refer me* to their own late Prints in the Engliſh Tongue, *therefore I ſhall apply my ſelf to them, to find out what their true Senſe in this matter is. And they ſeem freely to tell us what* they deny *and what* they affirm.

Conſiderations on the Explications of the Trinity by Dr. *W. &c.* p. 32.

Anſwer to my Serm. p. 12.

1. They deny that this Sacrifice was by way of true and proper Satisfaction or full and adequate Payment to the Juſtice of God.

2. They affirm, that this Sacrifice was only an Oblation, or Application to the Mercy of God.

In another place they complain, that very few of their Adverſaries have really underſtood what they affirm or deny concerning the Cauſes or Effects of

Anſw. to *Milb.* p. 58.

our

our Saviour's death. *And they ſay*, the Queſtion is only this, Whether the Lord Chriſt offer'd himſelf as ſuch a Sacrifice, Oblation or Price as might be made to the Juſtice of God, by way of Equivalent for what we ſhould have ſuffer'd; or was an Oblation or Satisfaction as all former Sacrifices under the Law were, to the Mercy of God by way of Humble Suit and Deprecation? *So that they will no longer Diſpute with us, about the Death of Chriſt being* an Expiatory Sacrifice for the ſins of Mankind; *and ſo this Point ſeems wholly gained. But we muſt have a Care of being deceived by them. For the Scripture was too clear and full to be born down by the Authority or Evaſions of* Socinus; *and therefore they found it neceſſary to comply in Terms, as long as they could keep to their own Notions under them. But what is the true Meaning of* an Expiatory Sacrifice to the Mercy of God? *If it be no more but as a* Condition intervening, Socinus *would not allow that to make an* Expiatory Sacrifice, *and therein he was in the Right.*

The main Point then between us ſeems to be whether the Death of Chriſt had Re-
Anſw. to Milb. p. 53. *ſpect to* the Juſtice or to the Mercy of God? *And here we muſt conſider what they under-*

underſtand by the Juſtice of God.

1. They ſay, that Almighty God as King and Proprietor of all Perſons and Things, can forgive any Offence or all Offences, even without Repentance or Amendment, nor is it contrary to his Juſtice ſo to do.

2. That it is not the Juſtice of God, by which he is prompted to puniſh ſinners, but his Holineſs and Wiſdom, and that Juſtice hath no other ſhare or intereſt in Puniſhment, but only to ſee that Puniſhment be not miſplaced, and that it do not exceed the Offence.

3. That God could not (juſtly or wiſely) ſubſtitute an innocent and well deſerving Perſon to undergo Puniſhment, p. 54. properly ſo called in the Place of the unrighteous and worthleſs, becauſe it is of the Nature of Juſtice not to miſplace Puniſhments.

4. That Chriſt could not offer himſelf freely for us to undergo the Puniſhment due to us, nor could God accept of it, or allow it: becauſe it is of the very Eſſence of Juſtice not to miſplace Puniſhment and not to exceed the Deſert p. 55. of the Offence, which they ſay are the two things that conſtitute the Nature of Punitive Juſtice.

In

Trinitarian Scheme of Relig. p. 18.

In another place, they ſay, That Chriſt made himſelf an Oblation, an Expiatory Sacrifice on the Altar of the Croſs for our Sins. But his Sufferings were not (as Trinitarians teach) deſigned as a Puniſhment laid on him in our ſtead, becauſe Puniſhment is the evil of Suffering inflicted for the evil of Doing; but Chriſt having done no ſin; what he underwent was only labour and ſuffering and no Puniſhment. *And again they ſay,* the Oblation was not made to the Juſtice, but to the Mercy of God. But p. 19. the Sufferings of Chriſt being graciouſly accepted by God, as an Interceſſion on our behalf, God was ſatisfied with them, and this, *they ſay,* is the proper Notion of Satisfaction. *The ſame they repeat in other places. And if no more were to be regarded but meer words, this Controverſie were at an End; for they own Chriſt's Death to be* an Expiatory Sacrifice for the Sins of Mankind, *and that he made by his Sufferings* Satisfaction to God.

Anſw. to the Archbiſhop, p. 32.

But I ſhall now make it appear, that whatever they pretend, they do really own no ſuch thing as the Death of Chriſt being an Expiatory Sacrifice for the Sins of Mankind. *However, we have this Advantage by theſe Conceſſions, that the Scrip-*

Scriptures are yielded to be on our ſide, and that they are forced to ſpeak as we do, whatſoever their meaning be. But that they do not own any proper Expiatory Sacrifice in the Death of Chriſt, *will beſt appear by an Account of the* Riſe *and* Progreſs *of this Controverſie, and of the true* State *of it.*

The firſt Riſe *of it was from the Multitudes of Places of Scripture, which Attribute all the proper Effects of an* Expiatory Sacrifice to the Death of Chriſt. *And that by thoſe who beſt underſtood for what End it was that Chriſt ſuffer d, and had no Intention to deceive or to amuſe Mankind, I mean our Saviour and his Apoſtles. Our Bleſſed Saviour himſelf ſaith,* That the Son of Man came to give his Life a Ranſom for many. A Ranſom *as to what? Surely not* as to the Mercy of God. *But Chriſt's Death was a* Ranſom *as it was an* Expiatory Sacrifice; *and if the one reſpects the* Mercy of God, *the other muſt do ſo too. They may ſay,* the Ranſom is from the Puniſhment of Sin, but this Ranſom might be made as to the Mercy of God, which delivers from it. *But a* Ranſom *is ſomething which is paid or laid down as a* Price *of* Redemption; *and was very well underſtood in that Senſe among the*

Matt. 20. 28. Mark 10. 45.

the Jews; *who all knew that by their Law,*
Levit. 17. 11. the Blood of the Sacrifices was appointed to be a Ranſom for their Souls. For it is the Blood that maketh an Atonement for the Soul. *To which the Apoſtle*
Heb. 9. 22. *refers, when he ſaith,* that without ſhedding of Blood there is no Remiſſion. *So that hereby the* Jews *underſtood theſe things,* (1.) *That there was a Puniſhment due to their Sins, from which they could expect no Deliverance but by the Blood of Sacrifices as a Ranſom or Price of Redemption for them.* (2.) *That as the Puniſhment became due by the Law, and the Execution of it was by the Juſtice of God, ſo the Ranſom or Price of Redemption muſt be by way of Satisfaction to the Law, in ſuch a manner as it had appointed.* (3.) *That they had no other Notion of an* Expiatory Sacrifice, *but the Offering* the Blood of the Sacrifice *for an* Atonement *in order to the Averting the juſt Diſpleaſure of God againſt them for their Sins; and this was that, which they underſtood by* Expiation *or* Remiſſion of Sins. (4.) *That the Expiation did not depend upon the Sacrifice, as an intervening Condition, as to the Party who thereby performed an Act of Obedience, but upon the Nature of the Sacrifice which was offer'd to God. For, what-*

whatever had been required, the Obedience had been the ſame; but here the great Force is laid on the Blood being offer'd for Expiation. (5.) *That however the Mercy of God was ſeen both in the Appointing and Accepting the Ranſom; yet the* Expiatory Sacrifice *was never underſtood by them to Reſpect* the Mercy of God, *but his* Juſt Diſpleaſure *againſt their Sins. What ſtrange Language would it have been thought among the* Jews *to offer an* Expiatory Sacrifice to the Mercy of God? *But Men that bring in New Doctrines, muſt make a New Senſe of Words and Phraſes; or elſe they can never reconcile them to each other. And it is a mighty Advantage to our Cauſe, that we underſtand the Expreſſions of the New Teſtament with Reſpect to theſe Matters, no otherwiſe than the* Jews *underſtood them, among whom they were ſpoken; and who had their own Law to interpret them by. Our preſent* Unitarians *do not deny that the Sacrifices under the Law had an immediate Reſpect to God; but they ſay, it* Was not by way of Satisfaction to the Juſtice of God, but by way of Application to the Mercy of God, by way of humble Suit and Deprecation.

But if there were ſuch a Sanction of the Law,

Law, whereby an Obligation to Puniſhment did follow the Offences forbidden by it; If the Juſtice of God were concerned to ſee the Puniſhment executed, if the Law were not ſatisfied; If the Sacrifice of Atonement or Expiation were deſigned for ſatisfaction of the Law; and God did accept it for that End, then it follows, that theſe Sacrifices were intended not meerly as Rites of Interceſſion *and* Deprecation *to the Mercy of God; but by way of* Satisfaction *to his* Juſtice. *For was it not Juſtice in God to puniſh Offenders againſt his Law? Was it not Juſtice in God to require a Satisfaction to his Law when it was broken? Was it not Juſtice in God, when he had declared that he would accept a Sacrifice of Atonement, to require that inſtead of the Puniſhment of the Offenders, and to puniſh thoſe who wilfully neglected or deſpiſed it? How then, can they pretend* that theſe Sacrifices had no Reſpect to the Juſtice of God? *We never read in Scripture any Expreſſions, as to the Methods of Supplication like this,* That the Blood of the Sacrifices was to expiate for their Sins; and that it was given for an Atonement for the Soul. *Is it ever ſaid, that Prayer and Supplication was to make a Sacrifice of Atonement, and that it was appointed for*

that

that End? Prayer is a Natural and Neceſſary Duty and a Condition in order to Pardon, but the Life and Force of that lies in a Man's own Breaſt, in the inward and fervent Deſires of the Soul: but a Sacrifice of Atonement was a thing of another Nature, the Blood was to be ſhed and then offer'd up to God, as a Sacrifice of Atonement, which God himſelf had appointed for that End; and without which no Remiſſion of Sins was to be expected. But was not this from the Mercy of God to appoint ſuch a Sacrifice of Atonement? *No doubt of it, and ſo it was that he would accept it for ſuch an End. But that is by no means the preſent Queſtion; for it is, Whether the Sacrifice, which God appointed for an Atonement, was only a Rite of* Supplication to the Mercy of God? *In one Senſe a Sacrifice of Atonement is a way of* Deprecation: *but then it relates to the Wrath and Diſpleaſure of God; for it is that which God hath appointed as the Means of Averting his Wrath, and Preventing the Execution of his Juſtice. But the main Queſtion is, Whether the Sacrifice of Atonement as to God's juſt Wrath and Diſpleaſure, be not a Real* Satisfaction to his Juſtice? *For if he be juſtly diſpleaſed, and might juſtly puniſh, but doth accept a*

Sacrifice of Expiation in ſtead of it, although there be a Concurrence of Mercy, yet there is a Real Atonement to his Juſtice: unleſs they will ſay, the Juſtice of God is not concerned in preſerving the Honour of his Laws. But of this more afterwards. If an Expiatory Sacrifice *under the Law were nothing elſe but a Solemn Rite of* Supplication to the Mercy of God *it would take away the Typical Nature of thoſe Sacrifices, and eſpecially thoſe on the Day of Expiation. For what doth a Rite of Supplication and Interceſſion repreſent* as a Figure of ſomething to come? *Why were*
Levit. 16. 10, 11. the Goat *and* the Bullock for the Sin-Offering to be preſented alive before the
14, 15, 19. Lord; *then* their Blood to be ſhed, and to be ſprinkled before the Mercy-ſeat and upon the Altar? *Why was the* Scape-Goat *to have* the Sins of the People confeſſed over him and put upon his head?
v. 21. 27. *Why was* the Fleſh of the Bullock and Goat that was Sacrificed burnt without the Camp? *Do theſe look like* Applications to the Mercy of God, by way of humble Suit and Deprecation? *But the*
Heb. 9. 9, 12, 13, 14. *Apoſtle to the* Hebrews *tells us, theſe things were a* Figure *repreſenting Chriſt* offering himſelf up to God by his own Blood, who having obtain'd eternal Redemption

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for us enter'd into the Holy Place *(in Heaven) whoſe Blood was far more effectual for* the Purging away of Sin, *than the* Blood of Bulls and Goats *could be; and to anſwer to the burning of the Fleſh of the Sacrifices without the Camp*, that he 13 12.
might Sanctify the People with his own Blood, he ſuffer'd without the Gate. *Was all this nothing but* an Oblation to the Mercy of God by way of Prayer and Interceſſion? *Why all this Ceremony about an Oblation of Prayer, which depends on the hearty Devotion of him that makes it? Why did not the* High-Prieſt *enter* without Blood into the Holy of Holies, *if it were nothing but a Rite of Supplication? Why was the* Blood ſprinkled upon the Altar for Atonement, *after he came out from* the Mercy-Seat? *Why was* the Fleſh burnt without the Camp? *Was that for* Interceſſion *too? But ſaith the Correct* Racovian Catechiſm, *all this doth not prove* that the whole Expiatory Sacrifice of Chriſt was performed on the Croſs, but only that it was begun there and perfected in Heaven. *This doth evidently prove, that the* Blood of Chriſt *was* ſhed *for the* Expiation of Sins, *and that as the* High-Prieſt *went into the* Holy of Holies *with* the Blood *of the* Sacrifice *of* Atone-

ment *there to make* Interceſſion; *ſo Chriſt as our* High-Prieſt *with his* Blood *ſhed en-*
Heb. 7.25. *ter'd in Heaven, where* he ever lives to make Interceſſion for us. *But ſay they,* the Sacrifices under the Law did not make any proper Satisfaction for Sin, therefore neither did Chriſt's Sacrifice. *So that at laſt they confeſs that Chriſt's death was no* proper Expiatory Sacrifice; *for whatſoever is ſo, muſt make* Satisfaction *to the Law and Juſtice of God. But ſay they,* the Sacrifices were not offer'd for Payment but for Remiſſion. *I ſay, they were* a Payment *in order to* Remiſſion. *I mean ſuch a* Payment *as the Law appointed and God accepted, and that is true and proper* Satisfaction. *But we muſt diſtinguiſh a* Legal Payment *and Satisfaction, from* Pecuniary Payment *to a Creditor. And all the Confuſion theſe Men have run into, hath been from want of diſtinguiſhing theſe; of which I have treated at large in the following Diſcourſe.*

Thus far it appears that they have by no means allow'd the Death and Sufferings of Chriſt to have been an Expiatory Sacrifice *in the Senſe of the Jews, as it was a* Ranſom or Price of Redemption.

But there is ſomething farther to be conſider'd in an Expiatory Sacrifice, and that

is

is a Subſtitution in place of the Offenders. *For that the* Jews *and others underſtood by a* Sacrifice *of* Expiation; *when the Puniſhment of one was laid upon another in order to his Deliverance. Not that the very ſame was to be undergone, as appears by the Sacrifice of* Atonement *on the Day of* Expiation; *which was not that which the People of* Iſrael *were to have ſuffer'd without it, but it was what God Appointed and Accepted inſtead of their Puniſhment: and therefore the Scape-Goat is ſaid* to bear upon him all the Iniquities of the People, *which was ſuppoſed to be ſo much charged with them, that he that let him go* was to Purify himſelf before he could come into the Camp. *So in the* Sin-offering for the Congregation, the Elders were to lay their hands upon the head of the Bullock before the Lord: *and in other Sacrifices the Rule among the* Jews *was*, that none but the Owner was to lay on his hands; *to ſhew on whoſe Account he was offer'd up as a Sacrifice of Atonement. For here the Right of Dominion was ſufficient for* Subſtitution; *but in a Rational Agent*, Conſent *is neceſſary to make it* Juſt. Levit. 16. 22. 26. 4. 15. 1. 4.

Having thus ſeen, what the true Nature of an Expiatory Sacrifice was, we muſt

now conſider, how far this can agreee with the Suffering of Chriſt for the Sins of Mankind. And we have already found our Saviour *himſelf declaring that* he gave his Life a Ranſom for many. *But that is not all; for, when he inſtituted his laſt Supper for a Commemoration of his Suffering,*

Matt. 26. 28. *he ſaid,* For this is my Blood of the New Teſtament which is ſhed for many for the Remiſſion of Sins. *His Diſciples, to whom he ſpake theſe words, muſt underſtand them as the* Jews *commonly did; when the Blood of a Sacrifice was offer'd for an Atonement in order to the Remiſſion of Sins. And one great end of his Preaching was to declare that he came into the World with that deſign; that it was the Will of*

Heb. 10. 9, 10. *God he ſhould ſuffer, and* that he came to do his Will. *And therefore ſpeaking of*

John 10. 17, 18. *laying down his Life, he ſaith,* No man taketh it away from me but I lay it down of my ſelf. I have power to lay it down and I have power to take it again. This Commandment have I received of my Father. *So that here we have God's Appointment of ſuch a Sacrifice of Atonement for Mankind; Chriſt's free and voluntary Conſent for the undertaking it, and a Tranſlation of the Puniſhment of our Sins upon him;*

him; which St. Paul *calls* God's making him to be ſin for us who knew no Sin; *which ſhews that the Sufferings of Chriſt were on the Account of our Sins, being laid upon him by his own Conſent as our* Sin-offering; *or a* Sacrifice of Expiation for our Sins. *And in another place ſaith, that* he hath redeemed us from the Curſe of the Law, being made a Curſe for us. *How could he be made* a Curſe for us *in order to the* Redeeming us from the Curſe of the Law; *if his Sufferings were only a meer voluntary Condition in order to his Exaltation, without bearing the Burden of our Sins? But St.* Paul *adds, that* we have Redemption through his Blood, the Forgiveneſs of Sins. *That,* God hath ſet him forth as a Propitiation through Faith in his blood, to declare his righteouſneſs for the Remiſſion of Sins. *That,* when we were enemies, we were reconciled to God by the Death of his Son. *That* he hath given himſelf for us, an Offering and Sacrifice to God. *That,* he appeared to put away Sin by the Sacrifice of himſelf; and that he was once offer'd to bear the Sins of many. *That,* he gave himſelf a Ranſom for all.

2 Cor. 5. 21. Gal. 3. 13. Eph. 1. 7. Coloſſ. 1. 14. Rom. 3. 25. 5. 10. Eph. 5. 2. Heb. 9. 26, 28. 1 Tim. 2. 6.

Neither was it St. Paul *only who ſpeaks after this manner; but St.* Peter *ſaith,* that

1 Pet. 2. 24. 3. 18. his own ſelf bare our Sins in his own body on the Tree. *That* Chriſt alſo hath once ſuffered for Sins, the Juſt for the Unjuſt. *And St.* John, that the Blood of Jeſus Chriſt his Son cleanſeth us from all ſin, and that God ſent his Son to be the Propitiation for our Sins. *So that Chriſt and his Apoſtles agree in the ſame manner of expreſſion; and great weight is laid upon Chriſt's being a* Propitiation *for us, and our Hopes of Remiſſion of Sins and the Favour of God depend upon it. What now is to be ſaid to all theſe places of Scripture? Were they deſigned only to humor and impoſe upon the Credulity of Mankind by telling them of ſuch an Expiatory Sacrifice in the Death of Chriſt, which never was, nor could be, being Repugnant to the Juſtice of God? For Chriſt, ſay they,* being Innocent could not ſuffer the Puniſhment of our Sins, and God being Juſt could not accept of it, although he freely offer'd himſelf as a Sacrifice for our Sins. *Doth this agree with the Force and Deſign of all theſe Expreſſions? Had not Chriſt the Power and Will to offer up himſelf as a Sacrifice of Propitiation to God? And where lies the* Injuſtice *of accepting ſuch a Sacrifice which he freely offer'd?* But it could not be, *ſay they,* by way of Puniſhment for

1 John 1. 7. 2. 2. 4. 10.

for our Sins. *What then is the meaning of all thoſe places, wherein he is ſaid to* bear our Sins *and to ſuffer in our ſtead,* the juſt for the unjuſt? *What is this but to contradict the Tenour and Scope of the* New Teſtament *with reſpect to the Death of Chriſt; and to turn their Senſe quite another way from what they were thought to ſignifie at that time? which is no reaſonable way of interpreting Scripture.*

Do they deny that Chriſt ſuffered, what we ſay he did? No; that they dare not do. But they ſay, What he underwent was only Labour and Suffering; but not the Puniſhment of our Iniquities. *Then, I ſay, it could be no* Expiatory Sacrifice, *which implies* a Subſtitution, *and the contrary appears by the many places of Scripture already mentioned, wherein our Sins and the Sufferings of Chriſt are joined together.*

Thus we ſee the true Riſe *of this Controverſie was from the many places of Scripture, which ſeem very plain and clear in this matter; and therefore I ſhall now give an account of the* Progreſs *of it.*

F. Socinus *ſeeing the bent of the Scripture ſo much againſt him, ſets himſelf to the finding out ways to avoid the force of them.*

1. *To*

1. *To thoſe which ſpeak of Chriſt's being* a Ranſom *or* Price of Redemption for us, *he anſwers*, That theſe Expreſſions are to be underſtood only Metaphorically, and Chriſt's Death being an Intervening Condition in order to our Deliverance, it is therefore called, a Price of Redemption. *And to the ſame purpoſe, the Correct* Racovian Catechiſm; *only there it is added*, That God did accept of the Death of Chriſt as a moſt Acceptable Sacrifice. But not by way of Satisfaction or Payment of our Debts, becauſe he as a Sacrifice was given by God himſelf; but that he might give us the greater Aſſurance of Pardon and Eternal Life.

Socin. de Serv. l. 2. c. 1. in fin.

So that here we have the true ſtate of this matter before us; viz. *Whether the Death of Chriſt, when it is ſaid to be a Ranſom or Price of Redemption for us, is only to be looked on as a hard Condition on his ſide Intervening, or as a proper Sacrifice of Atonement, which God had appointed, for the Expiation of Sins? The Queſtion is not, Whether God appointed or accepted him, for that we have allowed in all Sacrifices of Atonement by the Law of* Moſes; *but whether his Sufferings were not required in order to the Satisfaction of*

Divine

Divine Juſtice for the Sins of Mankind; not by way of ſtrict Payment, *as in caſe of* Debts; *but by a* Legal Satisfaction *to the* Juſtice of God *as it is concerned in the Honour of his Laws.*

Our Unitarians *grant*, That Chriſt was a Ranſom and Price of Redemption for us; *but they deny*, That he was an Adequate Price, or a Sacrifice to the Juſtice of God. *But ſtill they run upon the Notion of* Debts *and* Payments, *as though there were no other Notion of* Juſtice *and* Satisfaction *but between* Creditors *and* Debtors; *or as if their Notions of theſe things were rather taken from the* Shops *than the* Schools. *And the* monſtrous Contradiction *they conclude the charge of our Doctrine with, is*, That God freely Pardons the whole Debt of Sin, and yet hath been infinitely over-paid for both in the Death and other Sufferings of the Lord Chriſt. Anſw. to Milb p. 58.

But in the following Diſcourſe, I have endeavoured to lay open this Miſtake, by ſhewing, That Debts *and* Puniſhments *are of a different Nature; and therefore the* Satisfaction *in one Caſe is not to be meaſured by the other. But I ſhall not here anticipate the Reader, as to what follows; but I ſhall take notice of what they* Ch. I.

ſay,

ſay, which ſeems to relate to this matter.

Almighty God, *ſay they*, as King and Proprietor of all Perſons and things, can forgive any Offence or all Offences even without Repentance or Amendment, nor is it contrary to his Juſtice ſo to do.

This is a very ſtrange Aſſertion. For then there is no Obligation on God's part in point of Juſtice to puniſh the moſt Impenitent and Incorrigible Offenders. But there is a great deal of difference, between making the Exerciſe of Punitive *or* Vindictive Juſtice *neceſſary upon every Offence, and ſaying that the Juſtice of God doth not require that any Offences ſhould be puniſhed.*

The former makes Juſtice in God to proceed by a natural Neceſſity, which would leave no place for Mercy, nor any Satisfaction by a Mediator, for that muſt ſuppoſe Liberty and Relaxation, as to the Executive Part of Juſtice. And if God muſt puniſh Sinners as they deſerve, there can be no ſtop to the Execution of Juſtice ſhort of Annihilation; for our very Beings are the Gift of God which we have deſerved to be deprived of. But on the other ſide, to ſay, that the Juſtice of God *doth not require the Puniſhment of any Offences* without

without Repentance or Amendement, *is to overthrow any ſuch thing as* Punitive Juſtice *in God; by which I do not mean, the actual execution of it, and the due meaſures which belong to it, but the Will to puniſh Obſtinate and Impenitent Sinners. And that reſults from his Hatred and Abhorrency of Evil, and his juſt Government of the World. For how can any Men, who believe that God is really diſpleaſed with the Wickedneſs of Men, and that he is a Juſt and Righteous Governour, ever think that it is not Repugnant to his Juſtice to forgive all Offences without Repentance or Amendment? How can his Hatred of Sin and the Juſtice of his Government be reconciled with the Impunity of the moſt Obſtinate Offenders? Is there no ſuch thing as Juſtice to himſelf and to his Laws; which lies in a juſt Vindication of his Honour and of his Laws from Contempt? And who can be guilty of greater Contempt of him, than thoſe who perſiſt in their Wickedneſs* without Repentance or Amendment? *And after all,* Is it not contrary to his Juſtice to forgive ſuch as theſe, becauſe he is abſolute Lord and Proprietor of all Perſons and Things? *This might ſignifie ſomething, if we could imagine God to be nothing but* Almighty Power *without* Juſtice:

ſtice: *but if his* Juſtice *be as Eſſential an Attribute as his Omnipotency, we muſt not ſo much as ſuppoſe the Exerciſe of one without the other.*

Anſw. to Milb. p. 53. *But they do not deny*, That it is inconſiſtent with the Wiſdom and Holineſs of God to let the Incorrigible and Impenitent eſcape unpuniſhed, or to forgive Sin without Repentance or Amendment. *But if the* Wiſdom *and* Holineſs *of God will not permit the Impunity of Impenitent Sinners, is it not* juſt in God *to* puniſh *them? Not barely as to the* Degree *and* Deſert *of* Puniſhment; *but as to* the Will of Puniſhing *them according to their merits? Whence doth their Puniſhment come? Is it not from the Will of God? Is that Will juſt or not? If the Will to puniſh be juſt? whence comes it to be ſo? From the* Wiſdom *and* Holineſs *of God? Then* Punitive Juſtice, *when it is agreeable to God's* Wiſdom *and* Holineſs, *is a proper Divine Attribute as well as they. And they muſt have ſtrange Notions of* Punitive Juſtice, *who would ſeparate it from them.*

But Juſtice, *they ſay*, hath no other ſhare or intereſt in Puniſhment, but only to ſee that Puniſhment be not miſplac'd, and that it do not exceed the Offence. *We*

are

are far from denying theſe things to belong to the Meaſures in the Exerciſe of Punitive Juſtice: *But whence comes* Punitive Juſtice *to belong to God? Is it not becauſe it is juſt in him to puniſh Offenders according to thoſe meaſures? And whence comes this, but from that* Univerſal Juſtice in God, *which is always joyned with his* Wiſdom *and* Holineſs: *and implies an* Univerſal Rectitude *in all he doth? And from thence it comes that all the Meaſures of Juſtice are obſerved by him in the Puniſhment of the greateſt Offenders.*

Now this Univerſal Juſtice *in God is that, whereby he not only puniſhes Obſtinate and Impenitent Sinners, but he takes care of preſerving the Honour of his Laws. And therefore, although Almighty God out of his great Mercy were willing that Penitent Sinners ſhould be forgiven; yet it was moſt agreeable thereto, that it ſhould be done in ſuch a manner as to diſcourage Mankind from the practice of Sin, by the ſame way by which he offers Forgiveneſs; and for this end, it pleaſed God in his Infinite Wiſdom and Goodneſs to ſend his Son to become a Sacrifice of Propitiation for the Sins of Mankind; which being freely undertaken by him, there was no breach in the Meaſures of* Punitive Juſtice *with reſpect*

ſpect to him; and ſo by his Death he offered up himſelf as a full, perfect and ſufficient Sacrifice, Oblation and Satisfaction for the Sins of Mankind. *And this is that Doctrine of the* Satisfaction of Chriſt *which we own and defend.*

But theſe bold Aſſertions, That God as abſolute Lord may forgive all Offences without Repentance, *and* it is not contrary to his Juſtice ſo to do; that, it is not the Juſtice of God which prompts him to puniſh Sinners, *ariſe from too mean and narrow a Conception of* Divine Juſtice; *as though it lay only in the manner of the Execution of it. But that there is an Eſſential Attribute of* Juſtice *belonging to the Divine Nature, appears from hence, that there are ſome things which are ſo diſagreeable to the Divine Nature that he cannot do them; he cannot break his Promiſes, nor deceive Mankind to their Deſtruction;* he cannot deny himſelf, *nor pervert that Order, or due Reſpects of things to each other, which he hath eſtabliſhed in the World. He cannot make it the Duty of Mankind to diſhonour their Maker, or to violate the Rules of Good and Evil, ſo as to make Evil Good and Good Evil; he cannot make Murder and Adultery to be Virtues, nor Impiety*

piety and Wickedneſs not to deſerve Puniſhment. But whence comes all this? Is it that God wants Almighty Power *to do what he pleaſes? No doubt, he is ſupreme Lord over all, and hath all things under his Will. But there is an Eſſential Juſtice in God, which is a ſupreme Rule of Righteouſneſs, according to which he doth always exerciſe his Power and Will. And ſo* Moſes *ſaith of him,* All his ways are perfect, a God of Truth, and without Iniquity, juſt and right *is he; and the* Pſalmiſt, The Lord is righteous in all his ways and holy in all his works. *He not only is ſo, but he can be no otherwiſe, for this Univerſal Righteouſneſs is as great a Perfection and Attribute of God, as his Wiſdom, or Power. It is not one Name which ſtands for all; but it is a real and diſtinct Attribute of it ſelf: It is as a Rule and Meaſure to the Exerciſe of the reſt. And he particularly ſhews it in all the Acts of Punitive Juſtice: So* Nehemiah; Howbeit thou art juſt in all that is brought upon us, for thou haſt done right, but we have done wickedly. *And* Daniel; Righteouſneſs belongeth unto thee, but unto us confuſion of Face: For the Lord our God is righte-

Deut. 32. 4.

Pſal. 145. 17.

Neh. 9. 33.

Dan. 9. 7, 14.

ous in all his Works which he doth, for we obey'd not his Voice. *And* Zepha-
Zeph. 3. 5. niah; The juſt Lord is in the midſt thereof, he will not do Iniquity. *From whence it appears that the Exerciſe of Punitive Juſtice is according to the Eſſential Juſtice or Righteouſneſs of the Divine Nature. And ſo* Abraham *pleaded*
Gen. 18. 25. *with God*, Shall not the Judge of all the Earth do right? *i. e. Will he not puniſh according to the Righteouſneſs of his Nature? And ſo* Abimelech *argues from the natural Notion he had of God's righteous Nature*, Lord, wilt thou ſlay alſo a
20. 4. righteous Nation?

But here the main Difficulty which deſerves to be cleared is this, How far Punitive Juſtice *is founded on that* Univerſal Juſtice *which is an Eſſential Attribute of God. For the want of underſtanding this, hath been the great occaſion of ſo much Confuſion in the Diſcourſes about this matter. And for the clearing of it, theſe things muſt be conſidered;*

1. *That there is a difference between that Juſtice in God, whereby he hates Sin, and that whereby he puniſhes the Sinner. The hatred of Sin doth neceſſarily follow the Perfection of his Nature. Therefore God*

God is ſaid, To hate the Wicked; and Evil to be an Abomination to him; to love Righteouſneſs and to hate Wickedneſs. *But if the Puniſhment of the Offender were as neceſſarily conſequent as his Hatred of Sin, all Mankind muſt ſuffer as they offend, and there would be no place for Mercy in God, nor for Repentance in Men. But Sin in it ſelf is perfectly hatefull to God, there being nothing like God in it; but Man was God's Creature and made after* his Image and Likeneſs; *and however God be diſpleaſed with Mankind on the account of Sin, yet the Workmanſhip of God ſtill remains; and we continually ſee that God doth not exerciſe his Punitive Juſtice according to the Meaſures of their Iniquities. And they who plead moſt for the neceſſity of Punitive Juſtice, are themſelves a Demonſtration to the contrary; for they cannot deny, that they are not puniſhed as their Iniquities have deſerved. And if Punitive Juſtice be neceſſary in it ſelf it muſt reach the Perſons that have deſerved to be puniſhed, if there be no Relaxation of the Severity of it.*

Pſal. 11. 5. Prov. 6. 16. Pſal. 45. 7. Zech. 8. 17.

2. *That it is very agreeable to the* Divine Juſtice, *to exerciſe the Severity of Punitive Juſtice on obſtinate and incorri-*

gible Offenders. And this is that whereon the Juſtice of the Puniſhments of Sinners in another World is founded; becauſe God hath been ſo mercifull to them here, and uſed ſo many ways to reclaim them, and it is the Not exerciſing his Punitive Juſtice upon them in this World, which makes it ſo much more reaſonable in another. For thereby they have ſhewed their Contempt of God and his Laws, of his offers of Mercy and their wilfull obſtinacy in offending him. And the reaſonableneſs of the Puniſhment of ſuch Offenders is not denyed by any of our more Learned Adverſaries, as I have ſhewed in the following

Ch. I. p. 20. *Diſcourſe from* Socinus *and* Crellius, *and might do from ſeveral others. But I need not mention any more, ſince in the late*

Catech. Racov. p. 179. *Correct Edition of the* Racovian Catechiſm *there is this Note*, That they have always aſſerted, that the Wicked ſhall be raiſed up at the great Day to undergo the Puniſhment of their Sins, and to be caſt into the Fire prepared for the Devil and his Angels. *And for this, beſides their Publick Confeſſions, they quote* Crellius, Schlictingius, Volkelius, Wolzogenius, *&c. And* Schlictingius *ſaith*, The Doctrine of future Puniſhments was neceſſary to be preached, as being part of

Schlictin. in Joh 5. 29.

the

the Chriſtian Faith; and that God's Veracity is concerned in the Execution of his Threatnings. *Which is a part of Natural Juſtice. And thoſe Learned Men, who have been thought moſt favourable to the* Socinian *Opinions have declared themſelves very frankly as to the* Juſtice *of the Puniſhment of Impenitent Sinners.*

Curcellæus, *whom they often mention with reſpect, ſaith,* The Juſtice of God requires, that he ſhould inflict the Puniſhments he hath threatned on Contumacious Sinners. *And* Limborch (*whom they ſometimes appeal to*) *ſaith,* That the Juſtice of God doth not permit the Impunity of Refractory and Impenitent Contemners of his Grace. *Becauſe, ſaith he,* God by his declared Will hath tied himſelf up from the Exerciſe of his Abſolute Power; and his Laws would be trampled upon, and his Majeſty ſlighted; nor would God's hatred of Sin ever be fully diſcovered. *And therefore* the Day of Wrath *is called by St.* Paul, The Revelation of the Righteous Judgment of God. Epiſcopius *ſaith, That although in ſuch Puniſhments, which depend only on the Will of the Law-maker, he doth not think,* that God in Juſtice is obliged to make good his Threatnings, as he is to perform

Curcel. Inſtit. l. 2. c. 13. §. 5.

Limborch. Theol. Chriſt. l. 2. c. 12. §. 35.

Rom. 2. 5.

Epiſcop. Inſt. Theol. l. 4. c. 29.

form his Promiſes; (but that in ſuch Caſes God is not bound in Juſtice to execute all that the Law threatens; but when he thinks fit to puniſh, then his Juſtice requires him not to puniſh beyond the Commination) yet in the Caſe of obſtinate and incurable Offenders, *he doth not deny*, that the Juſtice of God requires the Rigour of the Law to be executed upon them. *And he adds*, That the Day of Judgment will fully manifeſt the Juſtice of God in the Threatnings he hath made to Impenitent Sinners. *Even* Vorſtius, *who was ſuppoſed to be too much inclined to the* Socinian *Doctrine*, *owns it to be* a part of God's Juſtice to puniſh wicked and impenitent Perſons; that his Patience and Goodneſs may not be always contemned with Impunity. *And afterwards*, *That* although God doth no Injury to the Offender, if he doth not execute his Threatnings; yet out of regard to the Juſtice of his Word, he doth not recede from what he hath declared: But all Threatnings under the Goſpel are Conditional; and none are damned by it, but ſuch as continue in Impenitency and Unbelief. *And in his Explication he ſaith*, That where God hath abſolutely declared his Will to puniſh

Vorſt. de Attrib. Diſp. 9. §. 38.

§. 47.

§. 50. Not. ad §. 46.

puniſh in ſuch a manner, he cannot forgive without Injuſtice.

But our Unitarians *ſpeak without any Reſerve*, That it is not the Juſtice of God, which prompts him to puniſh Sinners, and ſo it is not contrary to his Juſtice to forgive all Offences without Repentance or Amendment. *And thus the* Juſtice of God *is not concerned in the Puniſhments of the* great Day, *although the Apoſtle calls it*, The Revelation of the Righteous Judgment of God.

And by this the World may ſee how very far our Modern Unitarians are from handling this Subject more Carefully, Judiciouſly and Exactly than others; *However one of their own Party hath lately affirmed it; with as much Confidence and as little Ground as they have done other things.* Vindic. of S. R. H. p. 128.

3. *That it is very agreeable to* Divine Juſtice *to accept of a* Satisfaction *on behalf of the Sins of Mankind, who do not perſiſt in their evil ways, ſo that their Sins ſhall be forgiven upon their Repentance and Amendment. For ſince the Exerciſe of Punitive Juſtice is not neceſſary on the Perſons of the Offenders, and ſince God in this Life abates ſo much of his juſt*

Severity againſt them; he thereby ſhews, that he doth not proceed with Mankind here according to the Rigor of his Juſtice; but yet, ſince God hath given to them very juſt and righteous Laws, ſince thoſe Laws have been broken and his Authority contemned, it is very juſt for God to require a Sacrifice of Atonement for the Sins of the World, that Mankind may ſee that God was juſtly diſpleaſed at them, and that none take Incouragement to go on to commit them; but yet, that upon their hearty Repentance and ſincere Obedience, they may be aſſured of the Remiſſion of Sins and the Promiſe of Eternal Life. All the Difficulty now remaining is about Chriſt's Suffering in our ſtead, *of which the Scripture ſpeaks ſo fully in the places already mention'd. But we muſt conſider what is Anſwered to them.*

II. *To thoſe places of Scripture which ſpeak of* Chriſt's Suffering the Puniſhment of our Sins; *all that* Socinus *ſaith, comes to theſe two things.*

Socin de Servat. Part. 2. c. 4. &c.

1. That Chriſt ſuffer'd on the occaſion of our Sins, and with a Deſign to take away our Sins.

2. That by his Sufferings he came to have a Power to Forgive Sins; and that this is the proper Expiation of Sin. But by

by no means that he ſuffer'd in our ſtead; *for he hath theſe Words*; Ut nihil aliud ſit Chriſtum pro nobis mortuum eſſe, quam vice ſeu loco noſtro mortem ſubiiſſe, id adeo à veritate abhorret ut nihil magis. *Which in plain Engliſh is*, that nothing is more falſe than that Chriſt ſuffer'd in our ſtead. C. 7.

The old Editions of the Racovian Catechiſm *follow* Socinus, *and there the Anſwer to the Places which ſpeak of* Chriſt's Dying for us, *is*, that they do not ſignify in our ſtead; but for our good. *Which they are very careful to diſtinguiſh, becauſe they think that the latter implies no more than a Condition in order to the Expiation in Heaven; but the other makes him a true Propitiatory Sacrifice for our Sins. But if Chriſt did not* ſuffer in our ſtead; *how can they poſſibly Reconcile his undergoing this Condition with their own Meaſures of Divine Juſtice? All they pretend to ſay, is*, that it was Labour and Suffering but not Puniſhment. *Which is to ſpeak againſt the Common Senſe of Mankind; and is a ridiculous piece of* Stoiciſm. *They ſay*, it was a meer Act of Dominion as to Chriſt and not of Juſtice. *But if there be ſuch an Eſſential Attribute as Juſtice in God, then the Exerciſe of Dominion muſt be*

be regulated by it; eſpecially where there was nothing but perfect Innocency. The Caſe is very different as to the ſinful Race of Mankind, who having the Guilt of Sin upon them, God may juſtly exerciſe his Dominion over them as he ſees cauſe; but he always doth it juſtly, although the particular Reaſons may not be within our reach. But here is no Guilt of Sin conſider'd, either of his own, or others; according to their Principles; and yet they make him to undergo as great Sufferings, as we do, who aſſert that he ſuffer'd for our ſakes in our ſtead; *which alone gives a Reaſonable Account of it.*

But in the late correct Edition of the Racovian Catechiſm *they ſay,* the Senſe of Chriſt's Suffering for our Sins is twofold, but both come to one at laſt, 1. That Chriſt ſuffered as a Sacrifice in our ſtead; tanquam victima pro nobis Succedanea. *How can* Socinus *and the* Racovian Catechiſm *agree?* 2. That he ſuffer'd for our good. *But they deny any* Commutation *which they ſay,* was not in the Expiatory Sacrifice among the Jews. *What doth a* Subſtitution *differ from a* Commutation *in this Caſe?*

But how do ſuffering in our ſtead and for our good come all to one at laſt? *Either*

Either it muſt be, that Chriſt did truly ſuffer in our ſtead, *when he underwent the Puniſhment of our Sins in order to our Redemption and Expiation; and that is a very good and true Senſe; which we readily embrace, and are very well content that they ſhould* come all to one: *Or if the meaning be only, that Chriſt may be ſaid* to ſuffer in our ſtead, *becauſe we have* Benefit *by the* Conſequences of his Death; *then his dying is only conſider'd as a bare* Condition *and not as a* Sacrifice in our ſtead. *As to make it plain by an Inſtance; we all agree that* Joſeph's Suffering *in* Egypt *was deſigned by the Wiſe Providence of God for the good of his Brethren, which they received after his Advancement, to which his Suffering was an Antecedent Condition. But can any Man ſay, that he ſuffer'd in ſtead of his Brethren? But now if* Joſeph's *Brethren had been ſold for Slaves in* Egypt, *and* Joſeph *had gone down thither and offer'd himſelf a Priſoner for their Deliverance; this had been truly Suffering* in their ſtead, *as well as* for their Advantage. *And ſuppoſe the King of* Egypt *had agreed with* Joſeph, *that if he would become Priſoner for his Brethren, he would advance him, and he ſhould himſelf deliver them by his own Power; this doth not*

not at all hinder his Suffering in their ſtead. *But if it had no Relation to their Deliverance by his being made Captive himſelf; but was only a ſtep to his Advancement; then it cannot be ſaid to be* in their ſtead, *although it might turn to their Advantage. And ſo much for the Senſe of the* Racovian Catechiſm.

But our Unitarians *fly higher, for they ſay,*

1. That God could not juſtly or wiſely ſubſtitute an Innocent Perſon to undergo Puniſhment in place of the Guilty.

2. That Chriſt could not freely offer himſelf as a Sacrifice in our ſtead, nor could God accept of it, or allow it.

So that here we have the true State *of this Controverſie between us*, viz. whether Chriſt were a Real Expiatory Sacrifice for the Sins of Mankind. *For, if he could not be* Subſtituted in our ſtead, nor God accept of his offering up himſelf for us; *all the other Expreſſions are meer Words given out on purpoſe to Amuſe and Deceive us.*

And this is that which I have undertaken to make out in the following Diſcourſe, viz.

1. *That*

1. *That the Scripture doth as plainly* Chap. II.
ſet forth that Chriſt ſuffer'd the Puniſh-
ment of our Sins and in our ſtead, *as it could do; and that no Expreſſions could be thought of to that purpoſe, but might be anſwered in the ſame way that they do theſe. And therefore it is in vain to contend with ſuch Men, who are reſolved that Words and Phraſes ſhall ſignify no otherwiſe, than they would have them. And yet at laſt they cannot deny but a kind of* Subſtitution *is implied as a* Victima Succedanea; *but how? That he ſuffer'd* for our good and by the occaſion of our Sins, *but not the* Puniſhment *of them. Thus far then we have gained, that the Words of Scripture are for us; but ſay they,* what ever the Words are, they cannot mean any real Puniſhment, becauſe he was an Innocent Perſon. *Therefore I have ſhewed;*

2. *That there is no Repugnancy in Rea-* Chap. III.
ſon, nor to the Juſtice of God for an Innocent Perſon to ſuffer by his own Conſent and for ſo great an End, what the Scripture attributes to our Saviour. And I have fully anſwered the Arguments brought by our Adverſaries to prove that God could not juſtly or wiſely ſubſtitute an Innocent Perſon to ſuffer for the Guilty.

3. *That*

Ch. IV. v. 4. 3. *That* Chriſt did offer up himſelf, as an Expiatory Sacrifice to God in our ſtead; and that God did accept and allow of it. *Which is the Deſign of the three laſt Chapters. And till an Anſwer be given to what I have there diſcourſed at large, I ſhall refer the Reader to what is already ſaid; and ſhall ſuppoſe thoſe* Anſwers *to be ſufficient, till I ſee ſome better Reaſons for their Opinion in this matter, than I have yet met with, although I have been no ſtranger to their late Writings, as, God willing, they may ſee on another Occaſion.*

E. W.

April 24. 1696.

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A

DISCOURSE

Concerning the

Sufferings of Chriſt.

CHAP. I.

I. *Of the* Socinian *way of interpreting Scripture; and of the uncertainty it leaves us in as to the main Articles of Faith, manifeſted by an Expoſition of* Gen. 1. *ſuitable to that way.* II. *The ſtate of the Controverſie in general concerning the Sufferings of Chriſt for us. He did not ſuffer the ſame we ſhould have done.* III. *The grand miſtake in making puniſhments of the nature of Debts.* IV. *The difference between*

them at large diſcovered, from the different reaſon and ends of them. V. *The right of puniſhment in God, proved againſt* Crellius, *not to ariſe from mere dominion.* VI. *The end of puniſhment not bare Compenſation, as it is in Debts; what puniſhment due to an injured perſon by the right of Nature; proper puniſhment a reſult of Laws.* VII. Crellius *his great miſtake about the end of puniſhments.* VIII. *Not deſigned for ſatisfaction of Anger as it is a deſire of Revenge.* Seneca *and* Lactantius *vindicated againſt* Crellius. IX. *The Magiſtrates intereſt in puniſhment diſtinct from that of private perſons.* X. *Of the nature of Anger in God, and the ſatisfaction to be made to it.* Crellius *his great arguments againſt ſatisfaction depend on a falſe Notion of God's anger.* XI. *Of the ends of divine puniſhments.* XII. *The different nature of them in this and the future ſtate.*

SIR,

SIR,

ALthough the Letter I received from your hands contained in it ſo many miſtakes of my meaning and deſign, that it ſeemed to be the greateſt civility to the Writer of it, to give no anſwer at all to it; becauſe that could not be done, without the diſcovery of far more weakneſſes in him, than he pretends to find in my diſcourſe: Yet the weight and importance of the matter may require a farther account from me, concerning *the true reaſon of the Sufferings of Chriſt*. Wherein my deſign was ſo far *from repreſenting old Errors to the beſt advantage*, or *to rack my wits to defend them*, as that perſon ſeems to ſuggeſt; that I aimed at nothing more than to give a true account of what upon a ſerious enquiry, I judged to be the moſt natural and genuine meaning of the Chriſtian Doctrine contained in the Writings of the New Teſtament.

I. For finding therein ſuch multitudes of expreſſions, which to an unprejudiced mind attribute all the mighty effects of the Love of God to us, to the obedience and ſufferings of Chriſt, I be- *of the* Socinian *way of interpreting Scripture.*

gan to conſider what reaſon there was why the plain and eaſie ſenſe of thoſe places muſt be forſaken. and a remote and Metaphorical meaning put upon them. Which I thought my ſelf the more obliged to do, becauſe I could not conceive if it had been the deſign of the Scripture, to have delivered the received Doctrine of the Chriſtian Church, concerning the reaſon of the ſufferings of Chriſt, that it could have been more clearly and fully expreſſed than it is already. So that ſuppoſing that to have been the true meaning of the ſeveral places of Scripture which we contend for; yet the ſame arts and ſubtilties might have been uſed to pervert it, which are imployed to perſwade men that is not the true meaning of them. And what is equally ſerviceable to truth and falſhood, can of it ſelf, have no power on the minds of men to convince them it muſt be one, and not the other. Nay, if every unuſual and improper acception of words in the Scripture, ſhall be thought ſufficient to take away the natural and genuine ſenſe, where the matter is capable of it, I know ſcarce any article of Faith can be long ſecure; and by theſe arts men may declare that they believe the

the Scriptures, and yet believe nothing of the Chriſtian Faith. For if the improper, though unuſual acception of thoſe expreſſions *of Chriſt's dying for us*, of *redemption*, *propitiation*, *reconciliation by his blood*, *of his bearing our iniquities*, and *being made ſin and a curſe for us*, ſhall be enough to invalidate all the arguments taken from them to prove that which the proper ſenſe of them doth imply, why may not the improper uſe of the terms of Creation and Reſurrection, as well take away the natural ſenſe of them in the great Articles of the Creation of the world, and Reſurection after death? For if it be enough to prove that *Chriſt's dying for us*, doth not imply *dying in our ſtead*; becauſe ſometimes *dying for others* imports no more than dying for ſome advantage to come to them; if *redemption* being ſometimes uſed for *mere deliverance*, ſhall make our *redemption* by Chriſt, wholly *Metaphorical*; if the terms of *propitiation*, *reconciliation*, &c. ſhall loſe their force, becauſe they are ſometimes uſed where all things cannot be ſuppoſed parallel with the ſenſe we contend for: why ſhall I be bound to believe that the World was ever created in a proper ſenſe, ſince thoſe

perſons againſt whom I argue, ſo earneſtly contend that in thoſe places in which it ſeems as proper as any, it is to be underſtood only in a metaphorical? If when *the world and all things are ſaid to be made by Chriſt*, we are not to underſtand the production but the reformation of the World and all things in it, although the natural ſenſe of the Words be quite otherwiſe; what argument can make it neceſſary for me not to underſtand the Creation of the World in a metaphorical ſenſe, when *Moſes* delivers to us the hiſtory of it? Why may not I underſtand *in the beginning*, Gen. 1. for the beginning of the *Moſaical* Diſpenſation, as well as *Socinus* doth *in the beginning*, John 1. for the beginning of the Evangelical? and that from the very ſame argument uſed by him, *viz.* that *in the beginning* is to be underſtood of the main ſubject concerning which the author intends to write, and that I am as ſure it was in *Moſes* concerning the *Law* given by him, as it was in St. *John* concerning the *Goſpel* delivered by *Chriſt*. Why may not *the Creation of the Heavens and the Earth*, be no more than the erection of the Jewiſh Polity? ſince it is acknowledged, that by *New Heavens and New Earth*

John 1. 3, 10.

wherein

wherein dwelleth righteouſneſs, no more is underſtood than a new ſtate of things under the Goſpel? Why may not the *confuſed Chaos* import no more than the ſtate of Ignorance and Darkneſs under which the World was before the Law of *Moſes*? ſince it is confeſſed that it ſignifies in the New Teſtament ſuch a ſtate of the World before the Goſpel appeared? and conſequently, why may not *the light which made the firſt day* be the firſt tendencies to the Doctrine of *Moſes*, which being at firſt divided and ſcattered, was united afterwards in one great Body of Laws, which was called the *Sun*, becauſe it was the great Director of the *Jewiſh* Nation, and therefore ſaid *to rule the day*; as the leſs conſiderable Laws of other Nations are called the *Moon*, becauſe they were to govern thoſe who were yet under the *night* of Ignorance? Why may not the *Firmament being in the midſt of the Waters*, imply the erection of the Jewiſh State in the midſt of a great deal of trouble, ſince it is confeſſed, that *Waters* are often taken in Scripture in a Metaphorical ſenſe for troubles and afflictions? and *the Earth appearing out of the Waters*, be no more but the ſettlement of that State after its

troubles; and particularly with great elegancy after their paſſage through the Red Sea? And *the Production of Herbs and living Creatures*, be the great encreaſe of the People of all ſorts, as well thoſe of a meaner rank (and therefore called herbs) as thoſe of a higher, that were to live upon the other, and ſometimes trample upon them, and therefore by way of excellency called *the Living Creatures*? And when theſe were multiplied and brought into order, (which being done by ſteps and degrees, is ſaid to be finiſhed in ſeveral days) then the State and the Church flouriſhed and enjoyed a great deal of pleaſure, which was the production of Man and Woman, and their being placed in Paradiſe: (for *a perfect Man*, notes a high degree of perfection, and *a Woman* is taken for the *Church* in the *Revelations*) but when they followed the Cuſtoms of other Nations which were *as a forbidden tree* to them, then they loſt all their happineſs and pleaſure, and were expell'd out of their own Country, and lived in great ſlavery and miſery, which was the Curſe pronounced againſt them, for violating the rules of Policy eſtabliſhed among them. Thus you ſee how ſmall a meaſure of wit, by the

the advantage of thoſe ways of interpreting Scripture, which the ſubtileſt of our adverſaries make uſe of, will ſerve to pervert the cleareſt expreſſions of Scripture to quite another ſenſe than was ever intended by the Writer of them. And I aſſure you, if that rule of interpreting Scripture be once allowed; that if words are ever uſed in a Metaphorical ſenſe, there can be no neceſſity of underſtanding them any where in a proper; there is ſcarce any thing which you look on as the moſt neceſſary to be believed in Scripture, but it may be made appear not to be ſo upon thoſe terms. For by reaſon of the paucity, and therefore the ambiguity of the Original words of the Hebrew language, the ſtrange Idioms of it, the different ſenſes of the ſame word in ſeveral Conjugations, the want of ſeveral modes of expreſſion which are uſed in other Languages, and above all the lofty and Metaphorical way of ſpeaking uſed in all Eaſtern Countries, and the imitation of the Hebrew Idioms in the Greek Tranſlation of the Old Teſtament, and Original of the New, you can hardly affix a ſenſe upon any words uſed therein, but a man who will be at the pains to ſearch all poſſible ſignifications

and

and uſes of thoſe words, will put you hard to it, to make good that which you took to be the proper meaning of them. Wherefore although I will not deny to our adverſaries the praiſe of ſubtilty and diligence; I cannot give them that (which is much more praiſe-worthy) of diſcretion and ſound judgment. For while they uſe their utmoſt induſtry to ſearch all the moſt remote and Metaphorical ſenſes of words, with a deſign to take off the genuine and proper meaning of them, they do not attend to the ill conſequence that may be made of this to the overthrowing thoſe things, the belief of which themſelves make neceſſary to ſalvation. For by this way the whole Goſpel may be made an Allegory, and the Reſurrection of Chriſt be thought as metaphorical as the Redemption by his Death, and the force of all the Precepts of the Goſpel avoided by ſome unuſual ſignification of the words wherein they are delivered. So that nothing can be more unreaſonable than ſuch a method of proceeding, unleſs it be firſt ſufficiently proved that the matter is not capable of the proper ſenſe, and therefore of neceſſity the improper only is to be allowed. And this is that which *Socinus* ſeems after all his

his pains to pervert the meaning of the places in controverſie, to rely on moſt; viz. *That the Doctrine of ſatisfaction doth imply an impoſſibility in the thing it ſelf, and therefore muſt needs be falſe*; *nay*, he ſaith, *the infallibility of the Revealer had not been enough in this Caſe, ſuppoſing that Chriſt had ſaid it, and riſen from the dead, to declare his own Veracity; unleſs he had delivered it by its proper cauſes and effects, and ſo ſhewed the poſſibility of the thing it ſelf. And the reaſon*, he ſaith, *why they believe their Doctrine true, is not barely becauſe God hath ſaid it, but they believe certainly that God hath ſaid it, becauſe they know it to be true*; by knowing the contrary Doctrine to be impoſſible. The controverſie then, concerning the meaning of the places in diſpute is to be reſolved from the nature and reaſonableneſs of the matter contained in them? for if *Socinus* his reaſon be anſwerable to his confidence, if the account we give of the ſufferings of Chriſt, be repugnant not only to the Juſtice, Goodneſs and Grace of God, but to the nature of the thing; if it appear impoſſible, that mankind ſhould be redeemed in a proper ſenſe, or that God ſhould be propitiated by the Death of his Son as a Sacrifice for

Socin. de Servat. Part. 2. Cap. 4.

for ſin; if it enervate all the Precepts of Obedience, and tend rather to juſtifie ſins than thoſe who do repent of them; I ſhall then agree, that no induſtry can be too great in ſearching Authors, comparing places, examining Verſions, to find out ſuch a ſenſe as may be agreeable to the nature of things, the Attributes of God, and the deſign of Chriſtian Religion. But if on the contrary, the Scripture doth plainly aſſert thoſe things, from whence our Doctrine follows, and without which no reaſonable account can be given either of the expreſſions uſed therein, or of the ſufferings of Chriſt; if Chriſt's death did immediately reſpect God as a ſacrifice, and was paid as a price for our redemption; if ſuch a deſign of his death be ſo far from being repugnant to the nature of God, that it highly manifeſts his Wiſdom, Juſtice and Mercy; if it aſſert nothing but what is ſo far from being impoſſible, that it is very reconcileable to the common principles of Reaſon, as well as the Free-Grace of God in the pardon of ſin; if, being truly underſtood, it is ſo far from enervating, that it advances highly all the purpoſes of Chriſtian Religion, then it can be no leſs than a betraying

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one of the grand Truths of the Chriſtian Doctrine, not to believe ours to be the true ſenſe of the places in controverſie. And this is that which I now take upon me to maintain.

II. For our clearer proceeding herein, nothing will be more neceſſary, than to underſtand the true *ſtate of the Controverſie*; which hath been rendred more obſcure by the miſtakes of ſome, who have managed it with greater zeal than judgment; who have aſſerted more than they needed to have done, and made our Adverſaries aſſert much leſs than they do: And by this means have ſhot over their Adverſaries heads, and laid their own more open to aſſaults. It is eaſie to obſerve, that moſt of *Socinus* his Arguments are levelled againſt an opinion, which few who have conſidered theſe things do maintain, and none need to think themſelves obliged to do it; which is, That Chriſt paid a proper and rigid ſatisfaction for the ſins of men, conſidered under the notion of debts, and that he paid the very ſame, which we ought to have done; which in the ſenſe of the Law, is never called Satisfaction, but ſtrict Payment. Againſt this *Socinus* diſputes from the impoſſibility of Chriſt's

The ſtate of the Controverſie in general.

Chriſt's paying the very ſame that we were to have paid; becauſe our penalty was eternal Death, and that as the conſequent of inherent guilt, which Chriſt neither did nor could undergo. Neither is it enough to ſay, *That Chriſt had undergone eternal Death, unleſs he had been able to free himſelf from it*; for the admiſſion of one to pay for another, who could diſcharge the debt in much leſs time than the offenders could, was not the ſame which the Law required. For that takes no notice of any other than the perſons who had ſinned; and if a *Mediator* could have paid the ſame, the Original Law muſt have been disjunctive; *viz.* That either the Offender muſt ſuffer, or another for him; but then the Goſpel had not been the bringing in of a better *Covenant*, but a performance of the old. But if there be a relaxation or diſpenſation of the firſt Law; then it neceſſarily follows, that what Chriſt paid, was not the very ſame which the firſt Law required: for what need of that, when the very ſame was paid that was in the obligation? But if it be ſaid, *That the dignity of the perſon makes up, what wanted in the kind or degree of puniſhment*; this is a plain confeſſion that

that it is not the ſame, but ſomething equivalent, which anſwers the ends of the Sanction, as much as the ſame would have done, which is the thing we contend for. Beſides, if the very ſame had been paid in the ſtrict ſenſe, there would have followed a deliverance *ipſo facto*; for the releaſe immediately follows the payment of the ſame: and it had been injuſtice to have required any thing further, in order to the diſcharge of the Offender, when ſtrict and full payment had been made of what was in the obligation. But we ſee that Faith and Repentance, and the conſequences of thoſe two, are made conditions on our parts, in order to the enjoying the benefit of what Chriſt hath procured; So that the releaſe is not immediate upon the payment, but depends on a new contract, made in conſideration of what Chriſt hath done and ſuffered for us. If it be ſaid, *That by Chriſt's payment, we become his, and he requires theſe conditions of us*; beſides the contrariety of it to the Scriptures, which make the conditions to be required by him to whom the payment was made; we are to conſider, that theſe very perſons aſſert, that Chriſt paid all for us, and in our name and ſtead;

ſtead; ſo that the payment by Chriſt was by a ſubſtitution in our room; and if he paid the ſame which the Law required, the benefit muſt immediately accrue to thoſe in whoſe name the debt was paid. For what was done in the name of another, is all one to the Creditor, as if it had been done by the Debtor himſelf. But above all things, it is impoſſible to reconcile the freeneſs of remiſſion, with the full payment of the very ſame which was in the obligation. Neither will it ſerve to ſay, *That though it was not free to Chriſt, yet it was to us.* For the ſatisfaction and remiſſion muſt reſpect the ſame perſon; for Chriſt did not pay for himſelf, but for us, neither could the remiſſion be to him. Chriſt therefore is not conſider'd in his own name, but as acting in our ſtead; ſo that what was free to him, muſt be to us; what was exactly paid by him, it is all one as if it had been done by us: ſo that it is impoſſible the ſame debt ſhould be fully paid and freely forgiven. Much leſs will it avoid the difficulty in this caſe to ſay, *That it was a refuſable payment:* for it being ſuppoſed to be the very ſame, it was not in juſtice refuſable; and however not in equity, if it anſwer the intention

tention of the Law, as much as the ſuffering of the offenders had done; and the more it doth that, the leſs refuſable it is. And although *God himſelf found out the way*, that doth not make the pardon free, but the deſignation of the perſon who was to pay the debt. Thus when our Adverſaries diſpute againſt this opinion, no wonder if they do it ſucceſsfully; but this whole opinion is built upon a miſtake, that ſatisfaction muſt be the payment of the very ſame; which while they contend for, they give our Adverſaries too great an advantage, and make them think they triumph over the Faith of the Church, when they do it only over the miſtake of ſome particular perſons. But the foundation of this miſtake, lies in the conſideration of puniſhment, under the notion of *debts*, and that ſatisfaction therefore muſt be by ſtrict payment in rigor of Law; but how great that miſtake is, will appear in the ſubſequent diſcourſe. But it cannot but be wondred at, that the very ſame perſons who conſider ſins, as debts which muſt be ſtrictly ſatisfied for, do withal contend for the abſolute neceſſity of this ſatisfaction: whereas *Socinus* his Arguments would hold good, *if ſins were only*

conſidered as debts, and God as the mere Creditor of puniſhment; he might as freely part with his own right without ſatisfaction, as any Creditor may forgive what ſumm he pleaſes to a perſon indebted to him; and no reaſon can be brought to the contrary, from that notion of ſins, why he may not do it. But if they be conſidered, with a reſpect to God's Government of the world, and the honour of his Laws, then ſome further account may be given, why it may not be conſiſtent with that, to paſs by the ſins of men, without ſatisfaction made to them.

Of the difference of debts and puniſhments.

III. And becauſe the miſtake in this matter, hath been the foundation of moſt of the ſubſequent miſtakes on both ſides, and the diſcovery of the cauſe of errors, doth far more to the cure of them, than any Arguments brought againſt them; and withal, the true underſtanding of the whole Doctrine of ſatisfaction depends upon it, I ſhall endeavour to make clear the notion under which our ſins are conſidered; for upon that depends the nature of the ſatisfaction which is to be made for them. For while our Adverſaries ſuppoſe, that ſins are to be looked on under the notion of debts in this debate, they aſſert it to be wholly free for God

God to remit them, without any ſatiſfaction. They make the right of puniſhment merely to depend on God's abſolute Dominion; and that all ſatisfaction muſt be conſidered under the notion of compenſation, for the injuries done to him, to whom it is to be made. But if we can clearly ſhew a conſiderable difference between the notion of debts and puniſhments, if the right of puniſhment doth not depend upon mere Dominion, and that ſatisfaction by way of puniſhment, is not primarily intended for compenſation, but for other ends, we ſhall make not only the ſtate of the Controverſie much clearer, but offer ſomething conſiderable towards the reſolution of it. The way I ſhall take for the proof of the difference between debts and puniſhments, ſhall be uſing the other for the Arguments for it. For beſides, that thoſe things are juſt in matter of debts, which are not ſo in the caſe of puniſhments; as, that it is lawfull for a man to forgive all the debts which are owing him by all perſons, though they never ſo contumaciouſly refuſe payment, but our Adverſaries will not ſay ſo in the caſe of ſins; for although they aſſert, That the juſtice of God doth ne-

ver require puniſhment in caſe of repentance, yet withal they aſſert, That *in caſe of impenitency, it is not only agreeable, but due to the nature and decrees; and therefore to the rectitude and equity of God not to give pardon* But if this be true, then there is an apparent difference between the notion of *debts* and *puniſhments*; for the Impenitency doth but add to the greatneſs of the debt: And will they ſay, it is only in God's power to remit ſmall debts, but he muſt puniſh the greateſt? what becomes then of God's abſolute liberty to part with his own right? will not this ſhew more of his kindneſs to pardon the greater, rather than leſſer offenders? But if there be ſomething in the nature of the thing, which makes it not only juſt, but neceſſary for impenitent ſinners to be puniſhed, as *Crellius* after *Socinus* frequently acknowledges, then it is plain, that ſins are not to be conſidered merely as debts, for that obſtinacy and impenitency is only punished as a greater degree of ſin, and therefore as a greater debt.

Non reſipiſcentibus veneam non concedere, id demum naturæ divinæ, & decretis ejus & propterea rectitudini & æquitati debitum eſt ac conſentaneum. Socin. de Servat. l. 1. c 1. *Non reſipiſcentes pœnâ non liberare tum per ſe æquitati eſt admodum conſentaneum, & poſitis quibuſdam finibus quos Deus ſibi in regendis hominibus præfixit facto neceſſarium.* Crell. c. Grot. c. 2. ſect. 29.

debt. And withal, thoſe things are lawfull in the remiſſion of debts, which are unjuſt in the matter of puniſhments; as it is lawfull for a Creditor, when two perſons are conſidered in equal circumſtances, to remit one, and not the other; nay, to remit the greater debt, without any ſatisfaction, and to exact the leſſer to the greateſt extremity; but it is unjuſt in matter of puniſhments, where the reaſon and circumſtances are the ſame, for a perſon who hath committed a crime of very dangerous conſequence, to eſcape unpuniſhed, and another who hath been guilty of far leſs to be ſeverely executed. Beſides theſe conſiderations, I ſay, I ſhall now prove the difference of debts and puniſhments, from thoſe two things whereby things are beſt differenced from each other; *viz.* The different Reaſon, and the different End of them.

IV. (1.) *The different Reaſon of debts and puniſhments:* The reaſon of debts is dominion and property, and the obligation of them, depends upon voluntary contracts between parties; but the reaſon of puniſhments is Juſtice and Government, and depends not upon mere contracts, but the relation the perſon ſtands in to that Authority to which

The reaſon of humane puniſhment is the publick intereſt.

he is accountable for his actions. For if the obligation to puniſhment, did depend upon mere contract, then none could juſtly be puniſhed, but ſuch who have conſented to it by an antecedent contract: If it be ſaid, *That a contract is implied, by their being in ſociety with others*; that is as much as I deſire to make the difference appear, for in caſe of debts, the obligation depends upon the voluntary contract of the perſon; but in caſe of puniſhments, the very relation to Government, and living under Laws doth imply it. And the right of puniſhment depends upon the obligation of Laws, where the reaſon of them holds, without any expreſs contract, or ſuperiority of one over another; as in the caſe of violation of the Law of Nations, that gives right to another Nation to puniſh the infringers of it. Otherwiſe Wars could never be lawfull between two Nations, and none could be warrantable, but thoſe of a Prince againſt his rebellious ſubjects, who have broken the Laws themſelves conſented expreſly to. Beſides, in caſe of debts every man is bound to pay, whether he be call'd upon or no; but in caſe of puniſhments, no man is bound

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to betray or accuſe himſelf. For the obligation to payment in caſe of debt ariſeth from the injury ſuſtained by that particular perſon, if another detains what is his own from him; but the obligation to puniſhment, ariſes from the injury, the Publick ſuſtains by the impunity of crimes, of which the Magiſtrates are to take Care; who by the diſpenſing of puniſhments, do ſhew that to be true which *Grotius* aſſerts, that if there be any Creditor to be aſſigned in puniſhment, it is the publick good: Which appears by this, that all puniſhments are proportioned, according to the influence the offences have upon the publick intereſt; for the reaſon of puniſhment is not becauſe a Law is broken, but becauſe the breach of a Law tends to diſſolve the community, by infringing the Authority of the Laws, and the honour of thoſe who are to take care of them. For if we conſider it, the meaſure of puniſhments is in a well ordered State, taken from the influence which crimes have upon the peace and intereſt of the community. No man queſtions, but that Malice, Pride and Avarice, are things really as bad as many faults, that are ſeverely puniſhed by humane

Laws, but the reaſon theſe are not puniſhed is, becauſe they do not ſo much injury to the publick intereſt, as Theft and Robbery do. Beſides, in thoſe things wherein the Laws of a Nation are concerned, the utmoſt rigor is not uſed in the preventing of crimes, or the execution of them when committed, if ſuch an execution may endanger the publick more than the impunity of the offenders may do. And there are ſome things which are thought fit to be forbidden, where the utmoſt means are not uſed to prevent them; as Merchants are forbidden to ſteal cuſtoms, but they are not put under an Oath not to do it. And when penalties have been deſerved, the execution of them hath been deferred, till it may be moſt for the advantage of the publick: as *Joab*'s puniſhment till *Solomon*'s Reign, though he deſerved it as much in *David*'s. So that the rule commonly talked of, *Fiat juſtitia & pereat mundus*, is a piece of Pedantry, rather than true Wiſdom; for whatever penalty inflicted brings a far greater detriment to the publick, than the forbearance of it, is no piece of Juſtice to the State, but the contrary; the greateſt Law, being the ſafety and preſervation of

of the whole Body. By which it appears, that in humane Laws, the reaſon of puniſhment is not, that ſuch an action is done, but becauſe the impunity in doing it, may have a bad influence on the publick intereſt; but in debts, the right of Reſtitution depends upon the injury received by a particular perſon, who looks at no more than the reparation of his loſs by it.

V. We are now to conſider, how far theſe things will hold in Divine Laws, and what the right of puniſhment doth reſult from there. For *Crellius*, the ſubtilleſt of our Adverſaries, knowing of how great conſequence the reſolution of this is, in the whole Controverſie of Satisfaction, vehemently contends, *That the right of puniſhment doth reſult from God's abſolute Dominion, and therefore he is to be conſidered as the offended party, and not as Governor in the right of inflicting puniſhment*; for which his firſt Argument is, *That our obedience is due to God's Law, on the account of his Dominion; but when that is not performed, the penalty ſucceeds in its room, and therefore that doth belong to God on the ſame account*: His other arguments are, *from the compenſation of injuries due to the offended party, and from*

The right of Divine puniſhment not mere Dominion.

Crell. Reſponſ. ad Grot. cap. 2. ſect. 1. &c.

P. 144.

from God's anger againſt ſin, in which he is to be conſider'd as the offended party: Theſe two latter will be anſwered under the next head; the firſt I am to examine here. He therefore tells us, that the right of puniſhment belongs to God's Dominion, becauſe the reaſon of his Government of mankind is, becauſe he is the Lord of them. But, for our better underſtanding this, we are to conſider, although the original right of Government doth reſult from God's Dominion; for therefore our obedience is due, becauſe of his Sovereignty over us; yet when God takes upon him the notion of a Governour, he enters into a new relation with his creatures, diſtinct from the firſt as mere Lord. For he is equally Lord of all to whom he gives a being, but he doth not require obedience upon equal terms, nor governs them by the ſame Laws: Dominion is properly ſhewed in the exerciſe of power; but when God gives Laws according to which he will reward and puniſh, he ſo far reſtrains the exerciſe of his Dominion to a ſubſerviency to the ends of Government. If we ſhould ſuppoſe, that God governs the world merely by his Dominion, we muſt take away all rewards and puniſhments;

ments; for then the actions of men, would be the mere effects of irreſiſtable power, and ſo not capable of rewards and puniſhments; for there could be neither of theſe, where mens actions are capable of the differences of good and evil, and that they cannot be, if they be the acts of God's Dominion, and not of their own. But if God doth not exerciſe his full Dominion over rational creatures, it is apparent that he doth govern them under another notion than as mere Lord, and the reaſon of puniſhment is not to be taken from an abſolute right which God doth not make uſe of, but from the ends and deſigns of Government, which are his own Honour, the Authority of his Laws, and the good of thoſe whom he doth govern. And *Crellius* is greatly miſtaken, when he makes *puniſhment to ſucceed in the place of the right of obedience*; for it is only the deſert of puniſhment, which follows upon the violation of that right; and as we aſſert, that the right of obedience is derived from God's Sovereignty, ſo we deny not, but the deſert of puniſhment is from the violation of it; but withal we ſay, that the obligation to puniſhment depends upon the Laws, and God's right to inflict

flict puniſhment (Laws being ſuppoſed) is immediately from that Government which he hath over mankind: For otherwiſe, if the whole right of puniſhment did ſtill depend upon God's Dominion, and the firſt right of Sovereignty, then all ſins muſt have equal puniſhments, becauſe they are all equal violations of the fundamental right of obedience; then it were at liberty for God to puniſh a greater ſin, with a leſs puniſhment; and a leſſer ſin, with a greater: And laſtly, this would make the puniſhment of ſin, a mere Arbitrary thing in God; for there would be no reaſon of puniſhment, but what depended upon God's mere will; whereas the reaſon of puniſhment in Scripture is drawn from a repugnancy of ſin to the divine purity and holineſs, and not merely from God's power or will to puniſh; but if that were all the reaſon of it, there would be no repugnancy in the nature of the thing for the moſt vitious perſon to be rewarded, and the moſt pious to be made everlaſtingly miſerable. But who ever yet durſt ſay or think ſo? From whence it appears that the relation between ſin and puniſhment is no reſult of God's arbitrary will; but it is founded in the nature

nature of the things; ſo that as it is juſt for God to puniſh offenders, ſo it would be unjuſt to puniſh the moſt innocent perſon without any reſpect to ſin. But if the right of puniſhment depends merely on God's Dominion, I cannot underſtand why God may not puniſh when and whom, and in what manner he pleaſeth; without any impeachment of his Juſtice, and therefore it is to be wonder'd at, that the ſame perſons who aſſert the right of puniſhment to be merely in God's Dominion, ſhould yet cry out of the injuſtice of one perſon being puniſhed for anothers faults; for why may not God exerciſe his Dominion in this caſe? yes, ſay they, *he may his dominion, but he cannot puniſh, becauſe puniſhment ſuppoſes guilt, and cannot be juſt without it*; how far that reaches, will be examined afterwards; at preſent, we take notice of the contradiction to themſelves which our Adverſaries are guilty of, that they may ſerve their own *hypotheſis*, for when we diſpute with them, againſt abſolute remiſſion without ſatisfaction, then they contend that the right of puniſhment is a mere act of Dominion, and God may part with his right, if he pleaſe; but when they diſpute with

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us againſt the tranſlation of puniſhment from one to another, then they no longer ſay that the right of puniſhment is an act of Dominion, but that it is a neceſſary conſequent of inherent guilt, and cannot be removed from one to another. And then they utterly deny that puniſhment is of the nature of debts; for *one man's money*, they ſay, *may become anothers, but one man's puniſhment cannot become anothers:* Thus they give and take, deny and grant, as it ſerves for their preſent purpoſes.

Soc. de Servat. l. 3. c. 3: Prælect. c. 18.

2. The end of puniſhments not bare compenſation as it is in debts.

VI. (2.) The *different ends of debts and puniſhments*, make it appear that there is a difference in the nature of them; for the intention of the obligation to payment in caſe of debt, is the compenſation of the damage which the Creditor ſuſtains; but the intention of puniſhment, is not bare compenſation, but it is deſigned for greater and further ends. For which we are to conſider the different nature of puniſhments, as they are inflicted by way of reparation of ſome injury done to private perſons, and as they do reſpect the publick good. I grant, that private perſons in caſe of injuries, ſeek for compenſation of the damage they ſuſtain, and ſo far they bear

bear the nature of debts; but if we conſider them as inflicted by thoſe who have a care of the publick, though they are to ſee that no private perſon ſuffers injury by another; yet the reaſon of that is not merely that he might enjoy his own, but becauſe the doing injuries to others tends to the ſubverſion of the ends of Government. Therefore, I can by no means admit that Poſition of *Crellius, that a Magiſtrate only puniſhes as he aſſumes the perſon of the particular men who have received injuries from others*; for he aims at other ends than merely the compenſation of thoſe injured perſons. Their great end is according to the old Roman *Formula, nè quid Reſp. detrimenti capiat:* the reaſon of exacting penalties upon private men is ſtill with a regard to the publick ſafety. Suppoſing men in a ſtate of nature no puniſhment is due to the injured perſon, but reſtitution of damage, and compenſation of the loſs that accrues to him by the injury ſuſtained; and whatever goes beyond this, is the effect of Government, which conſtitutes penalties for perſervation of the Society which is under Laws. But herein *Crellius* is our adverſary, but with no advantage at all to his

Crell. c. Grot. cap. 2. Sect. 2. p. 147. Sect. 17. p. 162.

his Cauſe; for he offers to prove againſt *Grotius*, *That ſomething more is due by an injury beyond bare compenſation for what the other is ſuppoſed to loſe by the right of nature*; for ſaith he, *in every injury there is not only the real damage which the perſon ſuſtains, but there is a contempt of the perſon implyed in it, for which as well as the former, he ought to have compenſation.* To which I anſwer, 1. That this doth not prove what he deſigns, *viz.* that puniſhment doth belong to the injured perſon in a ſtate of Nature, beyond bare reſtitution, but that it is neceſſary, that men ſhould not continue in ſuch a ſtate, that ſo they may be vindicated from that contempt, and others compelled to reſtitution. Both which, as they are puniſhments, are not in the power of the offended party as ſuch, but ſhew that it is very reaſonable there ſhould be Laws and Governours, that private perſons may be preſerved in their juſt rights, and offenders puniſhed for the vindication not only of their honour, but of the Laws too. And Laws being eſtabliſhed, the injured perſon hath right to no more, than the compenſation of his loſs; for that being forced upon the offending party, is a ſufficient vindica-

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tion of his honour. 2. If the contempt of a private perſon makes a compenſation neceſſary, how much more will this hold in a publick Magiſtrate; whoſe contempt by diſobedience is of far worſe conſequence than that of a private perſon. And by this argument *Crellius* overthrows his main *hypotheſis*, viz. that God may pardon ſin without ſatisfaction; for if it be not only neceſſary, that the loſs be compenſated but the diſhonour too; then ſo much greater as the diſhonour is, ſo much higher as the perſon is, ſo much more beneficial to the world as his Laws are, ſo much more neceſſary is it that in order to pardon there muſt be a ſatisfaction made to him, for the affronts he hath received from men. And if the greatneſs of the injury be to be meaſured as *Crellius* aſſerts, *from the worth and value of the thing, from the dignity and honour of the perſon, from the diſplicency of the fact to him*, which he makes the meaſure of puniſhment; this makes it ſtill far more reaſonable, that God ſhould have ſatisfaction for the ſins of men, than that men ſhould have for the injuries done them by one another; eſpecially conſidering what the ſame Author doth aſſert afterwards, *that it is ſometime repugnant*

Crell. c. Grot. cap. 2. p. 174.

Sect. 29. *p.* 198.

to juſtice, for one to part with his own right in caſe of injuries, and that either from the nature and circumſtances of the things themſelves or a decree or determination to the contrary: for the firſt he inſtanceth in caſe of *notorious defamation*; in which he ſaith, *it is a diſhoneſt and unlawful thing for a man, not to make uſe of his own right for his vindication:* and for the other, *in caſe of great obſtinacy and malice.* By both which, it is moſt apparent, that *Crellius* puts a mighty difference between the nature of debts, and puniſhments, ſince in all caſes he allows it lawful for a perſon free, to remit his debts; but in ſome caſes he makes it utterly unlawful for a perſon not to make uſe of his right for puniſhment. And withal if a private perſon may not part with his own right in ſuch caſes, how unreaſonable is it not to aſſert the ſame of the great Governour of the World? and that there may be a neceſſity for him upon ſuppoſition of the contempt of himſelf and his Laws, to vindicate himſelf and his honour to the world, by ſome remarkable teſtimony of his ſeverity againſt ſin.

VII. But

VII. But *Crellius* yet urgeth another end of puniſhment, which though the moſt unreaſonable of all others, yet ſufficiently proves from himſelf the difference of debts and puniſhments, which is, *the delight which the injured perſon takes in ſeeing the offender puniſhed.* This he ſo much inſiſts upon, as though he made it the moſt natural end of puniſhment; for ſaith he, *among the Puniſhments which a Prince or any other free Perſon can inflict, revenge is in the firſt place, and the more there is of that in any thing, the more properly it is called a puniſhment*; and he tells us what he means by this *ultio*; viz. *ſolatium ex alieno dolore, the contentment taken in anothers pain.* But ſaith he, *no man muſt object, that this is a thing evil in it ſelf; for although it be forbidden us under the New Teſtament, yet in it ſelf it is not unlawful for one that hath ſuffered pain from another to ſeek for the eaſe of his own pain, by the miſeries of him that injured him: and for this purpoſe,* ſaith he, *we have the Paſſion of Anger in us, which being a deſire of returning injuries, is then ſatisfied when it apprehends it done.* But how abſurd and unreaſonable this doctrine is, will be eaſily diſcovered, for this would make the primary intend-

Of *Crellius* his great miſtake about the end of puniſhments. *Crell. cap.* 2. *ſect.* 2. *ſect.* 28.

p. 191.

ment of puniſhment to be the evil of him that ſuffers it. Where the right of puniſhment is derived from an injury received, and therefore that which gives that right, is ſome damage ſuſtained, the reparation of which is the firſt thing deſigned by the offended party: Though it take not up the whole nature of puniſhment. And on this account no man can juſtly propoſe any end to himſelf in anothers evil, but what comes under the notion of reſtitution. For the evil of another is only intended in puniſhment as it reſpects the good of him for whoſe ſake that evil is undergone. When that good may be obtained without anothers evil, the deſire of it is unjuſt and unreaſonable: and therefore all that contentment that any one takes in the evil another undergoes, as it is evil to him, is a thing repugnant to humane nature, and which all perſons condemn in others when they allow themſelves in it. It will be hard for *Crellius* to make any difference between this end of puniſhment which he aſſigns, and the greateſt cruelty; for what can that be worſe than taking delight in making others miſerable, and ſeeing them ſo when he hath made them. If it be replyed, *that*

cruelty

cruelty is without any cauſe, but here a juſt cauſe is ſuppoſed: I anſwer, a juſt cauſe is only ſuppoſed for the puniſhment, but there can be no juſt cauſe for any to delight in the miſeries of others, and to comfort themſelves by inflicting or beholding them. For the evil of another is never intended, but when it is the only means left for compenſation; and he muſt be guilty of great inhumanity, who deſires anothers evil any further than that tends to his own good, *i. e.* the reparation of the damage ſuſtained; which if it may be had without anothers evil, then that comes not by the right of nature within the reaſon of puniſhment; and conſequently where it doth not ſerve for that end, the comfort that men take in it is no part of juſtice, but cruelty. For there can be no reaſon at all aſſigned for it; for that *lenimentum doloris* which *Crellius* inſiſts on is meerly imaginary, and no other than the Dog hath in gnawing the ſtone that is thrown at him; and for all that I know, that propenſion in nature to the retribution of evil for evil any further than it tends to our ſecurity, and the preſervation for the future, is one of the moſt unreaſonable Paſſions in humane Nature.

Of the nature of anger and revenge in men, and whether punishments are designed to satisfie them.

VIII. And if we examine the nature of *Anger*, either considered Naturally or Morally, the intention of it is, not the returning evil to another, for the evil received, but the security and perservation of our selves; which we should not have so great a care of, unless we had a quick sense of injuries, and our blood were apt to be heated at the apprehension of them. But when this passion vents it self, in doing others injury to alleviate its own grief, it is a violent and unreasonable perturbation; but being governed by reason, it aims at no more, than the great end of our beings; *viz.* Self-Preservation. But when that cannot be obtained without anothers evil, so far the intendment of it is lawful, but no further. And I cannot therefore think those Philosophers, who have defined Anger to be ὄρεξις ἀντιλυπήσεως, by whose Authority *Crellius* defends himself, when he makes anger to be *a desire of revenge*, did throughly consider what was just and reasonable in it, but barely what was natural, and would be the effect of that passion, if not governed by reason. For otherwise *Jul. Scaliger*'s definition is much more true and justifiable, that it is *appetitus depulsionis*; *viz.* that whereby we are

Crell. c. 2. *sect.* 22. *p.* 177.

Exerc. 313.

are ſtirred up to drive away from us, any thing that is injurious to us. But becauſe *Crellius* alledgeth a ſaying of *Seneca*, that would make *vindicta* of the nature of puniſhment, *duabus de cauſis punire princeps ſolet, ſi aut ſe vindicet aut alium:* We ſhall oppoſe to this the ſenſe of the ſame Author in this matter, which may ſufficiently clear the other paſſage: For, ſaith he, *Inhumanum verbum eſt, & quidem pro juſto receptum, ultio, & à contumelia non differt niſi ordine: qui dolorem regerit, tantum excuſatius peccat.* And no man ſpeaks with greater vehemency againſt the delight in others puniſhments than he doth; for he always aſſerts, the only reaſon of puniſhment, to be ſome advantage which is to come by it, and not meerly to ſatisfie anger, or to allay their own griefs, by ſeeing anothers: For, ſaith he, the puniſhment is inflicted, *Non quia delectetur ullius pœna (procul eſt enim à ſapiente tam inhumana feritas) ſed ut documentum omnium ſint:* So that it is only the uſefulneſs of puniſhment according to him, which makes it become any wiſe man; and ſo far from a ſatisfaction of his grief by anothers puniſhment, that he makes that a piece of inhumanity, not inci-

Seneca de Clem. l. 1. c. 20.

De Irâ, l. 2. c. 32.

De Irâ, l. 1. c. 6.

dent to any who pretend to wiſdom. Nay, he denies, that a juſt puniſhment doth flow from *Anger*; for he that inflicts that, doth it *non ipſius pœnæ avidus, ſed quia oportet*, not as deſiring the puniſhment, but becauſe there are great reaſons for it: And elſewhere, *Exſequar quia oportet, non quia dolet:* he is far enough then from approving, that imaginary compenſation of one mans grief by anothers. And he ſhews at large that the weakeſt natures, and the leaſt guided by reaſon, are the moſt ſubject to this anger and revenge. And although other things be pretended, the general cauſe of it is, a great infirmity of humane nature; and thence it is, that children and old men, and ſick perſons, are the moſt ſubject to it; and the better any are, the more they are freed from it:

De Ira, l. 1. c. 9. Cap. 12.

Cap. 13.

——*quippe minuti*
Semper & infirmi eſt animi, exiguique voluptas
Ultio——

He makes *Cruelty* to be nothing elſe, *but the intemperance of the mind in exacting puniſhment*; and the difference between

De Clem. l. 2, c. 4.

tween a Prince and a Tyrant to lie in this, *That one delights in puniſhing, the other never does it but in caſe of neceſſity*, when the publick good requires it. And this throughout his diſcourſe, he makes the meaſure of puniſhment. Who then could imagine, that he ſhould ſpeak ſo contradictory to himſelf, as to allow puniſhment for meer revenge, or the eaſing ones own griefs, by the pains of another? In the places cited by *Crellius*, (if taken in his ſenſe) he ſpeaks what commonly is, not what ought to be in the world; for he diſputes againſt it in that very place, therefore that cannot be the meaning which he contends for. *The common deſign of puniſhments by a Prince*, ſaith he, *is either to vindicate himſelf or others*. I ſo render his words, becauſe *vindicare*, when it is joyned with the perſon injured, as here, *vindicare ſe aut alium*, doth properly relate to the end of puniſhment, which is aſſerting the right of the injured perſon; but when it is joyned with the perſons who have done the injury, or the crimes whereby they did it, then it properly ſignifies to puniſh. Thus *Salluſt* uſeth, *Vindicatum in eos*; and *Cicero*, *In milites noſtros vehementer vindicatum*, and for the fact very

De Clem. l. 1. c. 11, 12.

Salluſt. in Catalin. Cicero 7. v.

ry frequently in him, *maleficia vindicare*: but when it relates to the injured perſon, as here it doth, it cannot ſignifie meerly to puniſh; for then *ſe vindicare* would be to puniſh ones ſelf, but to aſſert his own right in caſe of injury, though it be with the puniſhment of another: For *Vindicatio*, as *Cicero* defines it, *eſt per quam vis & injuria & omnino quod obfuturum eſt defendendo aut ulciſcendo propulſatur*. So that the ſecurity of our ſelves in caſe of force or injury, is that which is called *Vindication*; which ſometimes may be done by defence, and other times by puniſhment. And that *Seneca* doth mean no more here, is apparent by what follows; for in caſe of private injuries, he ſaith, *pœnam ſi tutò poterit donet*, he would have the Prince forgive the puniſhment, if it may be done with ſafety; ſo that he would not have any one puniſhed, to ſatisfie anothers deſire of revenge, but to preſerve his own ſafety: And afterwards he ſaith, *It is much beneath a Princes condition, to need that ſatisfaction which ariſes from anothers ſufferings*: But for the puniſhments of others, he ſaith, *The Law hath eſtabliſhed three ends, the amendment of the perſons, or making others better by their puniſh-*

Cicero de Invent. 2.

De Irâ, l. 1. *c.* 21.

puniſhments, or the publick ſecurity, by taking away ſuch evil members out of the body: So that in publick puniſhments, he never ſo much as ſuppoſes, that contentment which revenge fanſies in others puniſhments, but makes them wholly deſigned for the publick advantage. For *the Laws in puniſhment do not look backward but forward*; for as* *Plato* ſaith, *No wiſe man ever puniſhed, meerly becauſe men had offended, but leſt they ſhould: For paſt things cannot be recalled, but future are therefore forbidden, that they may be prevented.* So to the ſame purpoſe is the ſaying of *Lactantius*, produced by *Grotius*, *Surgimus ad vindictam, non quia læſi ſumus, ſed ut diſciplina ſervetur, mores corrigantur, licentia comprimatur: hæc eſt Ira juſta.* To which *Crellius* anſwers, *That this ſignifies nothing, unleſs it can be proved, that no man may juſtly puniſh another, merely becauſe he is wronged.* If he means of the right to puniſh, we deny not that to be, becauſe the perſon is wronged; but if he underſtands it of the deſign and end of puniſhment, then we deny, that it is an allowable end of puniſhments, any further than it can come under the notion of reſtitution, of which we have ſpoken already. *When*

* *Non præterita ſed futura intuebitur; nam ut* Plato *ait, nemo prudens punit quia peccatum eſt, ſed ne peccetur.* Sen. de Ira, l. 1. c. 16.

Lact. de ira Dei. c. 17.

Cap. 2. ſect. 13.

a Maſter (which is the inſtance he produceth) *puniſheth his ſervants becauſe they have diſobeyed him:* The reaſon of that puniſhment, is not the bare diſobedience, but the injury which comes to him by it; the reparation of which he ſeeks by puniſhment, either as to his authority, ſecurity or profit. But he adds, That *where puniſhment is deſigned, for preſervation of diſcipline, and amendment of manners, and keeping perſons in order,* (which are the ends mentioned by *Lactantius*) *it is where the intereſt of the perſons lies, in the preſervation of theſe, and is therefore offended at the neglect of them.* To which I anſwer, That the intereſt of ſuch a one, is not barely the intereſt of an offended party, as ſuch, but the intereſt of a Governour; and no body denies, but ſuch a one may be an offended party: but the queſtion is, Whether the deſign of puniſhment be meerly to ſatisfie him as the offended party, or to anſwer the ends of Government? For *Crellius* hath already told us, what it is to ſatisfie one as an offended party, that is, to eaſe himſelf by the puniſhment of others; but what ever is deſigned for the great ends of Government, is not to be conſidered under that notion,

notion, although the Governour may be juſtly offended at the neglect of them. And there is this conſiderable difference between the puniſhment made to an offended party, as ſuch, and that which is for the ends of Government; that the former is a ſatisfaction to *Anger*, and the latter to Laws and the publick intereſt. For *Crellius* diſputes much for the right of Anger in exacting puniſhments; *the ſatisfaction of which, in caſe of real injury, he never makes unlawful, but in caſe that it be prohibited us by one, whoſe power is above our own: nay he makes it otherwiſe the primary end of puniſhment.* So that *anger* is the main thing upon theſe terms to be reſpected in puniſhment: but where it is deſigned for the ends before-mentioned, there is no neceſſity of any ſuch paſſion as anger to be ſatisfied, the ends of puniſhment may be attained wholly without it: And publick puniſhment, according to *Seneca*, *non ira ſed ratio eſt*, is no effect of anger, but reaſon; for, ſaith he, *nihil minus quam iraſci punientem decet:* nothing leſs becomes one that puniſheth, than *anger* doth; for all puniſhments being conſidered as Medicines, no man ought to give Phyſick in anger, or to let

Cap. 2. ſect. 1. p. 143. Sect. 13. p. 161.

Sen. de ira, l. 1. c. 14, & 15.

let himſelf blood in a fury: *A Magiſtrate,*
Chap. 16. ſaith he, *when he goes to puniſh, ought to appear only vultu legis quæ non iraſcitur, ſed conſtituit*, with the countenance of the Law, which appoints puniſhments without paſſion: The reaſon of which is, becauſe the Law aims not primarily at the evil of the man that ſuffers puniſhment, but at the good which comes to the publick by ſuch ſufferings. For the firſt deſign of the Law was to prevent any evil being done, and puniſhment coming in by way of Sanction to the force of the Law, muſt have the ſame primary end which the Law it ſelf had; which is not to ſatisfie barely the offended party for the breach, any further than that ſatisfaction tends to the ſecurity of the Law, and preventing the violation of it for the future. The ſubſtance of what I have ſaid upon this ſubject, may be thus briefly comprized, That antecedently to Laws, the offended party hath right to no more than bare reparation of the damage ſuſtained by the injury; that the proper notion of puniſhment is conſequent to Laws, and the inflicting of it is an act of Government, which is not deſigned for meer ſatisfaction of the anger of the injured perſon,

perſon, but for the publick good, which lies in preſerving the authority of the Laws, the preventing all injuries by the ſecurity of mens juſt rights, and the vindication of the dignity and honour of him, who is to take care of the publick good. For theſe *Crellius* himſelf acknowledgeth, to be *the juſt ends of puniſhments*, only he would have the ſatisfaction a man takes in anothers evil, to come in the firſt place; wherein how much he is miſtaken, I hope we have already manifeſted. Becauſe the proper nature of puniſhment depending upon Laws, the Laws do not primarily deſign the benefit of private perſons (ſuppoſing that were ſo) but the advantage of that community which they are made for.

Quibus (ſc. ſolatio & ſecuritati) addi poſſint honoris ac dignitatis, per injuriam violatæ, & aliquâ ratione imminutæ vindiciæ, aſſertioque juris noſtri. Crel. cap. 2. ſect. 28. p. 191.

IX. And in thoſe caſes wherein the Magiſtrate doth right to particular perſons in the puniſhment of thoſe who have injured them, he doth it not as taking their perſon upon him, for he aims at other things than they do; they look at a bare compenſation for the injury received; but the Magiſtrate at the ill conſequence the impunity of injuries may be of to the publick: they, it may be at the

The Intereſt of the Magiſtrate in puniſhment diſtinct from that of private perſons.

the ſatisfaction of their diſpleaſure; but he at the ſatisfaction of the Laws; they at their own private damage; he at the violation of the publick peace. And from hence among thoſe Nations who valued all crimes at a certain rate, in matters of injury between man and man, the injured perſon was not only to receive compenſation for his wrong; but a conſiderable fine was to be paid to the Exchequer for the violation of the publick peace. Thus *Tacitus* obſerves among the old *Germans*, *Grotius* of the old *Gothick Laws*, and from them (as moſt of our modern Laws and Cuſtoms are derived) *Lindenbrogius* of the *Salick*, *Alemannick*, *Lombardick*, *Spelman* of the *Saxon*, who tells us in caſe of murder there were three payments, one to the Kindred, which was called *Megbote*; the ſecond to the Lord, called *Manbote*, the third to the *King*, called *Freda*, from the *German Frid*, which ſignifies *peace*, it being the conſideration paid to the King for the breach of the publick peace. *And this*, ſaith he, *in all actions, was anciently paid to the King, becauſe the peace was ſuppoſed to be broken, not by meer force, but by any injuries; and if the action was unjuſt, the Plaintiff paid it; if juſt, the defendant.* And the

De morib. German. c. 12. Grot. de leg. Goth. in Proleg. ad hiſt. Goth. p. 67. Lindenbrog. Gloſſ. ad Cod. Leg. Antiq. v. Freda. Spelman. Gloſſ. v. Freda.

the meaſure of it, ſaith *Bignonius*, was the tenth part of the value of the thing as eſtimated by Law which by the Cuſtoms of the ancient *Romans* was depoſited at the commencing of a ſuit by both, and only taken up again by him who overcame; and was by them called *Sacramentum*, as *Varro* tells us. And the ſame cuſtom was obſerved among the Greeks too, as appears by *Julius Pollux*, who tells us it was called προκαταβολὴ among them, and in publick actions was the fifth part, in private the tenth. But that which was paid to the publick in caſe of murder, was among the Greeks called ποινὴ, the ſame with *pœna*, for *Heſychius* tells us that is ἀνταλλαγὴ ἢ ὑπὲρ φόνου διδομένη, and to the ſame purpoſe the Scholiaſt on *Homer* on thoſe words, *Iliad.* 1. ἕνεκα ποινῆς Ανδρὸς ἀποφθιμένου, by which the Original of the name *pœna*, comes from a payment made to the publick, according to that known rule, *intereſt reip. delicta puniri*, that perſons may ſee how much the publick ſafety is concerned, that crimes be puniſhed. From which and many other things which might be inſiſted on, *Crellius* his Hypotheſis will appear to be falſe, *viz. that when the Magiſtrate doth judge in the affairs of particular*

Bignon. not. in Macculphi form. cap. 20.

Varro de L. L. lib. 4.

Jul. Pollux. l. 8.

cular men, he doth it only as aſſuming the perſon of thoſe men; whereas it appears from the reaſon of the thing, and the Cuſtom of Nations, that the intereſt of the Magiſtrate is conſidered as diſtinct from that of private perſons, when he doth moſt appear in vindication of injuries. But all this is managed with a reſpect to the grand hypotheſis, *viz.* that the right of puniſhing doth belong only to the offended party as ſuch, that the puniſhment is of the nature of debts, and the ſatisfaction by compenſation to the anger of him who is offended. The falſity of which this diſcourſe was deſigned to diſcover.

Having thus conſidered the nature of puniſhments among men, we come more cloſely to our matter, by examining how far this will hold in the puniſhments which God inflicts on the account of ſin. For which two things muſt be enquired into, 1. In what ſenſe we attribute anger to God. 2. What are the great ends of thoſe puniſhments God inflicts on men on the account of ſin.

Of the nature of Anger in God; the ſatisfaction to be made to it.

X. For the firſt, though our Adverſaries are very unwilling to allow the term of *punitive juſtice*, yet they contend for a *punitive anger* in God, and that

that in the worſt ſenſe as it is *appetitus vindictæ*: for after *Crellius* hath contended that this is the proper notion of anger in general; *neither ought any one to ſay*, he adds, *that anger as other paſſions is attributed improperly to God; for ſetting aſide the imperfections, which thoſe paſſions are ſubject to in us, all the reſt is to be attributed to him, taking away then that perturbation, and pain, and grief we find in our ſelves in anger, to which the abhorrency of ſin anſwers in God, all the reſt doth agree to him.* I would he had a little more plainly told us what he means by *all the reſt*, but we are to gueſs at his meaning by what went before, where he allows of *Cicero*, and *Ariſtotle*'s definition of *Anger*, whereof the one is, that it is *libido*, or (as *Crellius* would rather have it,) *cupiditas puniendi*, the other ὄρεξις μετὰ λύπης τιμωρίας, &c. and himſelf calls it *pœnæ appetitio*, and in another place, that it may be as properly defined *cupiditas vindictæ*, as *cupiditas pœnæ* or *affectus vindicandi*, as well as *puniendi*: in all which places, he doth aſſert ſuch an anger in God as ſuppoſes ſuch a motion, or deſire, or inclination to puniſh ſin when it is committed, as there is in us when an injury is done us, only

Crell. cap. ſect. 1. p. 145. p. 177.

Cicer. Tuſcul 4. Ariſt. Rhet. l. 2. c. 2.

Crell. c. 2. ſect. 22. p. 177.

ly the perturbation and pain excluded. But he hath not thought fit to explain how ſuch new motions or inclinations in the divine nature every time ſin is committed, are conſiſtent with the immutability and perfection of it; nor what ſuch a kind of deſire to puniſh in God imports, whether a meer inclination without the effect, or an inclination with the effect following: if *without the effect*, then either becauſe the ſin was not great enough, or God's honour was not concerned to do it, and in this caſe the ſame reaſons which make the effect not to follow, make the deſire of it inconſiſtent with the divine wiſdom and perfection: or elſe becauſe the effect is hindred by the repentance of the perſon, or ſome other way which may make it not neceſſary to do it; then upon the ſame reaſon the effect is ſuſpended, the inclination to do it ſhould be ſo too; for that muſt be ſuppoſed to be governed by an eternal reaſon and counſel as well as his actions; unleſs ſome natural paſſions in *God* be ſuppoſed antecedent to his own wiſdom and counſel, which is derogatory to the infinite perfection of God, ſince thoſe are judged imperfections in our ſelves: if it be taken only

with

with the effect following it, then God can never be ſaid to be angry but when he doth puniſh, whereas his *wrath is ſaid to be kindled* in Scripture, where the effect hath not followed; which if it implies any more than the high provocation of God to puniſh (as I ſuppoſe it doth not) then this inclination to puniſh is to be conceived diſtinct from the effect following it. But that conception of *anger in God* ſeems moſt agreeable to the divine nature, as well as to the *Scriptures*, which makes it either *the puniſhment it ſelf*, as *Crellius* elſewhere acknowledges it is often taken ſo; or *God's declaration of his will to puniſh*, which is called *the revelation of the wrath of God againſt all unrighteouſneſs of men*, God thereby diſcovering the juſt diſpleaſure he hath againſt ſin; or *the great provocation of God to puniſh*, by the ſins of men; as when *his wrath* is ſaid, *to be kindled*, &c. By this ſenſe we may eaſily reconcile all that the Scripture ſaith concerning the *wrath of God*; we make it agreeable to infinite perfection, we make no ſuch alterations in God, as the appeaſing of his anger muſt imply, if that imply any kind of commotion in him. And thus the grand difficulty of *Crellius*

Crell. de verâ Relig. l. 1. *c.* 30.

Crell cap. 7. ſect. 3. p. 350.

pears to be none at all, againſt all thoſe paſſages of Scripture which ſpeak of *appeaſing God*, of *atonement*, and *reconciliation*, viz. *that if they prove ſatisfaction, they muſt prove that God being actually angry with mankind before the ſufferings of his Son, he muſt be preſently appeaſed upon his undergoing them.* For no more need to be ſaid, than that God being juſtly provoked to puniſh the ſins of mankind, 'was pleaſed to accept of the ſufferings of his Son, as a ſufficient ſacrifice of Atonement for the ſins of the world, on conſideration of which he was pleaſed to offer thoſe terms of pardon, which upon mens performance of the conditions required on their part, ſhall be ſufficient to diſcharge them from that obligation to puniſhment which they were under by their ſins. And what abſurdity, or incongruity there is in this to any principle of reaſon I cannot imagine. But our Adverſaries firſt make opinions for us, and then ſhew they are unreaſonable. They firſt ſuppoſe that anger in God is to be conſidered as a paſſion, and that paſſion a deſire of revenge for ſatisfaction of it; and then tell us, that if we do not prove, that this deſire of revenge can be ſatisfied

fied by the ſufferings of Chriſt, then we can never prove the doctrine of ſatisfaction to be true; whereas we do not mean by God's anger any ſuch paſſion, but the juſt declaration of God's will to puniſh upon our provocation of him by our ſins; we do not make the deſign of ſatisfaction to be, that God may pleaſe himſelf in the revenging the ſins of the guilty upon the moſt innocent perſon; becauſe we make the deſign of puniſhment, not to be the ſatisfaction of anger as a deſire of revenge, but to be the vindication of the honour and rights of the injured perſon, by ſuch a way as himſelf ſhall judge moſt ſatisfactory to the ends of his Government.

XI. (2.) Which is the next thing we are to clear: For which end we ſhall make uſe of the Conceſſion of *Crellius*, *That God hath prefixed ſome ends to himſelf in the Government of mankind; which being ſuppoſed, it is neceſſary, that impenitent ſinners ſhould be puniſhed.* What theſe ends of God are, he before tells us, when he enquires into the ends of Divine puniſhments, which he makes to be, *ſecurity for the future, by mens avoiding ſins, and a kind* εὐδοκία, *or pleaſure which God takes in the deſtruction of his*

Of the ends of divine puniſhments. *Crell. c.* 2. *ſect.* 29. *p.* 129.

p. 195.

implacable enemies, and the aſſerting and vindicating his own right by puniſhing, and ſhewing men thereby, with what care and fear they ought to ſerve him; and ſo attains the ends of puniſhment propoſed by Lactantius, *and manifeſtation of the Divine Honour and Majeſty, which hath been violated by the ſins of men.* All theſe we accept of, with this caution, That the delight which God takes in the puniſhing his implacable enemies, be not underſtood of any pleaſure in their miſery, as ſuch, by way of meer revenge; but as it tends to the vindication of his Right, and Honour, and Majeſty; which is an end ſuitable to the Divine Nature: but the other cannot in it ſelf have the notion of an end; for an end doth ſuppoſe ſomething deſirable for it ſelf, which ſurely the miſeries of others cannot have to us, much leſs to the Divine Nature. And that place which *Crellius* inſiſts on to prove the contrary, *Deut.* 28. 63. *The Lord will rejoyce over you, to deſtroy you*; imports no more, than the ſatisfaction God takes in the execution of his Juſtice, when it makes moſt for his honour, as certainly it doth in the puniſhment of his greateſt enemies. And this is to be underſtood in a ſenſe agreeable to

thoſe other places, where God is ſaid *not to delight in the death of ſinners*; which doth not (as *Crellius* would have it) meerly expreſs *God's benignity and mercy*, but ſuch an agreeableneſs of the exerciſe of thoſe attributes to God's nature, that he neither doth nor can delight in the miſeries of his creatures in themſelves, but as they are ſubſervient to the ends of his Government, and yet ſuch is his kindneſs in that reſpect too, that he uſeth all means agreeable thereto, to make them avoid being miſerable, to advance his own glory. And I cannot but wonder that *Grotius*, who had aſſerted the contrary in his Book of *Satisfaction*, ſhould in his Books *De Jure belli ac pacis*, aſſert, *That when God puniſheth wicked men, he doth it for no other end but that he might puniſh them:* For which he makes uſe of no other arguments, than thoſe which *Crellius* had objected againſt him; *viz. The delight God takes in puniſhing, and the judgments of the life to come, when no amendment can be expected*; the former hath been already anſwered, the latter is objected by *Crellius* againſt him, when he makes the ends of puniſhment, merely to reſpect the community, *which cannot be aſſerted of the puniſhments*

Ezek. 18. v. 23, 32. c. 33. 11.

Grot de ſatisfact. c. 2. p. 43. Ed. 1617.

Grot. de jure belli, &c. l. 2. c. 20. ſect. 4.

ments of another Life, which muſt chiefly reſpect the vindication of God's glory, in the puniſhment of unreclaimable ſinners. And this we do not deny to be a juſt puniſhment, ſince our Adverſaries themſelves, as well as we, make it neceſſary. But we are not to underſtand, that the end of Divine puniſhments doth ſo reſpect the community, as though God himſelf were to be excluded out of it; for we are ſo to underſtand it, as made up of God as the Governour, and mankind as the perſons governed, whatever then tends to the vindication of the rights of God's Honour and Sovereignty, tends to the good of the whole, becauſe the manifeſtation of that end is ſo great an end of the whole.

The ends of Divine puniſhments different in this and the future ſtate.

XII. But withal, though we aſſert in the life to come, the ends of puniſhment not to be the reclaiming of ſinners, who had never undergone them, unleſs they had been unreclaimable; yet a vaſt difference muſt be made between the ends of puniſhments in that, and in this preſent ſtate. For the other is the *Reſerve*, when nothing elſe will do, and therefore was not primarily intended; but the proper ends of puniſhment, as a part of Government, are

are to be taken from the deſign of them in this life. And here we aſſert, that God's end in puniſhing, is the advancing his Honour, not by the meer miſeries of his creatures, but that men by beholding his ſeverity againſt ſin, ſhould break off the practice of it, that they may eſcape the puniſhments of the future ſtate. So that the ends of puniſhment here, are quite of another kind, from thoſe of another life; for thoſe are inflicted, becauſe perſons have been unreclaimable by either the mercies or puniſhments of this life; but theſe are intended, that men ſhould ſo far take notice of this ſeverity of God, as to avoid the ſins which will expoſe them to the wrath to come. And from hence it follows, That whatſoever ſufferings do anſwer all theſe ends of Divine puniſhments, and are inflicted on the account of ſin, have the proper notion of puniſhments in them, and God may accept of the undergoing them as a full *ſatisfaction* to his Law, if they be ſuch as tend to break men off from ſin, and aſſert God's right, and vindicate his Honour to the world; which are the ends aſſigned by *Crellius*, and will be of great conſequence to us in the following Diſcourſe.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

I. *The particular ſtate of the Controverſie, concerning the ſufferings of Chriſt. The Conceſſions of our Adverſaries.* II. *The debate reduced to two heads: The firſt concerning Chriſt's ſufferings, being a puniſhment for ſin, entred upon. In what ſenſe* Crellius *acknowledgeth the ſins of men, to have been the impulſive cauſe of the death of Chriſt.* III. *The ſufferings of Chriſt proved to be a puniſhment, from Scripture. The importance of the phraſe of bearing ſins.* IV. *Of the Scape-Goats bearing the ſins of the people into the Wilderneſs.* V. Grotius *his ſenſe of* 1 Pet. 2. 24. *vindicated againſt* Crellius *and himſelf.* Ἀναφέρειν *never uſed for the taking away a thing by the deſtruction of it.* VI. Crellius *his ſenſe examined.* VII. Iſa. 53. 11. *vindicated. The argument from* Matt. 8. 17, *anſwered.* Grotius *conſtant to himſelf in his notes on that place.* VIII. Iſa. 53. 5, 6, 7. *cleared.* IX. *Whether Chriſt's death be a proper* παράδειγμα, *and whether that doth imply, that it was a puniſhment of ſin? How far*

far the puniſhments of Children for their Fathers faults, are exemplary among men. The diſtinction of calamities and puniſhments, holds not here. X. *That God's hatred of ſin could not be ſeen in the ſufferings of Chriſt, unleſs they were a puniſhment of ſin, proved againſt* Crellius. XI. Grotius *his Arguments from Chriſt being made ſin and a curſe for us, defended. The liberty our Adverſaries take in changing the ſenſe of Words.* XII. *The particles* διὰ, ἕνεκα, ὑπὲρ, *being joyned to ſins and relating to ſufferings do imply thoſe ſufferings to be a puniſhment for ſin. According to their way of interpreting Scripture, it had been impoſſible for our doctrine to be clearly expreſſed therein.*

I. THESE things being thus far cleared concerning the nature and ends of puniſhments, and how far they are of the nature of debts, and conſequently what kind of ſatisfaction is due for them, the reſolution of the grand Queſtion concerning the ſufferings of Chriſt will appear much more eaſie; but that we may proceed with all poſſible clearneſs in a debate of this conſequence, we muſt yet a little

The particular ſtate of the controverſie concerning the ſufferings of Chriſt for us.

little more narrowly examine the difference between our Adverſaries and us in this matter; for their conceſſions are in terms ſometimes ſo fair, as though the difference were meerly about words without any conſiderable difference in the thing it ſelf. If we charge them with denying ſatisfaction, *Crellius* anſwers in the name of them, *that we do it unjuſtly; for they do acknowledge a ſatisfaction worthy of God, and agreeable to the Scriptures.* If we charge them with denying that our ſalvation is obtained by the death of Chriſt, they *aſſert the contrary*, as appears by the ſame Author. Nay, *Ruarus* attributes *merit to the death of Chriſt too.* They acknowledge, *that Chriſt died for us*, nay, *that there was a commutation between Chriſt and us, both of one perſon for another, and of a price for a perſon*; and *that the death of Chriſt may be ſaid to move God to redeem us*; they acknowledge *reconciliation, and expiation of ſins to be by the death of Chriſt.* Nay, they aſſert, *that Chriſt's death was by reaſon of our ſins, and that God deſigned by that to ſhew his ſeverity againſt ſin.* And what could we deſire more, if they meant the ſame thing by theſe words, which we do? They aſſert a *ſatisfaction*, but

Crell. præf. p. 7.

Ruarus in Epiſtol.
Crell. cap. 9. ſect 2.
Cap. 10. ſect. 10.
Cap. 7, 8, &c.
Cap. 1. ſect. 57.

but it is ſuch a one as is *meerly fulfilling the deſire of another;* in which ſenſe all that obey God may be ſaid to ſatisfie him. They attribute our ſalvation to the death of Chriſt, but only *as a condition intervening*, upon the performance of which the Covenant was confirmed, and himſelf taken into Glory, that he might free men from the puniſhment of their ſins. They attribute *merit* to Chriſt's death but in the ſame ſenſe that *we may merit* too, when we do what is pleaſing to God. They acknowledge, *that Chriſt died for us*, but *not in our ſtead*, but *for our advantage*; that there was a *commutation*; but not ſuch a one, as that the Son of God did lay down his blood as a *proper price* in order to our redemption as the *purchaſe* of it; when they ſpeak of a *moving cauſe*, they tell us, they mean no more than *the performance of any condition* may be ſaid *to move*, or as our prayers and repentance do. The *reconciliation* they ſpeak of, doth not at all reſpect *God* but *us*; they aſſert *an expiation of ſins* conſequent upon the death of Chriſt, but not depending upon it any otherwiſe, than as a *condition* neceſſary for his admiſſion to the office of a High Prieſt in Heaven, there

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to expiate our ſins by his power, and not by his blood; but they utterly deny, that the death of Chriſt is to be conſidered as a *proper expiatory ſacrifice for ſin*; or that it hath any further influence upon it, than as it is conſidered as a means of the confirmation of the truth of his Doctrine, and particularly the promiſe of remiſſion of ſins, on which, and not on the death of Chriſt they ſay our remiſſion depends; but ſo far as the death of Chriſt may be an argument to us to believe his Doctrine, and that faith may incline us to obedience, and that obedience being the condition in order to pardon, at ſo many removes they make the death of Chriſt to have influence on the remiſſion of our ſins. They aſſert, *that God took occaſion by the ſins of men to exerciſe an act of dominion upon Chriſt in his ſufferings, and that the ſufferings of Chriſt were intended for the taking away the ſins of men*; but they utterly deny, *that the ſufferings of Chriſt were to be conſidered as a puniſhment for ſin; or that Chriſt did ſuffer in our place and ſtead*; nay, they contend with great vehemency, *that it is wholly inconſiſtent with the juſtice of God to make one mans ſins the meritorious cauſe of anothers puniſhment; eſpecially one wholly*

ly innocent, and ſo that the guilty ſhall be freed on the account of his ſufferings. Thus I have endeavoured to give the true ſtate of the controverſie with all clearneſs and brevity. And the ſubſtance of it will be reduced to theſe two debates.

1. Whether the ſufferings of Chriſt in general are to be conſidered *as a puniſhment of ſin*, or as *a meer act of dominion*?

2. Whether the death of Chriſt in particular were *a proper expiatory ſacrifice for ſin*, or only *an antecedent condition to his exerciſe of the Office of Prieſthood in Heaven*?

II. (1.) Whether the ſufferings of Chriſt in general are to be conſidered as a puniſhment of ſin, or as a meer act of dominion? for that it muſt be one or the other of theſe two, cannot be denied by our Adverſaries; for the inflicting thoſe ſufferings upon Chriſt, muſt either proceed from an antecedent meritorious cauſe, or not. If they do, they are then puniſhments; if not, they are meer exerciſes of power and dominion; whatever ends they are intended for, and whatever recompence be made for them. So *Crellius* aſſerts, *that God as abſolute Lord of all, had a right of abſolute dominion upon the life and body of Chriſt, and* Whether the ſufferings of Chriſt are to be conſidered as a puniſhment of ſin.

Crell. cap. 2. ſect. 1. p. 142.

therefore might juſtly deliver him up to death, and give his body to the Croſs; and although Chriſt by the ordinary force of the Law of Moſes, *had a right to eſcape ſo painful and accurſed a death, yet God by the right of dominion had the power of diſpoſal of him, becauſe he intended to compenſate his torments with a reward infinitely greater than they were: but becauſe* he ſaith, *for great ends the conſent of Chriſt was neceſſary, therefore God did not uſe his utmoſt dominion in delivering him up by force as he might have done, but he dealt with him by way of command, and rewards propoſed for obedience, and in this ſence he did act as a righteous Governour, and indulgent Father, who encouraged his Son to undergo hard, but great things.* In which we ſee that he makes the ſufferings of Chriſt an act of *meer dominion* in God, without any *antecedent cauſe* as the *reaſon* of them; only he qualifies this act of dominion with the propoſal of a reward for it. But we muſt yet further enquire into their meaning, for though here *Crellius* attributes the ſufferings of Chriſt meerly to God's *dominion*, without any reſpect to ſin, yet elſewhere he will allow a reſpect that was had to ſin antecedently to the ſufferings

ferings of Chriſt, and that the ſins of men were *the impulſive cauſe* of them. And although *Socinus* in one place utterly denies *any lawful antecedent cauſe of the death of Chriſt, beſides the will of God and Chriſt*, yet *Crellius* in his Vindication ſaith, *by lawful cauſe*, he meant *meritorious*, or ſuch upon ſuppoſition of which *he ought to die*; for elſewnere he makes *Chriſt to die for the cauſe, or by the occaſion of our ſins*; which is the ſame that *Crellius* means by an *impulſive*, or *procatartick cauſe*. Which he thus explains, *we are now to ſuppoſe a decree of God not only to give ſalvation to Mankind, but to give us a firm hope of it in this preſent ſtate, now our ſins by deſerving eternal puniſhment, do hinder the effect of that decree upon us, and therefore they were an impulſive cauſe of the death of Chriſt, by which it was effected, that this decree ſhould obtain notwithſtanding our ſins. But we are not to underſtand as tho this were done by any expiation of the guilt of ſin by the death of Chriſt; but this effect is hindred by three things, by taking away their ſins, by aſſuring men that their former ſins, and preſent infirmities upon their ſincere obedience ſhall not be imputed to them, and that the effect of that decree ſhall obtain, all which*, ſaith he, *is*

Crell. cap. 1. *ſect.* 7. &c. *Socin. de Chriſto ſervat. l.* 3. *c.* 10. *Crell. cap.* 1. *ſect.* 16. *Socin. l.* 2. *c.* 7.

Crell. c. 1. *ſect.* 11.

effected morte Chriſti interveniente, *the death of Chriſt intervening, but not as the procuring cauſe.* So that after all theſe words he means no more by making our ſins *an impulſive cauſe of the death of Chriſt*, but that the death of Chriſt was an argument to confirm to us the truth of his Doctrine, which doctrine of his doth give us aſſurance of theſe things: and that our ſins when they are ſaid to be *the impulſive cauſe*, are not to be conſidered with a reſpect to *their guilt*, but to that *diſtruſt of God* which our ſins do raiſe in us; which diſtruſt is in truth according to this ſenſe of *Crellius the impulſive cauſe*, and not the *ſins* which were the cauſe or occaſion of it. For that was it which the doctrine was deſigned to remove, and our ſins only as the ca[illegible]es of that. But if it be ſaid, *that he ſpeaks not only of the diſtruſt, but of the puniſhment of ſin as an impediment which muſt be removed too, and therefore may be called an impulſive cauſe*, we are to conſider that the removal of this is not attributed to the death of Chriſt, but to the leaving of our ſins by the belief of his Doctrine; therefore the puniſhment of our ſins cannot, unleſs in a very remote ſenſe, be ſaid to be an *impulſive cauſe* of that, which

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for all that we can obſerve by *Crellius*, might as well have been done without it; if any other way could be thought ſufficient to confirm his Doctrine, and Chriſt, without dying, might have had power to ſave all them that obey him. But we underſtand not an impulſive cauſe in ſo remote a ſenſe, as though our ſins were a *meer occaſion of Chriſts dying*, becauſe the death of Chriſt was one argument among many others to believe his Doctrine, the belief of which would make men leave their ſins; but we contend for a nearer and more proper ſenſe, *viz.* that the death of Chriſt was primarily intended for the *expiation of our ſins*, with a reſpect to *God* and not to us, and therefore our ſins as an *impulſive cauſe* are to be conſidered as they are ſo diſpleaſing to God, that it was neceſſary for the Vindication of God's Honour, and the deterring the world from ſin, that no leſs a Sacrifice of Atonement ſhould be offered, than the blood of the Son of God. So that we underſtand an *impulſive cauſe* here in the ſenſe, that the ſins of the people were, under the Law, the cauſe of the offering up thoſe Sacrifices, which were appointed for the expiation of them. And as in thoſe Sacrifices

there were two things to be conſidered, *viz.* the mactation, and the oblation of them, the former as a *puniſhment* by a ſubſtitution of them in place of the perſons who had offended; the latter as the proper Sacrifice of Atonement, although the mactation it ſelf, conſidered with the deſign of it, was a Sacrificial act too: So we conſider the ſufferings of Chriſt with a two-fold reſpect, either as *to our ſins*, as the impulſive cauſe of them, ſo they are to be conſidered as a *puniſhment*, or as *to God*, with a deſign to expiate the guilt of them, ſo they are a *Sacrifice of Atonement*. The firſt conſideration is that we are now upon, and upon which the preſent debate depends, for if the ſufferings of Chriſt be to be taken under the notion of *puniſhment*, then our Adverſaries grant, that our ſins muſt be an impulſive cauſe of them in another ſenſe than they underſtand it. For the clearing of this, I ſhall prove theſe two things.

1. That no other ſenſe ought to be admitted of the places of *Scripture* which ſpeak of the ſufferings of Chriſt with a reſpect to ſin, but this.

2. That this *Account* of the ſufferings of Chriſt, is no ways repugnant to the *Juſtice* of God.

III. That

III. That no other ſenſe ought to be admitted of the places of Scripture, which ſpeak of the ſufferings of Chriſt with a reſpect to our ſins, but that they are to be conſidered as a puniſhment for them. Such are thoſe which ſpeak of *Chriſt bearing our ſins, of our iniquities being laid upon him, of his making himſelf an offering for ſin, and being made ſin and a curſe for us, and of his dying for our ſins.* All which I ſhall ſo far conſider, as to vindicate them from all the exceptions which *Socinus* and *Crellius* have offered againſt them.

The ſufferings of Chriſt proved to be a puniſhment from Scripture. 1 Pet. 2. 24. Iſa. 53. 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11. 2 Cor. 5. 21. Gal. 3. 13. Rom. 4. 25.

1. Thoſe which ſpeak of *Chriſt's bearing our ſins.* As to which we ſhall conſider, Firſt, The importance of the phraſe in general of bearing ſin, and then the circumſtances of the particular places in diſpute. For the importance of the phraſe, *Socinus* acknowledges, *that it generally ſignifies bearing the puniſhment of ſin in Scripture: but that ſometimes it ſignifies taking away.* The ſame is confeſſed by *Crellius*, but he ſaith, *it doth not always ſignifie bearing proper puniſhment, but it is enough* (ſays he) *that one bears ſomething burdenſome on the occaſion of others ſins: and ſo Chriſt by undergoing his ſufferings by occaſion of ſins, may be ſaid to bear our*

Soc. de ſervat. l. 2. cap. 4.

Crell. cap. 1. Sect. 32.

ſins. And for this ſenſe he quotes *Numb.* 14. 33. *And your Children ſhall wander in the Wilderneſs forty years, and bear your whoredoms, until your carcaſſes be waſted in the Wilderneſs. Whereby,* ſaith he, *it is not meant that God would puniſh the Children of the* Iſraelites, *but that by the occaſion of their parents ſins, they ſhould undergo that trouble, in wandring in the Wilderneſs, and being deprived of the poſſeſſion of the promiſed Land.* But could *Crellius* think that any thing elſe could have been imagined, (ſetting aſide a total deſtruction) a greater inſtance of God's ſeverity, than that was to the Children of *Iſrael* all their circumſtances being conſidered? Is it not ſaid, that *God did ſwear in his wrath, they ſhould not enter into his reſt*? Surely then the debarring them ſo long of that reſt, was an inſtance of God's wrath, and ſo according to his own principles muſt have ſomething of *Vindicta* in it, and therefore be a proper puniſhment. The truth is, our Adverſaries allow themſelves in ſpeaking things moſt repugnant to Humane Nature in this matter of puniſhments, that they may juſtifie their own *hypotheſis.* For a whole Nation to be for forty years debarred from the greateſt

Pſal. 95. 11. Heb. 3. 11.

bleſſings

bleſſings were ever promiſed them; and inſtead of enjoying them, to endure the miſeries and hardſhips of forty years travels in a barren wilderneſs, muſt not be thought a puniſhment, and only becauſe occaſioned by their Parents ſins. But whatever is inflicted on the account of ſin, and with a deſign to ſhew God's ſeverity againſt it, and thereby to deter others from the practice of it, hath the proper notion of puniſhment in it; and all theſe things did concurr in this inſtance, beſides the general ſenſe of mankind in the matter of their puniſhment, which was ſuch, that ſuppoſing them preſerved in their liberty, could not have been imagined greater. And therefore *Vatablus*, whom *Socinus* and *Crellius* highly commend, thus renders thoſe words, *dabunt pœnas pro fornicationibus veſtris quibus defeciſtis à Deo veſtro:* they ſhall ſuffer the puniſhment of your fornications. And that bearing the ſins of Parents doth imply properly bearing the puniſhment of them, methinks they ſhould not ſo earneſtly deny, who contend that to be the meaning of the words in *Ezekiel*, *The Son ſhall not bear the iniquity of the Father*; viz. *that he ſhall not bear the puniſhment of his Fathers ſins.*

Doctiſſimè & elegantiſſimè Vatablus ut ferè ſolet. *Soc. de ſerv. l. 1. c. 8.* *Crell. cap. 1. Sect. 31.*

Ezek. 18. 20.

ſins. Where in bearing iniquity with a reſpect to their Parents ſins, by their own confeſſion, muſt be taken for the proper puniſhment; for otherwiſe they do not deny, but Children, notwithſtanding that ſentence, may undergo much affliction on the occaſion of their Parents ſins.

Crell. cap. 4. ſect. 15.

Of the Scape-Goats bearing away the ſins of the people.

IV. But *Socinus* further objects, *that bearing ſins doth not imply the puniſhment of them, becauſe the Scape-Goat under the Law, is ſaid to bear upon him the iniquities of the people, and yet could not be ſaid to be puniſhed for them.* To which *Grotius* anſwers, *that* Socinus *takes it for granted without reaſon, that the Scape-Goat could not be ſaid to be puniſhed for the ſins of the people; for puniſhment in general, may fall upon beaſts for the ſins of men,* Gen. 9. 5. Exod. 21. 28. Lev. 20. 15. Gen. 8. 21. *and* Socinus *hath no cauſe to ſay, that the Scape-Goat was not ſlain; for the Jewiſh Interpreters do all agree that he was, and however the ſending him into the Wilderneſs was intended as a puniſhment, and moſt probably by an unnatural death.* To which *Crellius* replies, *That in the general, he denies not but puniſhment may fall upon beaſts as well as men;* but (that he might ſhew himſelf true

Socin. 2. c. 4. Lev. 16. 22. Grot. de ſat. cap. 1.

Crell cap. 1. ſect. 56.

true to his principle, that one cannot be puniſhed for anothers faults,) he falls into a very pleaſant diſcourſe, *That the Beaſts are not ſaid to be puniſhed for mens ſins, but for their own, and therefore when it is ſaid, before the flood, that all fleſh had corrupted his way; he will by no means* Gen. 6. 12. *have it underſtood only of men, but that the ſins of the beaſts at that time, were greater than ordinary, as well as mens.* But he hath not told us what they were, whether by eating ſome forbidden herbs; or entring into conſpiracies againſt mankind their lawful Sovereigns, or unlawful mixtures; and therefore we have yet reaſon to believe, that when God ſaith, *the ground was curſed for man's ſake*, that Gen. 8. 21. the beaſts were puniſhed for mans ſin. And if *all fleſh*, muſt comprehend *beaſts* Iſa. 40. 5. in this place, why ſhall not *all fleſh ſeeing the glory of the Lord*, take in the beaſts there too? for *Vatablus* parallels this place with the other. *But if*, ſaith *Crellius, any ſhall contend that ſome beaſts at leaſt were innocent, then*, he ſaith, *that thoſe though they were deſtroyed by the flood, yet did not ſuffer puniſhment, but only a calamity by occaſion of the ſins of men.* I wonder he did not rather ſay, that the innocent beaſts were taken into the Ark,

for

for the propagation of a better kind afterwards. But by this ſolemn diſtinction of *calamities* and *puniſhments*, there is nothing ſo miſerable, that either men or beaſts can undergo, but when it ſerves their turn, it ſhall be only a calamity and no puniſhment, though it be ſaid to be on purpoſe to ſhew God's ſeverity againſt the ſins of the world. And this excellent notion of the *beaſts being puniſhed for their own ſins*, is improved by him to the vindication of the *Scape-Goat* from being *puniſhed, becauſe then*, ſaith he, *the moſt wicked and corrupt Goat ſhould have been made choice of.* As though all the deſign of that great day of expiation had been only to call the Children of *Iſrael* together with great ſolemnity; to let them ſee, how a poor Goat muſt be puniſhed for breaking the Laws which we do not know were ever made for them. I had thought our Adverſaries had maintained that the Sacrifices (on the day of expiation at leaſt) had repreſented and typified the Sacrifice which was to be offered up by Chriſt; and ſo *Socinus* and *Crellius* elſewhere contend: he needed not therefore have troubled himſelf concerning the ſins of the Goat, when it is expreſly ſaid, *That the ſins of*

Lev. 16. 21.

the

the people were put on the head of the Goat; Whatever then the puniſhment were, it was on the account of the ſins of the people, and not his own. But *Crellius* urgeth againſt *Grotius*, *that if the Scape-Goat had been puniſhed for the expiation of the ſins of the people, that ſhould have been particularly expreſſed in Scripiure, whereas nothing is ſaid there at all of it, and that the throwing down the Scape-Goat from the top of the rock, was no part of the Primitive Inſtitution, but one of the ſuperſtitions taken up by the Jews in after-times, becauſe of the Ominouſneſs of the return of it*; *and although we ſhould ſuppoſe* (*which is not probable*) *that it ſhould die by famine in the Wilderneſs, yet this was not the death for expiation, which was to be by the ſhedding of blood.* To this therefore I anſwer, 1. I do not inſiſt on the cuſtoms of the later Jews to prove from thence any puniſhment deſigned by the primitive inſtitution. For I ſhall eaſily yield, that many ſuperſtitions obtained among them aftewards about the Scape-Goat; as the ſtories of the red liſt turning white upon the head of it, the booths and the cauſey made on purpoſe, and ſeveral other things mentioned in the Rabbinical Writers

Cod. Joma. tit. 6. Writers do manifeſt. But yet it ſeems very probable from the Text it ſelf, that the Scape-Goat was not carried into the Wilderneſs at large, but to a ſteep mountain there. For although we have commonly render'd *Azazel* by the *Scape-Goat*, yet according to the beſt of the Jewiſh writers, as *P. Fagius* tells us, עזאזל doth not come from עז a Goat, and אזל *abiit*; but is the name of a Mountain very ſteep and rocky near Mount *Sinai*, and therefore probably called by the later Jews, צור, the name of a *Rock*: and to this purpoſe, it is obſervable that where we render it, *and let him go for a Scape-Goat into the Wilderneſs*, in the *Hebrew* it is, לשלח אתו לעזאזל תפיברה *to ſend him to* Azazel *in the Wilderneſs*: as the joyning the prepoſition ל doth import, and the *Arabick* Verſion wherever *Azazel* is mentioned, renders it by Mount *Azaz*: and the *Chaldee* and *Syriack to Azazel*; ſo that from hence, a carrying the *Scape-Goat* to a certain place may be inferred; but I ſee no foundation in the Text for the throwing it down from the rock when it was there; and therefore I cannot think, but that if the puniſhment intended did lie in that, it would have been expreſly mentioned in the ſolemnities

Lev. 16. 12.

lemnities of that day, which had ſo great an influence on the expiation of the ſins of the people. 2. I anſwer, that the *Scape-Goat* was to denote rather the effect of the expiation, than the manner of obtaining it. For the proper expiation was *by the ſhedding of blood*, as the *Apoſtle* Heb. 9. 22. tells us; and thence the live Goat was not to have the ſins of the people *to bear away into the deſart, till the High-Prieſt had* Lev. 16. 20. *made an end of reconciling the Holy Place, and the Tabernacle of the Congregation, and the Altar; and by the ſprinkling of the blood of the other Goat which was the ſin-offering for the people*; which being V. 15. done, *he was to bring the live Goat, and to lay his hands upon the head of it, and confeſs over it all the iniquities of the Children of* Iſrael, *and all their tranſ-* V. 21. *greſſions in all their ſins, putting them upon the head of the Goat, and ſhall ſend him away by the hand of a fit man into the Wil-* V. 22. *derneſs; and ſo the Goat ſhall bear upon him all their iniquities unto a land not inhabited, and he ſhall let go the Goat in the Wilderneſs.* So that the former Goat noted the way of expiation by the ſhedding of blood, and the latter the effect of it, *viz.* that the ſins of the people were declared to be expiated by the ſending the

the Goat charged with their ſins into a deſart place; and that their ſins would not appear in the preſence of God againſt them, any more than they expected, that the Goat which was ſent into the Wilderneſs ſhould return among them. Which was the reaſon that afterwards they took ſo much care that it ſhould not, by cauſing it to be thrown off from a ſteep rock; which was no ſooner done, but notice was given of it very ſuddenly by the ſounding of horns all over the Land. But the force of *Socinus* his argument from the Scape-Goat's bearing the ſins of the people, that therefore that phraſe doth not always imply the bearing of puniſhment, is taken off by *Crellius* himſelf, who tells us, *that the Scape-Goat is not ſaid to bear the ſins of the people in the Wilderneſs; but only that it carried the ſins of the people into the Wilderneſs*, which is a phraſe of another importance from that we are now diſcourſing of. As will now further appear from the places where it is ſpoken of concerning our Saviour, which we now come particularly to examine.

Crell. c. 1. ſect. 56.

V. The

V. The first place insisted on by *Grotius* with a respect to Christ, is 1 *Pet.* 2. 24. *Who his own self bare our sins, in his own body on the tree, which,* saith *Crellius, is so far from proving that Christ did bear the punishment of our sins, that it doth not imply any sufferings that he underwent on the occasion of them.* He grants *that* ἀναφέρειν *doth signifie to carry up, but withall* (he saith) *it signifies to take away; because that which is taken up, is taken away from the place where it was.* Besides, he observes, *that* ἀναφέρειν *doth answer to the Hebrew* העלה, *he hath made to ascend, which is frequently rendred by it in the LXX. and sometime by* ἀνάγειν; *but that Hebrew word doth often signifie to take away, where it is rendred in the Greek by one of those two words,* 2 *Sam.* 21. 13. *Josh.* 24. 32. *Psal.* 102. 25. *Ezra* 1. 11. To which I answer, 1. That the signification of ἀναφέρειν in this place, must not be taken from every sense the word is ever used for, but in that which the words out of which these are taken do imply; and in *Isa.* 53. 11. it doth not answer העלה but to סבל, a word which by the confession of all is never properly used for taking away, but for bearing of a burden, and is used with a respect to the

Grotius his sense of 1 *Pet.* 2. 24. vindicated. *Crell. c.* 1. *sect.* 35.

puniſhment of ſin, *Lament.* 5. 7. *Our fathers have ſinned, and are not, and we have born their iniquities*, where the ſame word is uſed; ſo that the ſignification of the word ἀναφέρειν here, muſt depend upon that in *Iſaiah*, of which more afterward. 2. Granting that ἀναφέρειν doth anſwer ſometimes to the *Hebrew* העלה yet it makes nothing to *Crellius* his purpoſe, unleſs he can prove that ἀναφέρειν doth ever ſignifie the taking away a thing by the deſtruction of it; for where it anſwers to that word, it is either for the offering up of a Sacrifice, in which ſenſe ἀναφέρειν is very frequently uſed, as is confeſſed by *Crellius*; and in that ſenſe it is no prejudice at all to our cauſe; for then it muſt be granted, that Chriſt upon the Croſs is to be conſidered as a *ſacrifice* for the ſins of men; and ſo our ſins were laid upon him as they were ſuppoſed to be on the Sacrifices under the Law, in order to the expiation of them, by the ſhedding their blood; and if our Adverſaries would acknowledge this, the difference would not be ſo great between us; or elſe it is uſed for the removal of a thing from one place to another, the thing it ſelf ſtill remaining in being, as 2 Sam. 21. 13. *And he made* Saul's *bones to aſcend*,

ἀνή-

ἀνήνεγκεν ἐκεῖθεν τὰ ὀστα, *he took them away*, ſaith *Crellius*; true, but it is ſuch a taking away, as is a bare removal, the thing ſtill remaining; the ſame is to be ſaid of *Joſeph*'s bones, *Joſh.* 24. 32. which are all the places where ἀναφέρειν is uſed; and although ἀνάγειν may be ſometimes taken in another ſenſe, as *Pſal.* 102. 25. yet nothing can be more unreaſonable than ſuch a way of arguing as this is; ἀναφέρειν, ſaith *Crellius*, ſignifies *taking away*; we demand his proof of it; is it that the word ſignifies ſo much of it ſelf? *No*; that he grants it doth not. Is it that it is frequently uſed in the *Greek Verſion* to render a word that properly doth ſignifie ſo? *No*; nor that neither. But how is it then? *Crellius* tells us, that it ſometimes anſwers to a word that ſignifies to make to aſcend: well, but doth that word ſignifie *taking away*? *No*; not conſtantly, for it is frequently uſed for a *ſacrifice*: But doth it at any time ſignifie ſo? *Yes*; it ſignifies the removal of a thing from one place to another. Is that the ſenſe then he contends for here? *No*; but how then? why ἀναφέρειν is uſed to render the ſame word that ἀνάγειν doth, and ἀνάγειν, though it ſignifies too a bare removal, as *Ezra* 1. 11. yet *Pſal.* 102.

25. it is used for cutting off, μὴ ἀναγάγης μὲ, the Hebr. is, *make me not to ascend in the midst of my days.* But doth it here signifie utter destruction? I suppose not; but grant it, what is this to ἀναφέρειν, when the LXX useth not that word here, which for all that we know was purposely altered; so that at last ἀναφέρειν is far enough from any such signification as *Crellius* would fix upon it, unless he will assert, that Christ taking away our sins, was only a removal of them from Earth to Heaven. But here *Grotius* comes in to the relief of *Crellius* against himself; for in his Notes upon this place, though he had before said, that the word was never used in the New Testament in that sense, yet he there saith, ἀνήνεγκεν is *abstulit*, for which he referrs us to *Heb.* 9. 28. where he proceeds altogether as subtilly as *Crellius* had done before him, for he tells us ἀναφέρειν is put for φέρειν, נשׂא, *Numb.* 14. 33. *Deut.* 14. 24. *Isa.* 53. 12. but φέρειν, i. e. נשׂא is put for ἀφαιρεῖν, *Lev.* 10. 17. *Numb.* 14. 18. A most excellent way of interpreting Scripture? considering the various significations of the Hebrew words, and above all of that נשׂא which is here mentioned. For according to this way of arguing, ἀφαιρεῖν shall signifie the same with

with λαμβάνειν, ὑπέχειν, and βαστάζειν, for נשא ſignifies all theſe, and is rendred by them in the *Greek Verſion*, ſo that by the ſame way that *Grotius* proves that ἀναφέρειν ſignifies ἀφαιρεῖν, we can prove that ἀφαιρεῖν doth not ſignifie *to take away*, but *to bear puniſhment*; nay, נשא ſignifies *the bearing puniſhment* in the ſtricteſt ſenſe, *Ezek.* 16. 52, 54. and *bearing ſin* in that ſenſe, *Ezek.* 16. 58. *Thou haſt born thy leudneſs, and thy abominations,* נשאתיך. So that when נשא is more frequently uſed in this than in the other ſenſe, why ſhall its ſignifying ἀφαιρεῖν at any time make ἀναφέρειν be taken in the ſame ſenſe with that? Nay, I do not remember in any place where נשא is joyned with ſin, but it ſignifies the puniſhment of it, ſo ἁμαρτίαν λαμβάνειν, Lev. 19. 8. *to bear his iniquity*, Lev. 20. 17. ἁμαρτίαν κομιοῦνται, *bearing their iniquity*, in one verſe, is explained by *being cut off from among their people*, in the next. And in the places cited by *Grotius*, that *Numb.* 14. 33. hath been already ſhewed to ſignifie bearing the puniſhment of ſin, and that *Deut.* 14. 24. is plainly underſtood of a Sacrifice, the other, *Iſa.* 53. 12. will be afterwards made appear by other places in the ſame

Chapter, to signifie nothing to this purpose. So that for all we can yet see, ἀναφέρειν must be taken either for *bearing our sins* as a *sacrifice* did under the Law, or the *punishment* of them; in either sense it serves our purpose, but is far enough from our Adversaries meaning.

Crell. his sense examined.

VI. But supposing we should grant them, that ἀναφέρειν may signifie *to take away*, let us see what excellent sense they make of these words of St. *Peter*. Do they then say, that Christ did take away our sins upon the Cross? *No*; they have a great care of that, for that would make the expiation of sins to have been performed there; which they utterly deny, and say, that Christ only took the Cross in his way to his Ascension to Heaven, that there he might expiate sins. But doth not St. *Peter* say, that what was done by him here, was *in his body on the tree*; and they will not say, he carried that with him to Heaven too. Well, but what then was the taking away of sin which belonged to Christ upon the Cross? is it only to perswade men to live vertuously, and leave off their sins? This *Socinus* would have, and *Crellius* is "contented "that it should be understood barely of "taking away sins, and not of the pu-"nishment

Soc. de serv. l. 2. cap. 6. *Crell. cap. 7. Sect. 39.*

" niſhment of them, but only by way of
" acceſſion and conſequence: but if it be
" taken (*which he inclines more to*) for the
" puniſhment, then (*he ſaith*) it is to be Sect. 44.
" underſtood not of the vertue and effica-
" cy of the death of Chriſt, but of the ef-
" fect: *and yet a little after he ſaith*, thoſe
" words of Chriſt bearing our ſins, are to
" be underſtood of the force and efficacy
" of Chriſts death to do it, not including
" the effect of it in us; not as though
" Chriſt did deliver us from ſins by his
" death, but that he did that by dying,
" upon which the taking away of ſin
" would follow, or which had a great
" power for the doing it. So uncertain
are our Adverſaries, in affixing any ſenſe upon theſe words, which may attribute any effect at all, to the death of Chriſt upon the Croſs. For if they be underſtood of taking away ſins, then they are only to be meant of the power that was in the death of Chriſt, to perſwade men to leave their ſins; which we muſt have a care of underſtanding ſo, as to attribute any effect to the death of Chriſt in order to it; but only that the death of Chriſt was an argument for us to believe what he ſaid, and the believing what he ſaid would incline us to obey him, and

if we obey him, we ſhall leave off our ſins whether Chriſt had died or no: ſuppoſing his miracles had the ſame effect on us, which thoſe of *Moſes* had upon the *Jews*, which were ſufficient to perſwade them to believe and obey without his death. But if this be all that was meant by Chriſt's *bearing our ſins in his body on the tree*; why might not St. *Peter* himſelf be ſaid to bear them upon his Croſs too? for his death was an excellent example of patience, and a great argument to perſwade men he ſpake truth, and that doctrine which he preached, was repentance and remiſſion of ſins: So that by this ſenſe there is nothing peculiar attributed to the *death of Chriſt*. But taking the other ſenſe for the *taking away the puniſhment of ſins*, we muſt ſee how this belongs to the death of Chriſt: Do they then attribute our delivery from the puniſhment of ſin, to the death of Chriſt on the *Croſs*? yes, juſt as we may attribute *Cæſar*'s ſubduing *Rome*, to his paſſing over *Rubicon*, becauſe he took that in his way to the doing of it: ſo they make the death of Chriſt only as a paſſage, in order to expiation of ſins, by taking away the puniſhment of them. For that ſhall not be actually perfected, they

they ſay, till his full deliverance of all thoſe that obey him, from hell and the grave, which will not be till his ſecond coming. So that if we only take *the body* of Chriſt for his *ſecond coming*, and the *Croſs* of Chriſt, or the *tree*, for his *Throne of Glory*, then they will acknowledge, that Chriſt may very well be ſaid *to take away ſins in his own body on the tree:* but if you take it in any ſenſe that doth imply any peculiar efficacy to the death of Chriſt, for all the plainneſs of St. *Peter's* words, they by no means will admit of it.

VII. But becauſe *Crellius* urgeth *Grotius* with the ſenſe of that place, *Iſa.* 53. 11. out of which he contends theſe words are taken, and *Crellius* conceives he can prove there, *that bearing is the ſame with taking away ſin:* We now come to conſider, what force he can find from thence, for the juſtifying his aſſertion, *That the bearing of ſins, when attributed to Chriſt, doth not imply the puniſhment of them, but the taking them away.* The words are, *for he ſhall bear their iniquities.* As to which *Grotius* obſerves, *That the word* עון *which ſignifies iniquity, is ſometimes taken for the puniſhment of ſin,* 2 King. 7. 9. *and the verb* סבל *is to bear,*

Iſa. 53. 11. vindicated. *Crell. c.* 1. *ſect.* 35.

and

and whenever it is joyned with sin or iniquity, in all languages, and especially the Hebrew, it signifies to suffer punishment; for although נשא *may sometimes signifie to take away,* סבל *never does: so that this phrase can receive no other interpretation.* Notwithstanding all which *Crellius* attempts to prove, *That* סבל *here, must be taken in a sense contrary to the natural and perpetual use of the word*; for which his first argument is very infirm, *viz. because it is mentioned after the death of Christ, and is therefore to be considered as the reward of the other.* Whereas it appears: 1. By the *Prophets* discourse, that he doth not insist on an exact methodical order, but dilates and amplifies things as he sees occasion: for *Verse.* 9. he saith, *He made his grave with the wicked, and with the rich in his death*; and *Verse* 10. he said, *Yet it pleased the Lord to bruise him, he hath put him to grief:* Will *Crellius* therefore say, that this must be consequent to his death and burial? 2. The particle ו may be here taken causally, as we render it, very agreeably to the sense; and so it gives an account of the foregoing clause, *By his knowledge, shall my righteous servant justifie many, for he shall bear their iniquities.*

Crell. c. 1. *sect.* 44.

quities. And that this is no unuſual acception of that particle, might be eaſily cleared from many places of *Scripture* if it were neceſſary; and from this very *Prophet*, as *Iſa.* 39. 1. where וישמע is the ſame with כי שמע 2 *King.* 20. 12. and *Iſa.* 64. 5. *Thou art wroth, for we have ſinned,* ונחטא where the ſame particle is made the caſual of what went before. But we need not inſiſt upon this to anſwer *Crellius*, who elſewhere makes uſe of it himſelf, and ſays, *They muſt be very ignorant of the Hebrew Tongue, who do not know that the conjunction copulative is often taken caſually*; and ſo much is confeſſed by *Socinus* alſo, where he explains that particle in one ſenſe in the beginning, and caſually in the middle of the verſe: *and the Lord's anger was kindled againſt Iſrael,* ויסת, *for he moved*, &c. but if this will not do, he attempts to prove, *That* סבל *in this very Chapter, hath the ſignification of taking away*, v. 4. *For he hath born our griefs, and carried our ſorrows*, which is applied by St. *Matth.* 8. 17. *to bodily diſeaſes, which our Saviour did not bear, but took away, as it is ſaid in the foregoing Verſe; he healed all that were ſick, on which thoſe words come in, That it might be fulfilled which was*

Crell. c. 9. *ſect.* 7. *p.* 463.

Soc. Prael. c. 14. *ſect.* 6.

2 Sam. 24. 1.

was ſpoken by Iſaias, &c. To which I anſwer: 1. It is granted by our Adverſaries, that St. *Matthew* in thoſe words, doth not give the full ſenſe of the *Prophet*, but only applies that by way of accommodation, to bodily diſeaſes, which was chiefly intended for the ſins of men. And in a way of accommodation it is not unuſual to ſtrain words beyond their genuine and natural ſignification, or what was intended primarily by the perſon who ſpake them. Would it be reaſonable for any to ſay that לקח ſignifies *to give*, becauſe that place, *Pſal.* 68. 18. where the word by all is acknowledged to ſignifie *to receive*, is rendred *to give*, *Eph.* 4. 8. ſo that admitting another ſenſe of the word here, as applied to the cure of bodily diſeaſes, it doth not from thence follow, that this ſhould be the meaning of the word in the primary ſenſe intended by the *Prophet*. 2. The word as uſed by St. *Matthew*, is very capable of the primary and natural ſenſe; for St. *Matthew* retains words of the ſame ſignification, with that which we contend for, ἀνέλαβε and ἔβάσασε, neither of which doth ſignifie taking away, by cauſing a thing not to be. So that all that is implied hereby,

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is the *pains* and *trouble* which our Saviour *took* in the healing of the ſick. For to that end, as *Grotius* well obſerves upon that place, the circumſtances are mentioned, *That it was at even, and multitudes were brought to him in St.* Matthew, Mat. 8.16. that *after Sun ſet all that were diſeaſed were brought, and all the City was gathered together at the door, in St.* Mark; Mat. 1. 32, *That he departed not till it was day, in St.* Luke; that we might the better underſtand how our Saviour did *bear our griefs*, becauſe the pains he took in healing them were ſo great. And here I cannot but obſerve, that *Grotius* in his Notes on that place, continued ſtill in the ſame mind he was in, when he writ againſt *Socinus*; for he ſaith, "Thoſe "words may either refer to the diſeaſes "of the body, and ſo they note the "pains he took in the cure of them; "or to our ſins, and ſo they were ful-"filled when Chriſt by ſuffering upon "the Croſs, did obtain remiſſion of ſins "for us, as St. *Peter* ſaith, 1 *Pet.* 2. 24. But upon what reaſon the *Annotations* on that place come to be ſo different from his ſenſe expreſſed here, long after *Crellius* his anſwer, I do not underſtand. But we are ſure he declared his mind, as to the 33. Luk. 4. 42.

the main of that Controverſie, to be the ſame, that it was when he writ his Book which *Crellius* anſwered; as appears by two Letters of his to *Voſſius*, not long ſince publiſhed; and he utterly diſowns the charge of *Socinianiſm*, as a calumny in his *diſcuſſion*, the laſt Book he ever writ.

Epiſt. Eccl. p. 747, 748. *Diſcuſſ.* p. 16, 17.

VIII. But we are no further obliged to vindicate *Grotius*, than he did the *truth*; which we are ſure he did in the vindication of the 53 of *Iſaiah*, from *Socinus* his interpretations, notwithſtanding what *Crellius* hath objected againſt him. We therefore proceed to other Verſes in the ſame Chapter inſiſted on by *Grotius*, to prove, *that Chriſt did bear the puniſhments of our ſins*, v. 6, 7. *The Lord hath laid on him the iniquities of us all: It is required, and he was afflicted*, as *Grotius* renders thoſe words. *Socinus* makes a two-fold ſenſe of the former clauſe; the firſt is, *That God by or with Chriſt did meet with our iniquities*; the latter, *That God did make our iniquities to meet with Chriſt.* The words ſaith *Grotius*, will not bear the former interpretation; *for the verb* הפגיע *being in Hiphil, muſt import a double action, and ſo it muſt not be, That God by him did meet with our ſins, but*

Iſa. 53. 5, 6, 7. vindicated.

De Servat. l. 2. *c.* 5.

but that God did make our ſins to meet upon him. To which *Crellius* replies, *That words in Hiphil are ſometimes uſed intranſitively*; but can he produce any inſtance in Scripture, where this word joyned with ב and את is ſo taken? for in the laſt verſe of the Chapter, the conſtruction is different: And what an uncertain way of interpreting *Scripture* will this be, if every Anomalous ſignification, and rare uſe of a word, ſhall be made uſe of to take away ſuch a ſenſe as is moſt agreeable to the deſign of the place. For that ſenſe we contend for, is not only enforced upon the moſt natural importance of theſe words, but upon the agreeableneſs of them with ſo many other expreſſions of this Chapter, that *Chriſt did bear our iniquities*, and *was wounded for our tranſgreſſions*, and that *his ſoul was made an offering for ſin*: to which it is very ſuitable, that as the iniquities of the people were (as it were) laid upon the head of the Sacrifice; ſo it ſhould be ſaid of Chriſt, who was to offer up himſelf for the ſins of the world. And the *Jews* themſelves by this phraſe do underſtand the puniſhment either for the ſins of the people, which *Joſias* underwent, or which the people

Crell. c. 1. ſect. 52.

people themſelves ſuffered, by thoſe who interpret this prophecy of them. To which purpoſe, *Aben Ezra* obſerves, that *iniquity is here put for the puniſhment of it*, as 1 *Sam.* 28. 10. and *Lam.* 4. 6. But *Socinus* miſtruſting the incongruity of this Interpretation, flies to another; *viz. That God did make our iniquities to meet with Chriſt:* And this we are willing to admit of, if by that they mean, That Chriſt underwent the puniſhment of them; as that phraſe muſt naturally import, for what otherwiſe can *our iniquities meeting with him* ſignifie? For the word פגע taken properly (as *Socinus* acknowledgeth it ought to be, when he rejects *Pagnin's* Interpretation of making Chriſt to interceed for our iniquities) ſignifies, either to meet with one by chance, or out of kindneſs, or elſe for an encounter, with an intention to deſtroy that which it meets with. So *Judg.* 8. 21. *Riſe thou* בנו ופגע, ἀπάντησον ἡμῶν, LXX. *irrue in nos, fall upon us*; *i. e.* run upon us with thy ſword, and kill us. *Judg.* 15. 12. *Swear unto me, that ye will not fall upon me your ſelves*; where the ſame word is uſed, and they explain the meaning of it in the next words, *v.* 13. *We will not kill thee*, Amos 5. 19. *as if a man*

a man did flee from a Lyon, and a Bear met him, ופגעו, i. e. *with a deſign to kill him.* Now I ſuppoſe they will not ſay that our ſins met with Chriſt by Chance, ſince it is ſaid, that *God laid on him,* &c. not out of kindneſs; it muſt be therefore out of enmity, and with a deſign to deſtroy him; and ſo our ſins cannot be underſtood as *Socinus* and *Crellius* would have them, as the meer occaſions of Chriſt's death: but as the proper impulſive cauſe of it. Whether the following word נגש be taken with a reſpect to ſin, and ſo it properly ſignifies *It is required,* or with a reſpect to the perſon, and ſo it may ſignifie *he was oppreſſed,* is not a matter of that conſequence, which we ought to contend about; if it be proved that Chriſt's oppreſſion had only a reſpect to ſin, as the puniſhment of it. Which will yet further appear from another expreſſion in the ſame Chapter, v. 5. *The chaſtiſement of our peace was upon him, and by his ſtripes we are healed.* In which *Grotius* ſaith "the word מוסר doth "not ſignifie any kind of affliction, but "ſuch as hath the nature of puniſhment, "either for example or inſtruction; but "ſince the latter cannot be intended in "Chriſt, the former muſt. *Crellius* thinks

Crell. c. 1. ſect. 57.

thinks to escape from this, by acknowledging, *that the sufferings of Christ have some respect to sin*; but if it be such a respect to sin, which makes what Christ underwent a punishment (which is only proper in this case) it is as much as we contend for. This therefore he is loth to abide by; and saith *that chastisement imports no more than bare affliction without any respect to sin*, which he thinks to prove from St. *Paul*'s words, 2 Cor. 6. 9. *We are chastised, but not given over to death*; but how far this is from proving his purpose will easily appear, 1. Because those by whom they were said *to be chastened*, did not think they did it without any respect to a fault; but they supposed them to be justly punished; and this is that we plead for, that the chastisement considered with a respect to him that inflicts it, doth suppose some fault as the reason of inflicting it. 2. This is far from the present purpose, for the *chastisement* there mention'd is opposed to death, *as chastened, but not killed*; whereas *Grotius* expressly speaks of such *chastisements as include death*, that these cannot be supposed to be meerly designed for instruction, and therefore must be conceived under the notion of punishment.

ment. The other place, *Psal.* 73. 14. is yet more remote from the business; for though the *Psalmist* accounts himself innocent in respect of the great enormities of others; yet he could not account himself so innocent with a respect to God, as not to deserve chastisement from him.

IX. But *Crellius* offers further to prove that Christ's death must be considered as a bare affliction, and not as a παράδειγμα, or exemplary punishment, because "in such a punishment the guilty themselves are to be punished, and "the benefit comes to those who were "not guilty, but in Christ's sufferings "it was quite contrary, for the innocent was punished, and the guilty "have the benefit of it: and yet (*he "saith*) if we should grant that Christ's "sufferings were a παράδειγμα, that "will not prove that his death was a "proper punishment. To which I answer, That whatever answers to the ends of an *exemplary punishment*, may properly be called so: but supposing that Christ suffered the punishment of our sins, those sufferings will answer to all the ends of an exemplary punishment. For the ends of such a punish-

Whether Christ's death be a proper κόλασις, and whether that doth imply that it was a punishment of sin.

ment assigned by *Crellius* himself, are, "That others observing such a punish-"ment, may abstain from those sins "which have brought it upon the per-"son who suffers. Now the question is, whether supposing Christ did suffer on the account of our sins, these sufferings of his may deterr us from the practice of sin or no? And therefore in opposition to *Crellius*, I shall prove these two things: 1. That supposing Christ suffered for our sins, there was a sufficient argument to deterr us from the practice of sin. 2. Supposing that his sufferings had no respect to our sins, they could not have that force to deterr men from the practice of it: for he after asserts, *That Christ's sufferings might be a* παράδειγμα *to us, though they were no punishment of sin.* 1. That the death of Christ considered as a punishment of sin, is a proper παράδειγμα, or hath a great force to deterr men from the practice of sin: and that because the same reason of punishment is supposed in Christ and in our selves, and because the example is much more considerable, than if we had suffered our selves. 1. The same reason of punishment is supposed. For why are men deterred

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from ſin, by ſeeing others puniſhed; but becauſe they look upon the ſin as the reaſon of the puniſhment; and therefore where the ſame reaſon holds, the ſame ends may be as properly obtained. If we ſaid that Chriſt ſuffered death meerly as an innocent perſon out of God's dominion over his life; what imaginable force could this have to deterr men from ſin, which is aſſerted to have no relation to it as the cauſe of it? But when we ſay, that *God laid our iniquities upon him*, that he ſuffered not upon his own account but ours, that the ſins we commit againſt God were the cauſe of all thoſe bitter Agonies which the Son of God underwent, what argument can be more proper to deterr men from ſin than this is? For hereby they ſee the great abhorrency of ſin which is in God, that he will not pardon the ſins of men without a compenſation made to his Honour, and a demonſtration to the world of his hatred of it. Hereby they ſee what a value God hath for his Laws, which he will not relax as to the puniſhment of offenders, without ſo valuable a conſideration as the blood of his own Son. Hereby they ſee, that the puniſhment of ſin is

no meer arbitrary thing depending barely upon the will of God; but that there is such a connexion between sin and punishment as to the ends of Government, that unless the Honour and Majesty of God, as to his Laws and Government may be preserved, the violation of his Laws must expect *a just recompence of reward*. Hereby they see what those are to expect who neglect or despise these sufferings of the Son of God for them; for nothing can then remain, but *a certain fearful looking for of judgment and fiery indignation which shall devour the Adversaries*. So that, here all the weighty arguments concur which may be most apt to prevail upon men to deterr them from their sins. *For if God did thus by the green tree, what will he do by the dry?* If he who was so innocent in himself, so perfectly holy, suffered so much on the account of our sins; what then may those expect to suffer, who have no innocency at all to plead, and add wilfulness and impenitency to their sins? But if it be replied by *Crellius*, *that it is otherwise among men*: I answer, that we do not pretend in all things to parallel the sufferings of Christ for us, with any sufferings of men for one another. But

yet we add, that even among men the punishments inflicted on those who were themselves innocent as to the cause of them, may be as exemplary as any other. And the greater appearance of severity there is in them, the greater terror they strike into all offenders. As Children's losing their estates and honours, or being banished for their Parents treasons in which they had no part themselves. Which is a proper punishment on them of their Father's faults, whether they be guilty or no? and if this may be just in men, why not in God? If any say, *that the Parents are only punished in the Children*, he speaks that which is contradictory to the common sense of mankind; for punishment doth suppose sense or feeling of it; and in this case the Parents are said to be punished, who are supposed to be dead and past feeling of it, and the Children who undergo the smart of it must not be said to be punished; though all things are so like it, that no person can imagine himself in that condition, but would think himself punished, and severely too. If it be said, *that these are calamities indeed, but they are no proper punishments*, it may easily be shewed that distinction

will not hold here. Because these punishments were within the design of the Law, and were intended for all the ends of punishments, and therefore must have the nature of them. For therefore the Children are involved in the Father's punishment on purpose to deterr others from the like actions. There are some things indeed that Children may fall into by occasion of their Father's guilt, which may be only *calamities* to them, because they are necessary consequents in the nature of the thing, and not purposely design'd as a punishment to them. Thus, being deprived of the comfort and assistance of their Parents, when the Law hath taken them off by the hand of justice: this was designed by the Law as a punishment to the Parents, and as to the Children it is only a necessary consequent of their punishment. For otherwise the Parents would have been punished for the Childrens faults, and not the Children only involved in that which unavoidably follows upon the Parents punishment. So that *Crellius* is very much mistaken either in the present case of our Saviour's punishment, or in the general reason of exemplary punishments, as among men. But the

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case of our Saviour is more exemplary, when we consider the excellency of his person, though appearing in our nature, when no meaner sufferings would satisfie, than of so transcendent a nature as he underwent, though he were the Eternal Son of God, this must make the punishment much more exemplary, than if he were considered only as our Adversaries do, as *a mere man*. So that the dignity of his person under all his sufferings may justly add a greater consideration to deterr us from the practice of sin, which was so severely punished in him, when he was pleased to be a Sacrifice for our sins. From whence we see that the ends of a παράδειγμα are very agreeable with the sufferings of Christ considered as a punishment of sin.

X. We now consider whether as *Crellius* asserts, supposing Christ's death were no punishment, it could have these effects upon mens minds or no? *Yes*, he saith, *it might, because by his sufferings we might see how severely God would punish wicked and obstinate persons.* Which being a strange riddle at the first hearing it, *viz.* that by the sufferings of an innocent person without any respect to sin as the cause of them: we should discern

God's hatred of sin could not be seen in the sufferings of Christ, if they were no punishment of sin. *Crell. c.* 1. *p.* 69.

cern God's severity against those who are obstinate in sin; we ought the more diligently to attend to what is said for the clearing of it. "*First*, saith he, If "God spared not his own most innocent "and holy and only Son, than whom "nothing was more dear to him in Hea-"ven or Earth, but exposed him to so "cruel and ignominious a death; how "great and severe sufferings may we "think God will inflict on wicked men, "who are at open defiance with him? I confess my self not subtle enough to apprehend the force of this argument, *viz.* If God dealt so severely with him who had no sin either of his own or others to answer for; therefore he will deal much more severely with those that have. For God's severity considered without any respect to sin, gives rather encouragement to sinners, than any argument to deterr them from it. For the natural consequence of it is, that God doth act arbitrarily, without any regard to the good or evil of mens actions; and therefore it is to no purpose to be sollicitous about them. For upon the same account that the most innocent person suffers most severely from him, for all that we know, the more we strive to be inno-

innocent, the more ſeverely we may be dealt with, and let men ſin, they can be but dealt ſeverely with; all the difference then is, one ſhall be called *puniſhments*, and the other calamities, but the ſeverity may be the ſame in both. And who would leave off his ſins meerly to change the name of *puniſhments* into that of *calamities*? And from hence it will follow, that the differences of good and evil, and the reſpects of them to puniſhment and reward, are but airy and empty things; but that God really in the diſpenſation of things to men, hath no regard to what men are or do, but acts therein according to his own Dominion, whereby he may diſpoſe of men how or which way he pleaſes. If a Prince had many of his Subjects in open rebellion againſt him, and he ſhould at that time make his moſt obedient and beloved Son to be publickly expoſed to all manner of indignities, and be diſhonoured and put to death by the hands of thoſe rebels; could any one imagine that this was deſigned as an exemplary puniſhment to all rebels, to let them ſee the danger of rebellion? *No*, but would it not rather make them think him a cruel Prince, one that would puniſh innocency

nocency as much as rebellion; and that it was rather better to ſtand at defiance, and become deſperate, for it was more dangerous to be beloved than hated by him, to be his Son than his declared Enemy? ſo that inſiſting on the death of Chriſt as it is conſidered as a προλῆψις, (for of that we ſpeak now) there is no compariſon between our Adverſaries *hypotheſis* and *ours*; *but*, ſaith *Crellius*, *the conſequence is not good on our ſide, if Chriſt ſuffered the puniſhment of our ſins, therefore they ſhall ſuffer much more who continue in ſin, for Chriſt ſuffered for the ſins of the whole world; but they ſuffer only for their own, and what they have deſerved themſelves.* To which I anſwer, that the argument is of very good force upon our *hypotheſis*, though it would not be upon theirs. For if we ſuppoſe him to be *a meer man* that ſuffered, then there could be no argument drawn from his ſufferings to ours, but according to the exact proportion of ſins and puniſhments: but ſuppoſing that he had a *divine* as well as *humane nature*, there may not be ſo great a proportion of the ſins of the world to the ſufferings of Chriſt, as of the ſins of a particular perſon to his own ſufferings; and therefore the argument

gument from one to the other doth ſtill hold. For the meaſure of puniſhments muſt be taken with a proportion to the dignity of the perſon who ſuffers them. And *Crellius* himſelf confeſſeth elſewhere, *that the dignity of the perſon is to be conſidered in exemplary puniſhment, and that a leſſer puniſhment of one that is very great, may do much more to deterr men from ſin, than a greater puniſhment of one much leſs.* But he yet further urgeth, *that the ſeverity of God againſt ſinners may be diſcovered in the ſufferings of Chriſt, becauſe God's hatred againſt ſin is diſcovered therein.* But if we ask how God's hatred againſt ſin is ſeen in the ſufferings of one perfectly innocent and free from ſin, and not rather his hatred of innocency, if no reſpect to ſin were had therein: he anſwers, *That God's hatred againſt ſin was manifeſted, in that he would not ſpare his only Son to draw men off from ſin.* For anſwer to which, we are to conſider the ſufferings of Chriſt as an innocent perſon, deſigned as an exemplary cauſe to draw men off from ſin; and let any one tell me, what hatred of ſin can poſſibly be diſcovered, in propoſing the ſufferings of a moſt innocent perſon to them without any conſi-

Crell. c. 8. ſect. 43.

Crell. c. 1. ſect. 57, 70.

deration

deration of sin as the cause of those sufferings? If it be said, *That the Doctrine of Christ was designed to draw men off from sin, and that God suffered his Son to die to confirm this Doctrine, and thereby shewed his hatred to sin.* I answer, 1. This is carrying the dispute off from the present business, for we are not now arguing about the design of Christ's Doctrine, nor the death of Christ as a means to confirm that, but as a satisfaction, and what power that hath without respect to our sins as the cause of them, to draw us from sin, by discovering God's hatred to it. 2. The Doctrine of Christ according to their *hypothesis*, discovers much less of God's hatred to sin than ours doth. For if God may pardon sin without any compensation made to his Laws or Honour, if repentance be in its own nature a sufficient satisfaction for all the sins past of our Lives; if there be no such a Justice in God which requires punishment of sin committed; if the punishment of sin depend barely upon God's will; and the most innocent person may suffer as much from God without respect to sin as the cause of suffering, as the most guilty; let any rational man judge whether this Doctrine discovers as much God's abhor-

rency

rency of sin, as asserting the necessity of vindicating God's honour to the World, upon the breach of his Laws, if not by the suffering of the offenders themselves, yet of the Son of God as a sacrifice for the expiation of sin, by undergoing the punishment of our iniquities, so as upon consideration of his sufferings, he is pleased to accept of repentance and sincere obedience, as the conditions upon which he will grant remission of sins, and eternal life. So that if the discovery of God's hatred to sin be the means to reclaim men from it, we assert upon the former reasons, that much more is done upon our Doctrine concerning the sufferings of Christ, than can be upon theirs. So much shall suffice to manifest in what sense Christ's death may be a ἱλαστήριον, and that this doth imply, that his sufferings are to be considered as a punishment of sin.

XI. The next Series of places which makes Christ's sufferings to be a punishment for sin, are those which assert Christ to be made *sin and a curse for us*, which we now design to make clear, ought to be understood in no other sense, for as *Grotius* saith, "As the *Jews* sometimes "use sin, for the punishment of sin; "as

Grotius his arguments from Christ's being made sin and a curse for us defended against *Crellius*.

"as appears, besides other places, by *Zach.* 14. 19. *Gen.* 4. 13. so they call "him that suffers the punishment of "sin, by the name of sin; as the Latins "use the word *Piaculum*, both for the "fault, and for him that suffers for it. "Thence under the Law, an expiatory "Sacrifice for sin, was called sin, *Lev.* 4. "29—5, 6. *Psal.* 40. 7. Which way of "speaking *Isaias* followed, speaking of "Christ, *Isai.* 53. 10. וְאָשָׁם נַפְשׁוֹ "he made his soul sin, *i. e.* liable to the "punishment of it. To the same pur"pose St. *Paul*, 2 *Cor.* 5. 21. He made "him to be sin for us, who knew no "sin, that we might be made the right"eousness of God in him. To which "*Crellius* replies, That as there is no "necessity, that by the name of sin, "when applied to sufferings, any more "should be implied, than that those "sufferings were occasioned by sin; no "more is there when it is applied to "the person; nay, much less, for in "saith, No more is required to this, "but that he should be handled as sin"ners use to be, and undergo the mat"ter of punishment, without any re"spect to sin, either as the cause or oc"casion of it. So he saith, The name

Crell. c. 1. sect. 60.

"Sinner

" *Sinner* is used, 1 *King.* 1. 21. and in " St. *Paul*, the name of sin in the first " clause is to be understood, as of righ- " teousness in the latter; and as we are " said to be righteousness in him, when " God deals with us as with righteous " persons, so Christ was said to be sin " for us, when he was dealt with as a " sinner. And the Sacrifices for sin un- " der the Law were so called, not with " a respect to the punishment of sin, but " because they were offered upon the " account of sin, and were used for ta- " king away the guilt of it, or because " men were bound to offer them, so that " they sinned if they neglected it. So " that all that is meant by *Esaias* and " St. *Paul* is, That Christ was made an " expiatory Sacrifice, or that he expos'd " himself for those afflictions which sin- " ners only by right undergo. But let *Crellius* or any others of them tell me, if the *Scripture* had intended to express, that the sufferings of Christ were a pu- nishment of our sins, how was it possible to do it more emphatically than it is done by these Expressions (the custom of the *Hebrew* Language being considered) not only by saying, that *Christ did bear our sins*, but, *that himself was made sin for*

us? those phraſes being ſo commonly uſed for the puniſhment of ſin. Let them produce any one inſtance in Scripture, where thoſe expreſſions are applied to any without the conſideration of ſin: that place, 1 *King.* 1. 21. is very far from it; for in all probability, the deſign of *Bathſheba* in making *Solomon King* was already diſcovered, which was the reaſon that *Adonijah* his elder Brother declaring himſelf *King*, invited not him with the reſt of the *King*'s ſons: All that ſhe had for *Solomon*'s ſucceſſion, was a ſecret promiſe and oath of *David*; and therefore ſhe urgeth him now to *declare the ſucceſſion*, v. 20. *Otherwiſe*, ſhe ſaith, *when David ſhould die, I and my ſon Solomon ſhall be accounted offenders*; i. e. ſaith *Crellius*, *we ſhall be handled as offenders, we ſhall be deſtroyed*: But ſurely not without the ſuppoſition of a fault; by them which ſhould inflict that puniſhment upon them: The plain meaning is, they ſhould be accuſed of Treaſon, and then puniſhed accordingly. But we are to conſider, that ſtill with a reſpect to them, who were the inflicters, a fault or ſin is ſuppoſed as the reaſon of their puniſhment, either of their own or others. But of our Saviour it is not ſaid,

That

That he should be counted as an offender by the Jews; for although that doth not take away his innocency, yet it supposeth an accusation of something, which in it self deserves punishment. But in *Esai.* 53. 10. It is said, *He made his soul sin*; and 2 Cor. 5. 21. *That God made him sin for us*, which must therefore imply, not being dealt with by men only as a sinner, but that with a respect to him who inflicted the punishment, there was a consideration of sin as the reason of it. We do not deny but God's suffering him to be dealt with as a sinner by men, is implied in it, for that was the method of his punishment designed; but we say further, that the reason of that permission in God, doth suppose some antecedent cause of it: For God would never have suffered his only Son, to be so dealt with by the hands of cruel men, unless he had made himself *an offering for sin*; being willing to undergo those sufferings, that he might be an expiatory Sacrifice for the sins of the world. And although *Socinus* will not yield, *That by being made sin for us should be understood Christ's being an expiatory Sacrifice for sin*; yet *Crellius* is contented *it should be so taken in both places*: Which if he

Socin. l. 1. c. 2.

will grant, ſo as by vertue of that Sacrifice, the guilt of ſin is expiated, we ſhall not contend with him about the reaſons, why thoſe Sacrifices were called *ſins*, although the moſt proper and genuine muſt needs be that, which is aſſigned by the Law, that the ſins of the people were ſuppoſed to be laid upon them, and therefore they were intended for the expiation of them: But it is very unreaſonable to ſay, *That expiatory Sacrifices were called ſins, becauſe it would have been a ſin to neglect them:* For on the ſame account, all the other Sacrifices muſt have been called ſo too; for it was a ſin to neglect any when God required them, and ſo there had been no difference between Sacrifices for ſin and others. To that reaſon of *Crellius, from our being made righteous, becauſe dealt with as ſuch, to Chriſt's being made ſin only, becauſe dealt with as a ſinner*, we need no more than what this parallel will afford us; For as *Crellius* would never ſay, that any are dealt with as righteous perſons, who are not antecedently ſuppoſed to be ſo by his own Argument, Chriſt being dealt with *as a ſinner*, muſt ſuppoſe guilt antecedent to it; and ſince the Apoſtle declares

clares it was not his own, in those words, *Who knew no sin*, it follows that it must be the consideration of ours, which must make him be dealt with as a sinner by him, who made him to be sin for us. But to suppose that Christ should be said to be *made sin*, without any respect *to sin*, is as much as if the *Latins* should call any one *Scelus*, and mean thereby a very honest man; or a *Piaculum*, without any supposition of his own or others guilt. But we are to consider, that the sufferings of Christ, seeming at first so inconsistent with that relation to God as his only Son, which the Apostles assert concerning him, they were obliged to vindicate his innocency, as to men, and yet withal to shew, that with a respect to God, there was sufficient reason for his permission of his undergoing these sufferings. That *he knew no sin*, was enough to clear his innocency as to men; but then the question will be asked, If he were so innocent, why did God suffer all those things to come upon him? Did not *Abraham* plead of old with God, *That he would not slay the righteous with the wicked*, because it was repugnant to the righteousness of his nature to do so; *That be far from thee to* Gen. 18. 25.

him

him so for us; and can we imagine all this to be without any respect to the guilt of sin, as the cause of it? Why should such an expression be used of *being made sin*, might not many others have served sufficiently to declare the indignities and sufferings he underwent, without such a phrase as seems to reflect upon Christ's innocency? If there had been no more in these expressions than our Adversaries imagine, the Apostles were so careful of Christ's honour, they would have avoided such ill-sounding expressions as these were, and not have affected *Hebraisms*, and uncouth forms of speech, to the disparagement of their Religion. But this is all which our Adversaries have to say, where words are used by them out of their proper sense. *That the Prophets and Apostles affected tricks of wit, playing with words, using them sometimes in one sense, and presently quite in another.* So *Crellius* saith of *Isaiah*, *That he affects little elegancies of words and verbal allusions, which makes him use words sometimes out of their proper and natural sense*; thence he tells us, *The sufferings of Christ are called chastisements, though they have nothing of the nature of chastisements in them*: And from

Crell. cap. 1. Sect. 37.

this liberty of interpreting, they make words (without any other reason, than that they serve for their purpose) be taken in several senses in the same verse: For *Socinus* in one verse of St. *John*'s Gospel, makes the *World* to be taken in three several senses: *He was in the World*, there it is taken, saith he, for the men of the World in general: *The world was made by him*, there it must be understood only of the reformation of things by the Gospel: and, *the world knew him not*, there it must be taken in neither of the former senses, but for the wicked of the world: What may not one make of the *Scripture*, by such a way of interpreting it? But by this we have the less reason to wonder, that *Socinus* should put such an Interpretation upon *Gal.* 3. 13. *Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the Law, being made a curse for us; for it is written, Cursed is every one that hangeth on a tree:* In which he doth acknowledge *by the curse*, in the first clause to be meant, *the punishment of sin*, but not in the second: And the reason he gives for it is, *amavit enim Paulus in execrationis verbo argutus esse.* St. *Paul* affected playing with the word *curse*, understanding it first in a proper, and then a Metaphorical sense.

Socin. explicat. 1. cap. Joh. v. 19.

Socin. de Christo servat. l. 2. c. 1.

But

But it is plain that the design of S. *Paul* and *Socinus* are very different in these words: *Socinus* thinks he speaks only Metaphorically, when he saith, that *Christ was made a curse for us*; *i. e.* by a bare allusion of the name, without a correspondency in the thing it self; and so that the death of Christ might be called a curse, but was not so: But St. *Paul* speaks of this not by way of extenuation, but to set forth the greatness and weight of the punishment he underwent for us. He therefore tells us, what it was which Christ did redeem us from, *The curse of the Law*; and how he did it, *by being not only made a curse, but a curse for us*; *i. e.* not by being hateful to God, or undergoing the very same curse, which we should have done; which are the two things objected by *Crellius* against our sense; but that the death of Christ was to be considered, not as a bare separation of soul and body, but as *properly pœnal*, being such a kind of death, which none but *Malefactors* by the *Law* were to suffer; by the undergoing of which punishment in our stead, he redeemed us from that *curse* which we were liable to by the violation of the Law of God. And there can be no reason to appropriate this *only*

ly to the Jews, unleſs the death of Chriſt did extend only to the deliverance of them from the puniſhment of their ſins; or becauſe the curſe of the Law did make that death pœnal, therefore the intention of the puniſhment, could reach no further than the Law did; but the Apoſtle in the very next words ſpeaks of the farther extenſion of *the great bleſſing promiſed to* Abraham, *That it ſhould come upon the Gentiles alſo*; and withal thoſe whom the Apoſtle ſpeaks to, were not *Jews*, but ſuch as thought they ought to joyn the Law and Goſpel together: that St *Paul* doth not mean as *Crellius* would have it, *that Chriſt by his death did confirm the New Covenant, and ſo take away the obligation of the Law*; (for to what end was the *curſe* mentioned for that? What did the *accurſedneſs* of his death add to the confirmation of the truth of his Doctrine? and when was ever the curſe taken for the continuance of the Law of *Moſes*?) but that Chriſt by the efficacy of his death as a puniſhment for ſin hath redeemed all that believe and obey him from the curſe deſerved by their ſins, whether inforced by the *Law* of *Moſes*, or the Law written in their hearts, which tells the con-

Crell. Annot. in loc.

consciences of sinners, that such who violate the Laws of God are worthy of death, and therefore under the curse of the Law.

XII. We come now to the force of the particles which being joyned with our sins as referring to the death of Christ, do imply that his death is to be considered as a punishment of sin. Not that we insist on the force of those particles διὰ, περὶ and ὑπὲρ, as though of themselves they did imply this (for we know they are of various significations according to the nature of the matter they are joyned with) but that these being joyned with sins and suffering together, do signifie that those sufferings are the punishment of those sins. Thus it is said of Christ, that he dyed, διὰ τὰ παραπτώματα ἡμῶν, *for our sins*, ὑπὲρ ἁμαρτιῶν ἡμῶν, *that he suffered once* περὶ ἁμαρτιῶν, *that he gave himself* περὶ ἁμαρτιῶν, *that he offered a Sacrifice* περὶ ἁμαρτιῶν. To which *Crellius* replies, "That if the force of these "particles not being joyned with sufferings, may be taken for the final and "not for the impulsive cause, they "may retain the same sense when joyned with sufferings, if those sufferings "may be designed in order to an end;

The particles διὰ, περὶ, ὑπὲρ being joyned to sins, and relating to sufferings, do imply those sufferings to be the punishment of sin.

Rom. 4. 25. 1 Cor. 15. 3. 1 Pet. 3. 18. Heb. 10. 12.

Crell. cap. 1. sect. 6.

"but

Sect. 14. p. 17. " but if it ſhould be granted, that thoſe " phraſes being joyned with ſufferings, " do always imply a meritorious cauſe, " yet it doth not follow, it ſhould be " here ſo underſtood becauſe the matter " will not bear it. To this a ſhort anſwer will at preſent ſerve: for, It is not poſſible a meritorious cauſe can be expreſſed more emphatically than by theſe words being joyned to ſufferings: ſo that we have as clear a teſtimony from theſe expreſſions as words can give; and by the ſame arts by which theſe may be avoided any other might; ſo that it had not been poſſible for our Doctrine to have been expreſſed in ſuch a manner, but ſuch kind of anſwers might have been given as our Adverſaries now give. If it had been ſaid in the plaineſt terms, *that Chriſt's death was a puniſhment for our ſins*, they would as eaſily have avoided the force of them as they do of theſe; " they would have told us the Apoſtles " delighted in an Antanaclaſis, and had " expreſſed things different from the na- " tural uſe of the words by them; and " though puniſhment were ſometimes " uſed properly, yet here it muſt be uſed " only metaphorically becauſe the mat- " ter would bear no other ſenſe. And

there,

therefore I commend the ingenuity of *Socinus* after all the pains he had taken to enervate the force of thoſe places which are brought againſt his Doctrine; he tells us plainly, "That if our Doctrine "were not only once, but frequently "mentioned in Scripture? yet he would "not therefore believe the thing to be "ſo as we ſuppoſe. For, *ſaith he*, ſee-"ing the thing it ſelf cannot be, I take "the leaſt inconvenient interpretation "of the words; and draw forth ſuch a "ſenſe from them, as is moſt conſiſtent "with it ſelf and the tenor of the Scri-"pture. But for all his talking of the tenor of the *Scripture*; by the ſame reaſon he interprets one place upon theſe terms, he will do many, and ſo the tenor of the *Scripture* ſhall be never againſt him: and by this we find, that the main ſtrength of our Adverſaries is not pretended to lie in the *Scriptures*; all the care they have of them is only to reconcile them if poſſible with their *hypotheſis*; for they do not deny but that the natural force of the words doth imply what we contend for; but becauſe they ſay the Doctrine we aſſert is inconſiſtent with reaſon, therefore all their deſign is to find out any other poſſible meaning which they there-

Socin. de Servat. l. 3. c. 6.

therefore aſſert to be true, becauſe more agreeable to the common reaſon of mankind. This therefore is enough for our preſent purpoſe, that if it had been the deſign of Scripture to have expreſſed our ſenſe, it could not have done it in plainer expreſſions than it hath done, that no expreſſions could have been uſed, but the ſame arts of our Adverſaries might have been uſed to take off their force, which they have uſed to thoſe we now urge againſt them, and that ſetting aſide the poſſibility of the thing, the Scripture doth very fairly deliver the Doctrine we contend for; or, ſuppoſing in point of reaſon there may be arguments enough to make it appear poſſible, there are *Scriptures* enough to make it appear true.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

I. *The words of Scripture being at laſt acknowledged by our Adverſaries to make for us, the only pretence remaining is, that our Doctrine is repugnant to reaſon. The debate managed upon point of reaſon. The grand difficulty enquired into, and manifeſted by our Adverſaries conceſſions, not to lie in the greatneſs of Chriſt's ſufferings, or that our ſins were the impulſive cauſe of them, or that it is impoſſible that one ſhould be puniſhed for anothers faults: or in all caſes unjuſt.* II. *The caſes wherein* Crellius *allows it, inſtanced. From whence it is proved that he yields the main cauſe.* III. *The arguments propounded whereby he attempts to prove it unjuſt for Chriſt to be puniſhed for our ſins.* Crellius *his principles of the juſtice of puniſhments examined. Of the relation between deſert and puniſhment.* IV. *That a perſon by his own conſent may be puniſhed beyond the deſert of his own actions.* V. *An anſwer to* Crellius *his Objections. What it is to ſuffer undeſervedly.* Crellius *his miſtake in the ſtate of*

of the question. VI. *The instances of Scripture considered. In what sense Children are punished for their Parents sins.* VII. Ezek. 18. 20. *explained at large.* VIII. *Whether the guilty being freed from the sufferings of an innocent person makes that punishment unjust or no?* Grellius *his shifts and evasions in this matter discovered. Why among men the offenders are not freed in criminal matters though the sureties be punished. The release of the party depends on the terms of the sureties suffering, therefore deliverance not* ipso facto. *No necessity of such a translation in criminal, as is in pecuniary matters.*

The matter debated in point of reason.

I. HAving gained so considerable concessions from our *Adversaries* concerning the places of *Scripture*, we come now to debate the matter in point of reason. And if there appear to be nothing repugnant in the nature of the thing, or to the justice of God, then all their loud clamours will come to nothing; for on that they fix, when they talk the most of our Doctrine being contrary to reason. This therefore we now come more closely to examine, in order

der to which we must carefully enquire what it is they lay the charge of injustice in God upon, according to our belief of Christ's sufferings being a punishment for our sins.

1. It is not, *That the offenders themselves do not undergo the full punishment of their sins.* For they assert, that there is no necessity at all that the offenders should be punished from any punitive justice in God: for they eagerly contend that God may freely pardon the sins of men: if so, then it can be no injustice in God not to punish the offenders according to the full desert of their sins.

2. It is not, *That God upon the sufferings of Christ doth pardon the sins of men:* for they yield that God may do this without any charge of injustice, and with the greatest demonstration of his kindness. For they acknowledge, that the sufferings of Christ are not to be considered as a bare antecedent condition to pardon, but that they were a *moving cause* as far as the obedience of Christ in suffering was very acceptable to God.

3. It is not, *in the greatneſs or matter of the ſufferings of Chriſt.* For they aſſert the ſame which we do. And therefore I cannot but wonder to meet ſometimes with thoſe ſtrange out-crys *of our making God cruel in the puniſhing of his Son for us:* for what do we aſſert that Chriſt ſuffered, which they do not aſſert too? Nay, doth it not look much more like cruelty in God to lay thoſe ſufferings upon him without any conſideration of ſin? as upon their *hypotheſis* he doth; than to do it ſuppoſing he bears the puniſhment of our iniquities, which is the thing we plead for. They aſſert all thoſe ſufferings to be lawful on the account of *God's dominion*, which according to them muſt ceaſe to be ſo on the ſuppoſition of a *meritorious cauſe.* But however from this it appears, that it was not unjuſt that Chriſt ſhould ſuffer thoſe things which he did for us: the queſtion then is, whether it were unjuſt that he ſhould ſuffer the ſame things, which he might lawfully do on the account of dominion with a reſpect to our ſins as the cauſe of them.

Certum eſt Chriſtum innocentiſſimum à Deo graviſſimis cruciatibus, ipſaque morte fuiſſe affectum; cum non in materiâ pœna abſolute & per ſe conſideratâ, adeoque etiam in eâ afflictione à quâ pœnæ forma abeſt, injuria reſidere à nobis dicatur. Crel. c. 4. Sect. 3. *Potuit autem id Deus facere, atque adeo fecit, jure dominii, quod in Chriſti vitam ac corpus habebat; accedente præſertim ipſius Chriſti conſenſu.* Id. Ib. Sect. 4.

4. As

4. As to this, they acknowledge, that it is not, *that the ſufferings of Chriſt were occaſioned by our ſins*, or that our ſins were the bare *impulſive cauſe* of thoſe ſufferings. For they both confeſs in general, that one mans ſins may be the occaſion of anothers puniſhment, ſo far that he might have eſcaped puniſhment, if the others ſins had not been the *impulſive cauſe* of it. And therefore *Crellius* in the general ſtate of this queſtion, would not have it, *whether it be unjuſt to puniſh one for anothers ſins*; for that he acknowledges it is not, but whether, *for any cauſe whatſoever it be juſt to puniſh an innocent perſon?* And likewiſe in particular of Chriſt, they confeſs, *that our ſins were the impulſive cauſe, and the occaſion of his ſufferings.*

Quod ſi ex theſi ſpectale facere velis generalem, ea hæc erit, injuſtum eſſe punire innocentem, quacunque tandem de cauſâ id fiat; non vero ſimpliciter, punire quempiam ob aliena delicta; id enim concedi poteſt non ſemper eſſe injuſtum. Crel. c. 4. Sect. 3.

5. It is not, *that there is ſo neceſſary a relation between guilt and puniſhment, that it cannot be called a puniſhment which is inflicted on an innocent perſon.* For *Crellius*, after a long diſcourſe of the difference of afflictions and puniſhments, doth acknowledge, "That it is not of

Cum ne illud quidem ad naturam pœnæ requiratur, ut is ipse, qui puniendus est pœnam revera fuerit commeritus, Id. Sect. 5.

the nature of punishment, that the person who is to be punished, should really deserve the punishment; *and afterwards when* Grotius *urgeth*, that though it be essential to punishment, that it be inflicted for sin, yet it is not, that it be inflicted upon him who hath himself sinned, *which he shews*, by the similitude of rewards, which though necessary to be given in consideration of service, may yet be given to others besides the person himself upon his account. All this *Crellius* acknowledgeth; who saith, "They do not make it necessary to the nature, but to the justice of punishment, that it be inflicted upon none but the person who hath offended. *So by his own Confession*, it is not against the nature of punishment, that no one man suffer for anothers faults. From whence it follows, that all *Socinus* his arguments signifie nothing, which are drawn from the impossibility of the thing, *that one man should be punished for anothers faults*; for *Crellius* grants the thing to be possible, but denies it to be just; yet not absolutely neither, but with some restrictions and limitations. For,

Pœna quidem simpliciter in innocentem cadit, justa non cadit, Crell. c. 4. Sect. 28.

II. 6. It

II. 6. It is not, *but that there may be ſufficient cauſes aſſigned in ſome particular caſes; wherein it may be juſt for God to puniſh ſome for the ſins of others.* For *Crellius* himſelf hath aſſigned divers. " When there is ſuch a near conjunction " between them, that one may be ſaid " to be puniſhed in the puniſhment of " another: as Parents in their Children " and Poſterity, Kings in their Subjects, " or the body of a State in its Members, " either in the moſt, or the moſt prin- " cipal, though the feweſt: but we are to conſider how far he doth extend this way of puniſhment of ſome in others. 1. *At the greateſt diſtance of time, if they have been of the ſame Nation*; for he extends it to the utmoſt degree of God's patience towards a people; " For, *ſaith* " *he*, God doth not preſently puniſh as " ſoon as they have ſinned; but ſpares " for a great while, and forbears, in ex- " pectation of their repentance, in the " mean while a great many guilty per- " ſons die, and ſeem to have eſcaped pu- " niſhment. But at laſt the time of God's " patience being paſt, he puniſheth their " Poſterity by exacting the full pu- " niſhment of their ſins upon them, and " by this means puniſheth their Ance- " ſtors

In what caſes *Crellius* grants ſome may be lawfully puniſhed for the ſins of others.

Quia Deus hunc puniendo illum quoque alterum ob cujus peccati eum dicitur punire, ſimul punire poſſit, ob arctiorem quæ inter illos intercedit conjunctionem. Crell. ib. Sect. 5. *Crell.* p. 242.

" ſtors too, and puniſheth their ſins in " their puniſhment; for, *ſaith he*, all " that people are reckoned for one man " of ſeveral Ages, and that puniſhment " which is taken of the laſt, may be " for the ſins of the firſt, for the con- " junction and ſucceſſion of them: of " which we have an example, *ſaith he*, " in the deſtruction of *Jeruſalem.* By which we ſee a very remote conjunction, and a mere ſimilitude in comparing a ſucceſſion of Ages in a people with thoſe in a man, may (when occaſion ſerves) be made uſe of to juſtifie God's puniſhing one Generation of men for the ſins of others that have been long before.

2. *When ſins are more ſecret or leſs remarkable which God might not puniſh, unleſs an occaſion were given from others ſins impelling him to it*; but becauſe God would puniſh one very near them, he therefore puniſheth them, that in their puniſhment he might puniſh the other. Or in caſe ſins ſpread through a Family or a people, or they are committed by divers perſons at ſundry times, which God doth not ſeverely puniſh, but ſometimes then, when the Head of a People or Family hath done ſomething which remarkably deſerves puniſhment, whom he will puniſh

niſh in thoſe he is related to, and therefore generally puniſheth the whole Family or People. 3. *That which may be a meer exerciſe of dominion as to ſome, may be a proper puniſhment to others*; as in the caſe of *Infants*, being taken away for their *Parents* ſins; *For God, as to the Children*, he ſaith, *uſeth only an act of dominion, but the puniſhment only redounds to the Parents, who loſe them; and though this be done for the very end of puniſhment*, yet he denies, *that it hath the nature of Puniſhment in any but the Parents*. Crell. ib. 4. *That puniſhment may be intended for thoſe who can have no ſenſe at all of it*; as *Crellius* aſſerts in the caſe of *Saul's ſons*, 2 Sam. 21. 8, 14. that the puniſhment was mainly intended for *Saul*, who was already dead. From theſe conceſſions of *Crellius* in this caſe, we may take notice, 1. That a remote conjunction may be ſufficient for a tranſlation of penalty, *viz.* from one Generation to another. 2. That ſins may be truly ſaid to be puniſhed in others, when the offenders themſelves may eſcape puniſhment, thus the ſins of Parents in their Children, and Princes in their Subjects. 3. That an act of dominion in ſome may be deſigned as a proper puniſhment to others.

ſect. 11. ſect. 19.

4. That the nature of punishment is not to be measured by the sense of it. Now upon these concessions, though our Adversaries will not grant, that Christ was properly punished for our sins, yet they cannot deny but that we may very properly be said to be *punished* for our sins in *Christ*, and if they will yield us this, the other may be a strife about words. For surely there may be easily imagined as great a conjunction between Christ and us, as between the several Generations of the *Jews*, and that last which was punished in the destruction of *Jerusalem*: and though we escape that punishment which Christ did undergo, yet we might have our sins punished in him, as well as Princes theirs in their Subjects, when they escape themselves; or rather as Subjects in an innocent Prince, who may suffer for the faults of his people; if it be said, *that these are acts of meer dominion as to such a one*, that nothing hinders but granting it, yet our sins may be said to be punished in him; as well as Parents sins are punished properly in meer acts of dominion upon their Children; if it be said, *that can be no punishment where there is no sense at all of it*, that is fully taken off by *Crellius*; for surely

surely we have as great a sense of the sufferings of Christ, as the first Generation of the *Jews* had of the sufferings of the last, before the fatal destruction of the City, or as *Saul* had of the punishment of his Sons after his death. So that from *Crellius* his own concessions, we have proved, that *our sins may very properly be said to be punished in Christ*, although he will not say, that Christ could be properly punished for our sins; nay he and the rest of our Adversaries not only deny it, but earnestly contend, that it is very unjust to suppose it, and repugnant to the rectitude of God's nature to do it.

III. And so we come to consider the mighty arguments that are insisted on for the proof of this, which may be reduced to these three; *viz.* 1. *That there can be no punishment but what is deserved, but no man can deserve that another should be punished.* 2. *That punishment flows from revenge, but there can be no revenge where there hath been no fault.* 3. *That the punishment of one, cannot any ways be made the punishment of another; and in case it be supposed possible, then those in whose stead the other is punished, must be actually delivered upon the pay-*

Crellius his arguments propounded.

payment of that Debt which was owing to God.

1. *That one man cannot deserve another's punishment*, and therefore one cannot be punished for another; for there is no just punishment, but what is deserved. This being the main Argument insisted on by *Crellius*, must be more carefully considered; but before an answer be made to it, it is necessary that a clear account be given in what sense it is he understands it, which will be best done, by laying down his principles, as to the justice of punishments, in a more distinct method than himself hath done; which are these following: 1. That no person can be justly punished, either for his own or anothers faults, but he that hath deserved to be punished by some sin of his own: For he still asserts, "That the justice of *Crell. c. 4. Jeff. 3. p. 239, 240.* "punishment ariseth from a mans own "fault, though the actual punishment "may be from anothers: But he that is "punished without respect to his own "guilt, is punished undeservedly; and "he that is punished undeservedly, is pu-"nished unjustly. 2. That personal guilt being supposed one man's sin may be the *impulsive cause* of another's punishment, but they cannot be the *meritori-*

ous.

ous. The difference between them he thus explains, " The cauſe is that which " makes a thing to be; the impulſive, " that which moves one to do a thing, " without any conſideration of right that " one hath to do it: Merit, is that which " makes a man worthy of a thing, ei- " ther good or bad, and ſo gives a right " to it; if it be good, to himſelf; if " bad, to him at whoſe hands he hath " deſerved it. Now he tells us, that it is impoſſible. " That one mans ſins ſhould " make any other deſerve puniſhment, " but the perſon who committed them; " but they may impell one to puniſh ano- " ther, and that juſtly, if the perſon hath " otherwiſe deſerved to be puniſhed, un- " juſtly if he hath not. The reaſon he gives of it is, " That the vitioſity of the " act, which is the proper cauſe of pu- " niſhment, cannot go beyond the per- " ſon of the offender; and therefore can " oblige none to puniſhment, but him " that hath committed the fault. And therefore he aſſerts, " That no man can " be juſtly puniſhed beyond the deſert " of his own ſins, but there may ſome- " times be a double impulſive cauſe of " that puniſhment; *viz.* His own and " other mens, whereof one made that

Crell. ib. ſect. 18.

" they

" they might be justly punished, the o-
" ther that they should be actually: but
" the latter, *he saith*, always supposeth
" the former, as the foundation of just
" punishment; so that no part of pu-
" nishment could be executed upon him,
" wherein his own sins were not suppo-
" sed as the meritorious cause of it.
These are his two main principles which we must now throughly examine, the main force of his Book lying in them. But if we can prove that it hath been generally received by the consent of mankind, that a person may be punished beyond the desert of his own actions; if God hath justly punished some for the sins of others, and there be no injustice in one mans suffering by his own consent for another, then these principles of *Crellius* will be found not so firm as he imagines them.

That a person by his own consent may be punished beyond the desert of his own actions. *Grot. de Satisf. c. 4.*

IV. 1. That it hath been generally received by the consent of mankind, that a person may be justly punished beyond the desert of his own actions. For which purpose *Grotius* objected against *Socinus* (who appealed to the consent of Nations, about one being punished for anothers fault) " That the Heathens did agree,
" that Children might be punished for
" their

"their Parents faults, and People for "their Princes, and that corporal pu- "niſhment might be born by one for "another, did appear by the *Perſians* "puniſhing the whole family for the "fault of one. The *Macedonians* the "near kindred in the caſe of Treaſon; "ſome Cities of *Greece*, deſtroying the "Children of Tyrants together with "them; in all which, the mere con- "junction was ſuppoſed a ſufficient "reaſon without conſent; but in caſe "of conſent, *he ſaith*, They all agreed "in the Juſtice of ſome being puniſhed "for the faults of others. Thence the "right of killing hoſtages among the "moſt civilized nations; and of ſure- "ties being puniſhed in capital matters, "if the guilty appear not, who were "thence called ἀντίψυχοι, who were "bound to anſwer body for body. In which caſes, the puniſhment did extend beyond the deſert of the perſon who ſuffered it; for no other reaſon is aſſign- ed of theſe ſufferings, beſides the con- junction of the perſon, or his conſent; but no antecedent guilt is ſuppoſed as neceſſary, to make the puniſhment juſt. We are now to conſider what *Crellius* doth anſwer to this: 1. As to their ac-

knowledgments

knowledgments of God's puniſhing Children for their Parents faults, he gives the ſame anſwer which he doth to the examples recorded in *Scripture* to that purpoſe, *That either they were puniſhed for the ſins of others, but their own ſins deſerved the puniſhment; or that the Parents were puniſhed in the Children, but the Children were not properly puniſhed.* 2. As to puniſhments among men, he anſwers two things; 1. That ſuch perſons were truly "puniſhed, but not juſtly: for he ac- "knowledges, That in ſuch a caſe it is "a proper puniſhment, and that it is "enough in order to that, that any fault "be charged upon a perſon, whether "his own or anothers, whether true or "falſe, on the account of which he is ſup- "poſed worthy to be puniſhed: And "that ſuch a conjunction is ſufficient "for cruel, angry, or imprudent men: "for where-ever there is a place, *ſaith "he*, for anger, there is likewiſe for pu- "niſhment. So that he confeſſeth, there may be *a true puniſhment*, and that which anſwers all the reaſon and ends of puniſhment aſſigned by him where there is *no deſert* at all of it in the perſon who undergoes it. But then he adds, *that this is an unjuſt puniſhment*, to which I reply,

Grell. c. 4. ſect. 5. p. 244.

That

That then the reaſon of puniſhment aſſigned by *Crellius* before is inſufficient; for if this anſwers all the ends of puniſhments aſſigned by him, and yet be unjuſt, then it neceſſarily follows, that thoſe ends of puniſhment are conſiſtent with the greateſt injuſtice. For he before made puniſhment to have a natural reſpect to anger, and makes the ordinary end of puniſhment to be a ſatisfaction of the deſire of revenge in men, yet now grants, that theſe may be in an unjuſt puniſhment. Neither can it be ſaid, *that he conſidered puniſhment only naturally, and not morally*; for he tells us, that *this is the nature of divine puniſhments*, which are therefore juſt, becauſe deſigned for theſe ends; but in caſe there be no ſuppoſal of a fault at all, then he denies that it is a puniſhment, but only an affliction, and an exerciſe of dominion. So that according to him, where-ever there is a proper puniſhment, it muſt be juſt, when ever God doth puniſh men: and the only difference between God and man ſuppoſable in this caſe is, that we have aſſurance God will never uſe his dominion unjuſtly; but that men do ſo when they make one to ſuffer for anothers fault, notwithſtanding a conſent and conjunction

junction between the man that committed the fault, and the person that suffers for him. But this is begging the thing in question, for we are debating, whether it be an unlawful exercise of power or no? for we have this presumption, that it is not unlawful, because it may answer all the ends of punishments, and what way can we better judge, whether a punishment be just or no, than by that?

Objections answered.

V. But we are to consider, that we do not here take the person we speak of, abstractly *as an innocent person*, for then there is no question, but anger and punishment of one as such is unjust; but of an innocent person as supposed under an obligation by his own consent to suffer for another. And in this case we assert, since according to *Crellius* the natural and proper ends of punishments may be obtained, and the consent of the person takes away the wrong done to him in the matter of his sufferings, so far as he hath power over himself, that such a punishment is not unjust. For if it be, it must suppose some *injury* to be done; but in this case let them assign where the injury lies; it cannot be to the *publick*, if the ends of punishments may be obtained by

by such a suffering of one for another by a valid consent of the suffering party, it cannot be to the *person* in *whose room* the other suffers, for what injury is that to escape punishment by anothers suffering; it cannot be to *the suffering person*, supposing that to be true, which the Heathens still supposed, *viz.* that every man had a power over his own life. If it be said still, that the injustice lies in this; *that such a one suffers undeservedly, and therefore unjustly.* I answer; if be meant by *undeservedly* without *sufficient cause* or *reason* of punishment, then we deny that such a one doth suffer *undeservedly*. *Immerito* in the *Greek Glosses* is rendred by Ἀλόγως, and *Merito* by εἰκότως and εὐλόγως, and in *Cicero*, *jure & merito* are most commonly joyned together. So that where there is a right to punish, and sufficient reason for it, such a one doth not suffer *immerito*, i. e. *undeservedly*. If it be said, *that such a one is not dignus pœna*, that implies no more than the other, for *dignus*, or as the Ancients writ it *dicnus*, comes from the *Greek* δίκη *jus*, as *Vossius* tells us, *ut dignus sit cui tribui aliquid æquum est*: so that where there is an equity in the thing, there is a dignity in the person, or he

Immerito quemquam punire est injustè punire. Crell. p. 240.

may be ſaid to be *worthy* to undergo it. *But doth not this lay open the greateſt innocency to as great a deſert of ſufferings, as the higheſt guilt?* By no means. For we make a lyableneſs to puniſhment, the natural conſequent of guilt: and he that hath committed a fault, cannot but *deſerve* to be puniſhed, ſo that no ſufferings of others can take away the natural conſequence of a bad action, which is a *deſert of puniſhment*; So that as we ſay, a wicked action cannot but deſerve to be puniſhed, *i. e.* there is an agreeableneſs in reaſon and nature, that he who hath done ill, ſhould ſuffer ill; ſo we ſay likewiſe there is neceſſity in nature and reaſon, that he that hath thus deſerved it, muſt unavoidably ſuffer it. And on the other ſide, we ſay, *no man by his innocency can deſerve to be puniſhed*, i. e. no man's innocency makes him by vertue of that obnoxious to puniſhment; but yet we add, that *notwithſtanding his innocency*, the circumſtances may be ſuch that he may be *juſtly* puniſhed, and in that ſenſe *deſervedly*. So that the Queſtion is ſtrangely miſtaken, when it is thus put, *Whether an innocent perſon conſidered as ſuch, may be juſtly puniſhed*; for no one aſſerts that, or is bound to do it;

it; but the true queſtion is, *whether a perſon notwithſtanding his innocency may not by ſome act of his own will oblige himſelf to undergo that puniſhment which otherwiſe he did not deſerve? which puniſhment, in that caſe is juſt and agreeable to reaſon.* And this is that which we aſſert and plead for. So that innocency here is not conſidered any other ways, than whether that alone makes it an unlawfull puniſhment, which otherwiſe would be lawfull, *i. e.* whether the Magiſtrate in ſuch caſes, where ſubſtitution is admittable by the Laws of Nations (as in the caſes we are now upon) be bound to regard any more than that the obligation to puniſhment now lies upon the perſon who by his own act hath ſubſtituted himſelf in the others room; and if he proceeds upon this, his action is juſtifiable and agreeable to reaſon. If it be ſaid, *that the ſubſtitution is unjuſt, unleſs the ſubſtituted perſon hath beforehand deſerved to be puniſhed*; it is eaſily anſwered, that this makes not the matter at all clearer; for either the perſon is puniſhed for the former fault, and then there is no ſubſtitution; or if he be puniſhed by way of ſubſtitution; then there is no regard at all had to his for-

mer fault, and ſo it is all one as if he were perfectly innocent.

The inſtances of Scripture conſidered.

VI. And by this *Crellius* his anſwer to the inſtances both in *Scripture* and elſewhere concerning Childrens being puniſhed for their Parents faults, will appear to be inſufficient, *viz.* "That "God doth never puniſh them for their "Parents faults beyond the deſert of "their own ſins, and therefore no argu- "ment can be drawn from thence, that "God may puniſh an innocent perſon "for the ſins of others, becauſe he hath "puniſhed ſome for what they were "innocent: For the force of the ar- gument doth not lie in the ſuppoſition of their innocency, as to the ground of puniſhment in general, for we do not deny, but that they may deſerve to be puniſhed for their own faults: but the argument lies in this, whether their own guilt were then conſidered as the reaſon of puniſhment, when God did puniſh them for their fathers faults? And whe- ther they by their own ſins did deſerve to be puniſhed not only with the pu- niſhment due to their own miſcarriages, but with the puniſhment due to their fa- thers too? If not, then ſome perſons are juſtly puniſhed, who have not deſerved

that

that puniſhment they undergo; if they did deſerve it, then one perſon may deſerve to be puniſhed for anothers ſins. If it be ſaid, as it is by *Crellius*, *that his own ſins make him capable of puniſhment, and God by occaſion of others ſins doth execute that puniſhment, which he might not have done for his own.* I anſwer, we are not enquiring into the bare capacity of puniſhing, but into the reaſon of it: was the reaſon of puniſhment his own or his fathers ſins? If his own, then he was puniſhed only for his own ſins? if his fathers, then the puniſhment may be juſt which is inflicted without conſideration of proper *deſert* of it; *for no man* (ſay they) *can deſerve to be puniſhed, but for his own ſins.* But it's ſaid, *that the ſins of Fathers are only an impulſive cauſe for God to puniſh the Children according to the deſert of their own ſins which he might otherwiſe have forborn to puniſh.* Then, the ſins of the Fathers are no *reaſon* why the Children ſhould be puniſhed; but their own ſins are the *reaſon*, and their Fathers the *bare occaſion* of being puniſhed for them. But in *Scripture*, the *reaſon* of puniſhment is drawn from the *Fathers ſins*, and not from the *Childrens*: For then the words would have

run thus, *if the Children ſin, and deſerve puniſhment by their own iniquities, then I will take occaſion from their Fathers ſins, to viſit their own iniquities upon them:* Whereas the words referr to the *Fathers ſins* as the reaſon of the *Childrens* puniſhment. So in the words of the Law, wherein the reaſon of puniſhment ought to be moſt expreſly aſſigned, it is not, I will certainly puniſh the Children, if they continue in the Idolatry of their Fathers; but, *I will viſit the ſins of the Fathers upon the Children, unto the third and fourth Generation of them that hate me.* If it were only becauſe of *imitation* of the Fathers ſins by the Children, there could be no reaſon for the limitation to the third and fourth Generation; for then the reaſon of puniſhment would be as long as the *imitation* continued, whether to the fourth or tenth Generation: And as *Alphonſus à Caſtro* obſerves, "If "the reaſon of puniſhment were the "imitation of their Fathers ſins, then "the Children were not puniſhed for "their Fathers ſins, but for their own; "for that imitation was a ſin of their "own, and not of their Fathers. Beſides, if the proper reaſon of puniſhment were the ſins of the Children, and the Fathers ſins

Exod. 20. 3.

Alph à Caſtro de juſtâ hæret. punit. l. 2. c. 10.

ſins only the occaſion of it, then where it is mentioned that Children are puniſhed for their Parents ſins, the Childrens *ſins* ſhould have been particularly expreſſed, as the proper *cauſe* of the puniſhment: But no other reaſon is aſſigned in the Law, but the ſins of the *Fathers*, no other cauſe mentioned of *Canaan*'s puniſhment, but his Father's ſin; nor of the puniſhment of the people in *David*'s time, but his own ſin; *Lo, I have ſinned, and I have done wickedly, but theſe ſheep, what have they done?* Which is no hyperbolical expreſſion, but the aſſigning the proper *cauſe* of that judgment to have been his *own ſin*, as the whole Chapter declares: Nor, *of the hanging up of Saul's ſons by the Gibeonites*, but, *that Saul their Father had plotted their deſtruction.* And in an inſtance more remarkable than any of thoſe which *Crellius* anſwers; *viz.* the puniſhment of the people of *Judah*, for the ſins of *Manaſſes* in the time of *Joſias*; when a through Reformation was deſigned among them, the Prince being very good, and all the places of Idolatry deſtroyed, ſuch a Paſſover kept as had not been kept before in the time of any King in *Iſrael*, yet it then follows, *Notwithſtanding the Lord*

Gen. 9. 25.

2 Sam. 24. 17.

2 Sam. 21. 5.

run thus, *if the Children ſin, and deſerve puniſhment by their own iniquities, then I will take occaſion from their Fathers ſins, to viſit their own iniquities upon them:* Whereas the words referr to the *Fathers ſins* as the reaſon of the *Childrens* puniſhment. So in the words of the Law, wherein the reaſon of puniſhment ought to be moſt expreſly aſſigned, it is not, I will certainly puniſh the Children, if they continue in the Idolatry of their Fathers; but, *I will viſit the ſins of the Fathers upon the Children, unto the third and fourth Generation of them that hate me.* If it were only becauſe of *imitation* of the Fathers ſins by the Children, there could be no reaſon for the limitation to the third and fourth Generation; for then the reaſon of puniſhment would be as long as the *imitation* continued, whether to the fourth or tenth Generation: And as *Alphonſus à Caſtro* obſerves, "If "the reaſon of puniſhment were the "imitation of their Fathers ſins, then "the Children were not puniſhed for "their Fathers ſins, but for their own; "for that imitation was a ſin of their "own, and not of their Fathers. Beſides, if the proper reaſon of puniſhment were the ſins of the Children, and the Fathers ſins

Exod. 20. 3.

Alph à Caſtro de juſtâ hæret. punit. l. 2. c. 10.

ſins only the occaſion of it, then where it is mentioned that Children are puniſhed for their Parents ſins, the Childrens *ſins* ſhould have been particularly expreſſed, as the proper *cauſe* of the puniſhment: But no other reaſon is aſſigned in the Law, but the ſins of the *Fathers*, no other cauſe mentioned of *Canaan*'s puniſhment, but his Father's ſin; nor of the puniſhment of the people in *David*'s time, but his own ſin; *Lo, I have ſinned, and I have done wickedly, but theſe ſheep, what have they done?* Which is no hyperbolical expreſſion, but the aſſigning the proper *cauſe* of that judgment to have been his *own ſin*, as the whole Chapter declares: Nor, *of the hanging up of Saul's ſons by the Gibeonites*, but, *that Saul their Father had plotted their deſtruction.* And in an inſtance more remarkable than any of thoſe which *Crellius* anſwers; *viz.* the puniſhment of the people of *Judah*, for the ſins of *Manaſſes* in the time of *Joſias*; when a through Reformation was deſigned among them, the Prince being very good, and all the places of Idolatry deſtroyed, ſuch a Paſſover kept as had not been kept before in the time of any King in *Iſrael*, yet it then follows, *Notwithſtanding the Lord*

Gen. 9. 25.

2 Sam. 24. 17.

2 Sam. 21. 5.

2 Kin. 23. v. 4 to v. 21. *turned not from the fierceneſs of his great wrath, wherewith his anger was kindled againſt Judah, becauſe of all the provocations wherewith Manaſſes had provoked him withal.* Who can ſay here, that the ſins Verſ. 22. of *Manaſſeh* were only the *occaſion* of God puniſhing the people in the time of Verſ. 26. *Joſias* for their own ſins, when their ſins were much leſs in the time of *Joſias*, than in any time mentioned before, after their lapſe into *Idolatry*? Nay, it is 2 Chron. 34. 33. expreſly ſaid, *That Joſiah took away all the abominations out of all the countries that pertained to the Children of Iſrael, and made all that were preſent in Iſrael to ſerve, even to ſerve the Lord their God. And all his days they departed not from following the Lord God of their Fathers:* To ſay, that this was done in *hypocriſie*, and bare outward compliance, is to ſpeak without book; and if the reaſon of ſo ſevere puniſhments had been their hypocriſie, that ought to have been mentioned; but not only here, but afterwards it is ſaid, that the reaſon of God's deſtroying *Judah*, was *for the ſins of Manaſſeh; viz.* his Idolatries and 2 Sa[illegible] Murther, which it is ſaid, *the Lord will* 3, 4. *not pardon.* And if he would not pardon, then he did puniſh for thoſe ſins, not barely

barely as the *occaſion*, but as the *meritorious cauſe* of that puniſhment. What ſhall we ſay then? Did the people in *Joſiah*'s time, deſerve to be puniſhed for the ſins of *Manaſſeh*, Grandfather to *Joſiah*? Or was God ſo highly provoked with thoſe ſins, that although he did not puniſh *Manaſſeh* himſelf upon his repentance, yet he would let the world ſee how much he abhorred them, by puniſhing thoſe ſins upon the people afterwards; although according to the uſual proportion of ſins and puniſhments, the ſins of the people in that age did not exceed the ſins of other ages, as much as the puniſhments they ſuffered, did exceed the puniſhments of other ages: which is neceſſary according to *Crellius* his Doctrine; for if God never puniſheth by occaſion of their Fathers ſins, the Children beyond the *deſert* of their own *ſins*; then it is neceſſary, that where judgments are remarkably greater, the ſins muſt be ſo too; the contrary to which is plain in this inſtance. By which we ſee, that it is not contrary to the Juſtice of God in puniſhing, to make the puniſhment of ſome on the account of others ſins, to exceed the *deſert* of their own; meaſuring that *deſert*, not in a way common

mon to all ſin, but when the *deſert*, of ſome ſins is compared with the deſert of others: For it is of this latter we ſpeak of, and of the method which God uſeth in puniſhing ſin here, for the demonſtration of his hatred of it, according to which the greateſt puniſhments muſt ſuppoſe the greateſt ſins, either of their own, or others which they ſuffer for.

Ezek. 18. 20. explained. Ezek. 18. 4. 20.

VII. But *hath not God declared, That he will never puniſh the Children for the Fathers ſins? for the ſoul that ſinneth it ſhall die; the ſon ſhall not bear the iniquity of the Father*, &c. To which I anſwer, Theſe words are to be conſidered, as an anſwer to a complaint made by the *Jews*, ſoon after their going into Captivity, which they imputed to God's ſeverity in puniſhing them for their Fathers ſins. Now the complaint was either true or falſe; if it were true, then though this was looked upon as great ſeverity in God, yet it was no injuſtice in him; for though God may act ſeverely, he cannot act unjuſtly: If it was falſe, then the anſwer had been an abſolute denial of it, as a thing repugnant to the Juſtice of God. Which we do not find here, but that God

God ſaith unto them, *v.* 3. *Ye ſhall not have occaſion any more to uſe this Proverb in* Iſrael: if the thing had been plainly unjuſt, which they complained of, he would have told them, they never had occaſion to uſe it. But we find the *Prophets* telling them before-hand, that they ſhould ſuffer for their Fathers ſins, *Jer.* 15. 3, 4. where he threatens them with deſtruction and baniſhment, becauſe of the *ſins of Manaſſeh in Jeruſalem*; and in the beginning of the captivity they complain of this, *Lam.* 5. 7. *Our Fathers have ſinned, and are not, and we have born their iniquities.* And *Jer.* 31. 28. *God* ſaith by the *Prophet, that he had watched over them to pluck up, and to pull down, and to deſtroy, and to afflict: but that he would watch over them to build, and to plant, and in thoſe days they ſhall ſay no more, the Fathers have eaten ſowre grapes and the Childrens teeth are ſet on edge; but every one ſhall die for his own iniquity.* Jer. 31. 29, 30. Which place is exactly parallel with this in *Ezekiel*, and gives us a clear account of it, which is, that now indeed God had dealt very ſeverely with them, by making them ſuffer beyond what in the ordinary courſe of his providence their ſins had deſerved; but he puniſhed them not

not only for their own ſins, but the ſins of their *Fathers:* But leſt they ſhould think, they ſhould be utterly conſumed for their iniquities, and be no longer a people enjoying the Land which *God* had promiſed them, he tells them by the *Prophets*, though they had ſmarted ſo much, by reaſon of their *Fathers* ſins, this ſeverity ſhould not always continue upon them; but that God would viſit them with his kindneſs again, and would plant them in their own Land, then they ſhould ſee no reaſon to continue this Proverb among them, for they would then find, *Though their Fathers had eaten ſowre grapes, their teeth ſhould not be always ſet on edge with it.* And if we obſerve it, the occaſion of the *Proverb*, was concerning the *Land of Iſrael*, על אדמת ישראל *ſupra terra Iſrael*, as the *Chaldee Paraphraſt* renders it more agreeable to the *Hebrew*, than the other Verſions do. So that the *Land of Iſrael* was the occaſion of the *Proverb*, by their being baniſhed out of it for their Fathers ſins. Now God tells them, they ſhould have no more occaſion to uſe this Proverb concerning the *Land of Iſrael*; for they, notwithſtanding their Fathers ſins, ſhould return into their own *Land*. And even during the

Ezek. 18. 2.

the continuance of their captivity, they ſhould not undergo ſuch great ſeverities for the future, but they ſhould find their condition much more tolerable than they imagined; only, if any were guilty of greater ſins than others, they ſhould themſelves ſuffer for their own faults, but he would not puniſh the whole Nation for them or their own Poſterity. This I take to be the genuine meaning of this place; and I the rather embrace it, becauſe I find ſuch inſuperable difficulties in other interpretations that are given of it: For to ſay as our Adverſaries do, *That what God ſaith, ſhould not be for the future, was repugnant to his nature and juſtice ever to do*, is to charge God plainly with injuſtice in what he had done: For the *Prophets* told them they ſhould ſuffer for the ſins of their *Fathers*: Which ſufferings were the ground of their complaint now, and the anſwer here given muſt relate to the occaſion of the complaint; for God ſaith, *They ſhould not have occaſion to uſe that Proverb*: Wherein is implyed, they ſhould not have the ſame reaſon to complain which they had then. I demand then, Do not theſe words imply, That God would not do for the future with them, what he had done before;

fore; if not, the proper anſwer had been a plain denial, and not a promiſe for the future he would not; if they do, then either *God* properly puniſhed them for the ſins of their *Fathers*, and then God muſt be *unjuſt* in doing ſo, or it was juſt with *God* to do it, and ſo this place inſtead of overthrowing will prove, that ſome may be juſtly puniſhed, beyond the deſert of their own ſins: or elſe, *God did only take occaſion by their Fathers ſins, to puniſh them according to the deſert of their own iniquities:* But then they had no cauſe to complain, that they were puniſhed for any more than their own iniquities; and withal, then God doth oblige himſelf by his promiſe here, never to puniſh men for the future *by the occaſion of others ſins:* which is not only contrary to their own Doctrine, but to what is plainly ſeen afterwards in the puniſhment of the *Jews* for their *Fathers ſins*, mentioned by our *Saviour* after this: And if this be a certain rule of equity which God here ſaith, that he would never vary from, then the puniſhing of ſome on the occaſion of others ſins, would be as unjuſt, as our *Adverſaries* ſuppoſe the puniſhing any beyond the deſert of their own ſins to be. *But is it not implyed,*

Matt. 23. 35.

implyed, that Gods ways would be unequal, if he ever did otherwiſe than he there ſaid he would do? No, it is not, if by *equal* he meant *juſt*, for his ways never were, or can be ſo unequal; but here if it be taken with a reſpect to the main diſpute of the Chapter, no more is implied in them, but that they judged amiſs concerning God's actions, and that they were *juſt*, when they thought them not to be ſo: or if at leaſt they thought his ways very ſevere, though juſt, God by remitting of this ſeverity, would ſhew that he was not only *juſt*, but *kind*; and ſo they would find his ways *equal*, that is, always agreeable to themſelves, and ending in *kindneſs* to them, though they hitherto were ſo ſevere towards them in their baniſhment and captivity. Or if they be taken with a reſpect to the immediate occaſion of them both, *Ezek.* 18.——33. They do not relate to this diſpute about *Childrens ſuffering for their Fathers ſins*; but to another, which was concerning a righteous mans ſinning and dying in his ſins, and a wicked mans repenting, and living in his righteouſneſs; which were directly contrary to the common opinion of the *Jews* to this day, which is, that God will judge men according to

Ezek. 18. 25.

Ezek. 33. 20.

to the greateſt number of their actions good or bad: as appears by *Maimonides* and others. Now they thought it a very hard caſe, for a man who had been righteous the far greateſt part of his time, if he did at laſt commit iniquity, that his former righteouſneſs ſhould ſignifie nothing, but he muſt die in his iniquity. To this therefore God anſwers, that it was only the inequality of their own ways, which made them think God's ways in doing ſo unequal. This then doth not make it unequal, for God either to puniſh men, upon the occaſion, or by the deſert of other mens ſins, ſuppoſing ſuch a conjunction between them, as there is in the ſame body of people, to thoſe who went before them. And *Crellius* himſelf grants, "That *Socinus* "never intended to prove, that one mans "ſuffering for anothers ſins was unjuſt in "it ſelf, from this place: no, not though "we take it in the ſtricteſt ſenſe, for one "ſuffering in the ſtead of another.

Crell. c. 4. ſect. 15.

The deliverance of the guilty by the ſufferings of an innocent perſon by his own conſent, makes not the puniſhment unjuſt.

VIII. Having thus far declared, how far it is agreeable to God's Juſtice, to puniſh any perſons either by reaſon of his dominion, or the conjunction of perſons, for the ſins of others, and conſequently whether any puniſhment may be undergone juſt-

juſtly beyond the proper deſert of their own ſins, I now return to *the conſent of Mankind* in it, on ſuppoſition either of a near conjunction, or a valid conſent which muſt make up the want of dominion in men without it. And the queſtion ſtill proceeds upon the ſuppoſition of thoſe things, that there be a proper dominion in men over that which they part with for others ſakes, and that they do it by their free conſent; and then we juſtifie it not to be repugnant to the principles of Reaſon and Juſtice, for any to ſuffer beyond the *deſert* of their own actions. And *Crellius* his ſaying, that ſuch a puniſhment is true punithment, but not juſt, is no anſwer at all to the conſent of Nations that it is ſo. And therefore finding this anſwer inſufficient; he relies upon another, *viz.* "That it "was never received by the conſent of "Nations, that one man ſhould ſuffer in "the ſtead of another, ſo as the guilty "ſhould be freed by the others ſuffering. "For, *he ſaith*, neither *Socinus* nor he "do deny that one man may be puniſh-"ed for anothers ſins; but that which "they deny is, that ever the innocent "were puniſhed ſo as the guilty were "freed by it; *and ſo he anſwers*, in the *Crell. c. 4. ſect. 30, 32, 34, &c.*

" caſe of Hoſtages and Sureties, their pu-
" niſhment did never excuſe the offenders
" themſelves. And to this purpoſe *he ſaith*,
" *Socinus* his argument doth hold good,
" that tho' one mans money may become
" anothers, yet one mans ſufferings can-
" not become anothers: For, *ſaith he*, if it
" could, then it would be all one who ſuf-
" fered, as it is who pays the money due:
" And then the offender muſt be preſent-
" ly releaſed, as the Debtor is upon pay-
" ment of the debt. This is the ſubſtance
of what is ſaid by him upon this Argu-
ment. To which I reply; 1. That this
gives up the matter in diſpute at preſent
between us; for the preſent queſtion is,
Whether it be unjuſt for any one to ſuffer
beyond the deſert of his own actions? *Yes*,
ſaith *Crellius*, *it is, in caſe he ſuffers ſo, as
that the guilty be freed by his ſufferings*. But
we are not enquiring, Whether it be juſt
for another perſon to be freed for a mans
ſuffering for him? but whether it be juſt
for that man to ſuffer by his own conſent,
more than *his own* actions, without that
conſent, deſerved? The releaſe of another
perſon by vertue of his ſufferings, is a
matter of another conſideration. Doth
the freeing or not freeing of another by
ſuffering, add any thing to the *deſert* of

ſuffering? He that being wholly innocent, and doth ſuffer on the account of anothers fault, doth he not ſuffer as *undeſervedly*, though another be not freed, as if he were? As in the caſe of *Hoſtages* or Sureties, doth it make them at all the more guilty, becauſe the perſons they are concerned for, will be puniſhed notwithſtanding, if they come under the power of thoſe who exacted the puniſhment upon them, who ſuffered for them? Nay, is not their *deſert* of puniſhment ſo much the leſs, in as much as the guilty are ſtill bound to anſwer for their own offences? If we could ſuppoſe the guilty to be freed by the others ſufferings, it would be by ſuppoſing their guilt more fully tranſlated upon thoſe who ſuffer, and conſequently, a greater obligation to puniſhment following that guilt. From whence it follows, that if it be juſt to puniſh, when the perſon is not deliver'd from whom the other ſuffers, it is more juſt when he is; for the tranſlation of the penalty is much leſs in the former caſe, than in the latter; and what is juſt upon leſs grounds of puniſhment, muſt be more juſt upon greater. I look on this therefore but as a ſhift of *Crellius*, hoping thereby to avoid the conſent

of mankind in one mans ſuffering for another, without attending to the main argument he was upon; *viz.* The juſtice of one perſon ſuffering for another. 2. It is a very unreaſonable thing, to make an action unjuſt for that, which of it ſelf is acknowledged by our *Adverſaries* to be very juſt; *viz.* The pardoning the offenders themſelves. If it were juſt to ſuffer, if the other were not pardoned, and it were juſt to pardon, whether the other were puniſhed or no, how comes this ſuffering to be unjuſt, merely by the others being pardoned by it: nay, is it not rather an argument, that thoſe ſufferings are the moſt juſt, which do ſo fully anſwer all the ends of puniſhments; that there is then no neceſſity that the offender ſhould ſuffer; but that the Supreme Governour having obtained the ends of Government, by the ſuffering of one for the reſt, declares himſelf ſo well pleaſed with it, that he is willing to pardon the offenders themſelves. 3. Many of thoſe perſons who have had their ſins puniſhed in others, have themſelves eſcaped the puniſhment due to the deſert of their ſins: As is plain in the caſe of *Ahab*, whoſe puniſhment was not ſo great as his ſins deſerved, becauſe the full puniſhment

niſhment of them was reſerved to his poſterity. If it be ſaid, as it is by *Crellius*, *That* Ahab *was not wholly freed, his life being taken away for his own ſins*: That gives no ſufficient anſwer; for if ſome part of the puniſhment was deferred, that part he was delivered from; and the ſame reaſon in this caſe will hold for the whole as the part. As is plain in the caſe of *Manaſſeh*, and ſeveral others, the guilt of whoſe ſins were puniſhed on their poſterity, themſelves eſcaping it. 4 Our Adverſaries confeſs, that in ſome caſes it is lawful and juſt for ſome to ſuffer, with a deſign that others may be freed by their ſuffering for them. Thus they aſſert, *That one Chriſtian, not only may, but ought to lay down his life for another, if there be any danger of his denying the truth, or he judges him far more uſefull and conſiderable than himſelf: ſo likewiſe a Son for his Father, one Brother for another, or a Friend, or any, whoſe life he thinks more uſefull than his own.* Now I ask, whether a man can be bound to a thing that is *in its one nature unjuſt*? if not, as it is plain he cannot, then ſuch an obligation of one man to ſuffer for the delivery of another cannot be unjuſt, and conſequently the ſuffering it

Crell. c. 4. ſect. 25. 1 Kin. 21. 19.

Crell cap. 6. ſect. 39.

ſelf cannot be ſo. But *Crellius* ſaith, *The injuſtice in this caſe lies wholly upon the Magiſtrate who admits it:* but I ask, wherefore is it unjuſt in the Magiſtrate to admit it? it is becauſe the thing is in it ſelf unjuſt? if ſo, there can be no obligation to do it; and it would be as great a ſin to undergo it, as in the Magiſtrate to permit it; but if it be juſt in it ſelf, we have obtained what we contend for, *viz.* that it may be juſt for a man to ſuffer beyond *the deſert* of his own actions; for he that lays down his life for his Brethren, doth not deſerve by his own actions that very puniſhment which he undergoes. And if the thing be in it ſelf juſt, how comes it to be unjuſt in him that permits it? 5. The reaſon why among men the offenders themſelves are puniſhed, is becauſe thoſe were not the terms, upon which the perſons ſuffered. For if they had ſuffered upon theſe terms that the other might be freed, and their ſuffering was admitted of by the Magiſtrate on that conſideration, then in all reaſon and juſtice the offenders ought to be freed on the account of the others ſuffering for them. But among men the chief reaſon of the obligation to puniſhment of one man for another, is not, that the other might

might be freed, but that there may be ſecurity given by the publick, that the offenders ſhall be puniſhed: and the reaſon of the Sureties ſuffering is not to deliver the offender, but to ſatisfie the Law, by declaring that all care is taken that the offender ſhould be puniſhed, when in caſe of eſcape, the Surety ſuffers for him. But it is quite another thing when the perſon ſuffers purpoſely that others might be freed by his ſuffering, for then in caſe the ſuffering be admitted, the releaſe of the other is not only not unjuſt, but becomes due to him that ſuffered, on his own terms. Not as though it followed *ipſo facto* as *Crellius* fanſies, but the manner of releaſe doth depend upon the terms which he who ſuffered for them, ſhall make in order to it. For upon this ſuffering of one for another upon ſuch terms, the immediate conſequent of the ſuffering is not the *actual diſcharge* but the *right* to it which he hath purchaſed; and which he may diſpenſe upon what terms he ſhall judge moſt for his honour.

6. Although one perſons ſufferings cannot become anothers ſo as one mans *Money* may; yet one mans ſufferings may be a ſufficient conſideration on which a benefit may accrue to another. For to

that end a Donation, or ſuch a transferring right from one to another as is in *Money*, is not neceſſary, but the acceptation which it hath from him who hath the power to pardon. If he declare that he is ſo well pleaſed with the ſufferings of one for another, that in conſideration of them, he will pardon thoſe from whom he ſuffered; where lies the impoſſibility or unreaſonableneſs of the thing? For *Crellius* grants, *that rewards may be given to others than the perſons who did the actions in conſideration of thoſe actions*; and why may not the ſufferings of one for others, being purpoſely undertaken for this end, be available for the pardon of thoſe whom he ſuffered for? For a man can no more transfer the right of his good actions, than of his ſufferings. From all which it follows, that one perſon may by his own conſent, and being admitted thereto by him to whom the right of puniſhing belongs, ſuffer juſtly; tho' it be beyond the deſert of his own actions; and the guilty may be pardoned on the account of his ſufferings. Which was the firſt thing we deſigned to prove from *Crellius*, in order to the overthrowing his own *hypotheſis*. For it being confeſſed by him that ſuch ſufferings have

Crell. ib. ſect. 28.

all

all that belongs to the nature of punishments, and since God hath justly punished some for the sins which they have not committed; since all Nations have allowed it just for one man by his own consent to suffer for another; since it cannot be unjust for the offender to be released by anothers sufferings, if he were admitted to suffer for that end, it evidently follows, contrary to *Crellius* his main Principle, that *a person may be justly punished beyond the desert of his own actions:* And so that first argument of *Crellius* cannot hold, *that one man cannot by his own consent suffer for another, because no man can deserve anothers punishment, and no punishment is just but what is deserved.* His second argument from the nature of *anger* and *revenge* hath been already answered in the first Discourse about the nature and ends of punishments, and his third argument, *that one mans punishment cannot become anothers*, immediately before. And so we have finished our first consideration of the *sufferings of Christ* in general, as *a punishment of our sins*, which we have shewed to be agreeable both to *Scripture* and *Reason.*

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

I. *The Death of Christ considered as an Expiatory Sacrifice for sin.* II. *What the expiation of sin was by the Sacrifices under the Law; twofold, Civil and Ritual. The Promises made to the Jews under the Law of* Moses, *respected them as a People, and therefore must be temporal. The typical nature of Sacrifices asserted.* III. *A substitution in the Expiatory Sacrifices under the Law, proved from* Lev. 17, 11. *and the Concession of* Crellius *about the signification of* ἀντὶ *joyned with* ψυχῆς. Lev. 10. 17. *explained. The expiation of uncertain murther proves a substitution.* IV. *A substitution of Christ in our room proved from Christ's being said to die for us; the importance of that phrase considered.* V. *In what sense a Surrogation of Christ in our room is asserted by us.* VI. *Our Redemption by Christ proves a substitution.* VII. *Of the true notion of Redemption: that explained, and proved against* Socinus *and* Crellius. *No necessity of paying the price to him that detains captive, where the captivity is not by force,*

force, but by ſentence of Law. Chriſt's death a proper λύτρον: and therefore the ἀπολύτρωσις attributed to it, cannot be taken for mere deliverance.

The death of Chriſt conſidered as an Expiatory Sacrifice for ſin.

WE come now to conſider the death of Chriſt, as an *Expiatory Sacrifice for the ſins of mankind:* Which is as much denied by our Adverſaries, as that it was a puniſhment for our ſins. For though they do not deny, *That Chriſt as a Prieſt did offer up a Sacrifice of Expiation for the ſins of men;* yet they utterly deny, *That this was performed on earth,* or that *the Expiation of ſins did reſpect God, but only us;* or, *that the death of Chriſt, had any proper efficacy towards the expiation of ſin, any further than as it comprehends in it all the conſequences of his death,* by a ſtrange *Catachreſis.* I ſhall now therefore prove, that all things which do belong to a proper Expiatory Sacrifice, do agree to the death of Chriſt. There are three things eſpecially conſiderable in it: 1. A Subſtitution in the place of the Offenders. 2. An Oblation of it to God. 3. An Expiation of ſin conſequent upon it. Now theſe three, I ſhall make appear to agree fully to the death of Chriſt for us.

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1. *A Subſtitution in the place of the Offenders.* That we are to prove, was deſigned in the *expiatory Sacrifices* under the *Law*, and that *Chriſt* in his death *for us*, was *ſubſtituted* in our place. 1. That in the expiatory Sacrifices under the Law, there was a *Subſtitution* of them *in the place* of the Offenders. This our Adverſaries are not willing to yield us, becauſe of the correſpondency which is ſo plain in the *Epiſtle* to the *Hebrews*, between thoſe Sacrifices, and that which was offered up by Chriſt. We now ſpeak only of thoſe Sacrifices, which we are ſure were appointed of old for the expiation of ſin, by God himſelf. As to which the great rule aſſigned by the Apoſtle was, *That without ſhedding of blood there was no remiſſion.* If we yield *Crellius* what he ſo often urgeth, *viz. That theſe words are to be underſtood, of what was done under the Law*; They will not be the leſs ſerviceable to our purpoſe; for thereby it will appear, that the means of Expiation lay in the *ſhedding of blood*: Which ſhews, that the very *mactation* of the beaſt to be ſacrificed, was deſigned in order to the Expiation of ſin. To an inquiſitive perſon, the reaſon of the ſlaying ſuch multitudes of beaſts in the

Heb. 9.22.

Crell. c. 10. *Jeſt.* 14.

the Sacrifices appointed by God himſelf among the *Jews*, would have appeared far leſs evident than now it doth, ſince the *Author* of the *Epiſtle* to the *Hebrews* hath given us ſo full an account of them. For it had been very unreaſonable to have thought, that they had been merely inſtituted out of compliance with the cuſtoms of other Nations, ſince the whole deſign of their Religion, was to ſeparate them from them: and on ſuch a ſuppoſition the great deſign of the *Epiſtle* to the *Hebrews* ſignifies very little; which doth far more explain to us the nature and tendency of all the Sacrifices in uſe among them, that had any reſpect to the expiation of ſins, than all the cuſtoms of the *Egyptians*, or the Commentaries of the later *Jews*. But I intend not now to diſcourſe at large upon this ſubject of Sacrifices, either as to the nature and inſtitution of them in general, or with a particular reſpect to the Sacrifice of Chriſt, ſince a learned perſon of our *Church*, hath already undertaken *Crellius* upon this Argument, and we hope e'er long will oblige the world with the benefit of his pains. I ſhall therefore only inſiſt on thoſe things which are neceſſary for our purpoſe, in order to the clearing

clearing the Subſtitution of Chriſt in our ſtead, for the expiation of our ſins by his death; and this we ſay was repreſented in the expiatory Sacrifices, which were inſtituted among the *Jews*. If we yield *Crellius* what he after *Socinus* contends for; *viz. That the Sacrifice of Chriſt was only repreſented in the publick and ſolemn expiatory Sacrifices for the people, and eſpecially thoſe on the day of Atonement*; We may have enough from them to vindicate all that we aſſert, concerning the expiatory Sacrifice of the blood of Chriſt.

Crell. c. 10. *ſect.* 13.

What the Expiation of ſin was by the Sacrifices under the Law.

II. For that thoſe were deſigned by way of *Subſtitution* in the place of the offenders, will appear from the circumſtances and reaſon of their Inſtitution: But before we come to that, it will be neceſſary to ſhew what that *Expiation* was, which the Sacrifices under the Law were deſigned for; the not underſtanding of which, gives a greater force to our Adverſaries Arguments, than otherwiſe they would have. For while men aſſert, that the expiation was wholly typical, and of the ſame nature with that expiation which is really obtained by the death of Chriſt, they eaſily prove, *That all the expiation then, was only declarative*,

tive, and did no more depend on the ſacrifices offered, than on a condition required by God, the neglect of which would be an act of diſobedience in them; and by this means it could repreſent, ſay they, *no more than ſuch an expiation to be by Chriſt; viz. God's declaring that ſins are expiated by him, on the performance of ſuch a condition required in order thereto, as laying down his life was.* But we aſſert another kind of expiation of ſin, by vertue of the Sacrifice being ſlain and offered; which was real, and depended upon the Sacrifice: And this was twofold a *Civil*, and a *Ritual* expiation, according to the double capacity in which the people of the *Jews* may be conſidered, either as members of a Society, ſubſiſting by a body of *Laws*, which according to the ſtricteſt *Sanction* of it, makes death the penalty of diſobedience, *Deut.* 27. 26. but by the will of the Legiſlator, did admit of a relaxation in many caſes, allowed by himſelf; in which he declares, That the death of the beaſt deſigned for a *Sacrifice* ſhould be accepted, inſtead of the death of the offender; and ſo the offence ſhould be fully expiated, as to the execution of the penal Law upon him. And thus far, I freely admit what

Grotius

Grot de Satisf. c.10. *Grotius* asserts upon this subject, and do yield that no other offence could be expiated in this manner, but such which God himself did particularly declare should be so. And therefore no sin which was to be punished by cutting off, was to be expiated by Sacrifice; as *wilful Idolatry*, *Murther*, &c. Which it is impossible for those to give an account of, who make the expiation wholly *typical*; for why then should not the greatest sins much rather have had sacrifices of *expiation* appointed for them: because the Consciences of men would be more solicitous for the pardon of greater than lesser sins; and the blood of Christ represented by them, was designed for the expiation of all. From whence it is evident, that it was not a meer *typical* expiation; but it did relate to the civil constitution among them. But besides this, we are to consider the people with a respect to that mode of Divine Worship which was among them; by reason of which, the people were to be purified from the *legal* impurities which they contracted, which hindred them from joyning with others in the publick Worship of *God*, and many Sacrifices were appointed purposely for the expiating

expiating this *legal guilt*, as particularly, *the aſhes of the red heifer*, Numb. 19. 9. which is there called *a purification for ſin*. And the *Apoſtle* puts *the blood of Bulls and of Goats, and the aſhes of a heifer ſprinkling the unclean*, together; and the effect of both of them, he ſaith, was *to ſanctifie to the purifying of the fleſh*; which implies, that there was ſome proper and immediate effect of theſe ſacrifices upon the people at that time, though infinitely ſhort of the effect of the blood of Chriſt upon the *Conſciences* of men. By which it is plain, the *Apoſtle* doth not ſpeak of the ſame kind of *expiation* in thoſe ſacrifices, which was in the Sacrifice of Chriſt, and that the one was barely typical of the other; but of a different kind of *expiation*, as far as *purifying the fleſh* is from *purging the Conſcience*. But we do not deny, that the whole diſpenſation was *typical*, and that *the Law had a ſhadow of good things to come, and not the very image of the things*, i. e. a dark and obſcure repreſentation, and not the perfect reſemblance of them. There are two things which the Apoſtle aſſerts concerning the Sacrifices of the *Law*: Firſt, that they had an effect upon the Bodies of men, which he calls Heb. 9. 12, 13. Heb. 10. 1.

purifying the flesh; the other is, that they had no power to expiate for the sins of the soul, considered with a respect to the punishment of another life, which he calls *purging the Conscience from dead works*; and therefore he saith, *that all the gifts and sacrifices under the Law, could not make him that did the service perfect, as pertaining to the Conscience*, and *that it was impossible that the blood of Bulls and Goats should take away sin.* So that the proper expiation which was made by them, was civil and ritual, relating either to corporal punishment, or to legal uncleanness, from whence the *Apostle* well proves the necessity of a higher Sacrifice to make expiation for sins, *as pertaining to the Conscience:* But that expiation among the *Jews* did relate to that *Polity* which was established among them, as they were a people under the Government of a body of Laws distinct from the rest of the world. And they being considered as such, it is vain to enquire, whether they had only *temporal* or *eternal* promises; for it was impossible they should have any other than temporal, unless we imagine, that *God* would own them for a distinct people in another World as he did in this. For what

Heb. 9. 9. 10. 4.

what Promiſes relate to a People *as ſuch*, muſt conſider them as a People, and in that capacity they muſt be the bleſſings of a *Society*, viz. peace, plenty, number of People, length of days, &c. But we are far from denying that the general Principles of *Religion* did remain among them, viz. *that there is a God, and a rewarder of them that ſeek him*; and all the Promiſes God made to the *Patriarchs*, did continue in force *as to another Country*, and were continually improved by the *Prophetical* inſtructions among them. But we are now ſpeaking of what did reſpect the people in general, by vertue of that Law which was given them by *Moſes*, and in that reſpect the puniſhment of faults being either *death* or *excluſion* from the publick Worſhip, the expiation of them, was taking away the obligation to either of theſe, which was the guilt of them in that conſideration.

But doth not this take away the typical nature of theſe ſacrifices? No, but it much rather eſtabliſheth it. For as *Sociuus* argues, "If the expiation was only "typical, there muſt be ſomething in "the type correſpondent to that which "is typified by it. As the Brazen Ser-

Socin. de ſervat. l. 2. c. 10. Prælect. Theolog. cap. 22.

" pent typified Chriſt, and the benefit " which was to come by him, becauſe " as many as looked up to it were heal- " ed. And *Noah*'s Ark is ſaid to be a " type of Baptiſm, becauſe as many as " entred into that were ſaved from the " deluge. So *Corinth.* 10. the Apoſtle " ſaith, that thoſe things happened to " them in types, *v.* 11. becauſe the e- " vents which happened to them, did " repreſent thoſe which would fall upon " diſobedient Chriſtians. So that to make good the true notion of a *Type*, we muſt aſſert an *expiation* that was *real* then, and agreeable to that diſpenſation, which doth repreſent an expiation of a far higher nature, which was to be by the Sacrifice of the Blood of Chriſt.

A ſubſtitution proved from *Levit.* 17.11, &c.

III. Which being premiſed, I come to prove, that there was a *ſubſtitution* deſigned of the Beaſt to be ſlain and ſacrificed in ſtead of the offenders themſelves. Which will appear from *Levit.* 17. 11. *For the life of the fleſh is in the blood, and I have given it you upon the Altar, to make an Atonement for your Souls; for it is the blood that maketh an Atonement for the Soul.* The utmoſt that *Crellius* would have meant by this place is, *that*

Crell. c. 10. *ſect.* 9.

there

there is a double reaſon aſſigned of the prohibition of eating blood, viz. *that the life was in the blood, and that the blood was deſigned for expiation; but he makes theſe wholly independent upon each other.* But we ſay, that the proper reaſon aſſigned againſt the eating of the *blood*, is that which is elſewhere given, when this precept is mentioned, viz. *that the blood was the life*, as we may ſee *Gen.* 9.4. *Lev.* 17.14. but to confirm the reaſon given, that *the blood was the life*; he adds, *that God had given them that upon the Altar for an atonement for their Souls:* So the Arabick Verſion renders it, *and therefore have I given it you upon the Altar*, viz. becauſe the blood is the life. And hereby a ſufficient reaſon is given, why God did make choice of the blood for atonement, for that is expreſſed in the latter clauſe, *for it is the blood that maketh an atonement for the Soul*; why ſhould this be mentioned here, if no more were intended but to give barely another reaſon why they ſhould not eat the blood? what force is there more in this clauſe to that end, than in the foregoing? for therein God had ſaid, *that he had given it them for an atonement.* If no more had been intended, but the bare prohibition of common

uſe of the blood, on the account of its being conſecrated to ſacred uſe, it had been enough to have ſaid, that the blood was holy unto the *Lord*, as it is in the other inſtances mentioned by *Crellius*, of the *holy Ointment and Perfume*, for no other reaſon is there given, why it ſhould not be profaned to common uſe, but *that it ſhould be holy for the Lord*; if therefore the blood had been forbidden upon that account, there had been no neceſſity at all of adding, that *the blood was it that made atonement for the ſoul:* which gives no peculiar reaſon why they ſhould not eat the blood, beyond that of bare conſecration of it to a ſacred uſe; but if we conſider it as reſpecting the firſt clauſe, viz. *For the life of the fleſh is in the blood*, then there is a particular reaſon why the blood ſhould be for atonement, viz. *becauſe the life was in that*; and therefore when the *blood* was offered, the life of the Beaſt was ſuppoſed to be given inſtead of the life of the offender. According to that of *Ovid*,

Exod. 30. 32, 33. 37, 38.

Hanc animam vobis pro meliore damus.

Ovid. Faſt. l. 6.

This will be yet made clearer by another inſtance produced by *Crellius* to explain this, which is *the forbidding the*

eating

eating of fat; which ſaith he, *is joyned with this of blood*, Levit. 3.17. *It ſhall be a perpetual Statute for your Generations, throughout all your dwellings, that ye eat neither fat nor blood.* To the ſame purpoſe, *Levit.* 7. 23, 25, 26. Now no other reaſon is given of the prohibition of the fat, but this, *All the fat is the Lords.* Which was enough to keep them from eating it. But we ſee here in the caſe of *blood* ſomewhat further is aſſigned, *viz.* that it was *the life*; and therefore was moſt proper for *expiation*, the life of the beaſt being ſubſtituted in the place of the offenders. Which was therefore called *animalis hoſtia* among the *Romans*, as *Grotius* obſerves upon this place, and was diſtinguiſhed from thoſe whoſe entrails were obſerved; for in thoſe Sacrifices as *Servius* ſaith, *ſola anima Deo ſacratur*, the main of the Sacrifice lay in ſhedding of the *blood*, which was called the *Soul*; and ſo it is נפש in this place. From whence it appears that ſuch a ſacrifice was properly ψυχὴ ἀντὶ ψυχῆς, for the ſame word נפש is uſed, both relating to the *blood* and the *ſoul*, that is expiated by it: and the LXX do accordingly render it, ψυχὴ πάσης σαρκὸς αἷμα αὐτῆς ἐστι, and in the laſt

Lev. 3. 16.

Servius ad Æneid. 4.

clauſe, τὸ δὲ αἷμα αὐτῶν ἀντὶ ψυχῆς ἐξιλάσεται. From whence *Euſebius* calls theſe Sacrifices of living Creatures, ἀντίψυχα τῶν αὐτῶν ψυχῆς, and afterwards ſaith they were λύτρα τῶν ἑαυτῶν ζωῆς καὶ ἀντίψυχα τῆς ἰδίας φύσεως. And *Crellius* elſewhere grants, *that where* ἀντὶ *is joyned with* ψυχὴ, *it doth imply, that one doth undergo the puniſhment which another was to have undergone*, which is all we mean by *ſubſtitution*, it being done in the place of another. From whence it follows, that the Sacrifices under the Law being ſaid to be ἀντὶ ψυχῆς, doth neceſſarily infer a ſubſtitution of them in the place of the offenders. And from hence may be underſtood, what is meant by *the Goat of the Sin offering, bearing the iniquity of the Congregation, to make atonement for them before the Lord*, Levit. 10. 17. for *Crellius* his ſaying, *That bearing is as much as taking away, or declaring that they are taken away*, hath been already diſproved: And his other anſwer hath as little weight in it; viz. *That it is not ſaid, that the ſacrifice did bear their iniquities, but the Prieſt:* For, 1. The *Chaldee Paraphraſt*, and the *Syriack Verſion*, underſtand it wholly of the *ſacrifice*. 2. *Socinus* himſelf grants, *That if it*

Euſeb. demonſt. Evang. l. 1. c. 10.

Crell. c. 8. ſect. 23. Denotat enim vox ἀντίψυχον *eos quorum alter pro altero animam ponat aut devoveat, & ſic id malum quod alteri ſubeundum erat ejus loco ſubire non detrectet.*

Socin. de ſervat. l. 2. c. 11.

it were ſaid, the Prieſt did expiate by the ſacrifices, it were all one as if it were ſaid, that the ſacrifices themſelves did expiate; becauſe the expiation of the Prieſt was by the ſacrifice. Thus it is plain in the caſe of uncertain murther, mentioned *Deut.* 21. from the firſt to the tenth; *If a murther were committed in the Land, and the perſon not known who did it, a heifer was to have her head cut off by the Elders of the next City; and by this means they were to put away the guilt of the innocent blood from among them:* The reaſon of which was, becauſe God had ſaid before, *That blood defiled the Land, and the Land cannot be cleanſed of the blood that is ſhed therein, but by the blood of him that ſhed it.* From whence it appears, that upon *the ſhedding of blood*, there was a guilt contracted upon the whole Land wherein it was ſhed, and in caſe the Murtherer was not found to expiate that guilt by his own blood, then it was to be done by the cutting off the head of a heifer inſtead of him: In which caſe, the death of the heifer was to do as much towards the expiating the Land, as the death of the Murtherer if he had been found: And we do not contend, *that this was deſigned to expiate* Numb. 35. 33.

the

the Murtherers guilt (which is the Ob-
Crell. c. 10. *ſect.* 9. jection of *Crellius* againſt this inſtance) but that a ſubſtitution here was appointed by God himſelf, for the expiation of the people: For what *Crellius* adds, *That the people did not deſerve puniſhment, and therefore needed no expiation*; it is a flat
Deut. 21. 8. contradiction to the Text: For the prayer appointed in that caſe is, *Be merciful, O Lord, unto thy people Iſrael, whom thou haſt redeemed, and lay not innocent blood unto thy people Iſraels Charge, and the blood ſhall be expiated:* for the ſame word כפר is uſed here, which is in the other places where *Expiation* is ſpoken of. So that here muſt be ſome guilt ſuppoſed, where there was to be an *expiation*, and this *expiation* was performed by the *ſubſtitution* of a *ſacrifice* in the place of the offender. Which may be enough at preſent to ſhew, that a ſubſtitution was admitted by the Law, of a ſacrifice inſtead of the offender, in order to the expiation of guilt; but whether the offender himſelf was to be freed by that Sacrifice; depends upon the terms on which the ſacrifice was offered; for we ſay ſtill, that ſo much *guilt* was expiated, as the ſacrifice was deſigned to expiate; if the ſacrifice was deſigned to expiate the guilt

of

of the offender, his ſin was expiated by it; if not his, in caſe no Sacrifice was allowed by the Law, as in that of murther, then the guilt which lay upon the Land was expiated, although the offender himſelf were never diſcovered.

IV. I now come to prove, that in correſpondency to ſuch a *ſubſtitution* of the ſacrifices for ſin under the Law, Chriſt was ſubſtituted in our room for the expiation of our guilt; and that from his being ſaid *to die for us*, and his death being called *a price of Redemption* for us. A ſubſtitution of Chriſt in our room proved by his dying for us.

1. *From Chriſt's being ſaid to die for us.* By St. *Peter*, *For Chriſt hath alſo once ſuffered for ſins, the juſt for the unjuſt*; by whom he is alſo ſaid, *to ſuffer* ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν, *for us*, and *for us in the fleſh*: By St. *Paul*, he is ſaid *to die* ὑπὲρ πάντων, *for all*, and ὑπὲρ ἀσεβῶν, *for the ungodly*, and *to give himſelf* ἀντίλυτρον ὑπὲρ πάντων, *a ranſom for all*, and, *to taſt death* ὑπὲρ παντός, *for every man*: By *Caiaphas*, ſpeaking by inſpiration, he is ſaid *to die* ὑπὲρ τοῦ λαοῦ, *for the people*. So Chriſt himſelf inſtituting his laſt Supper, ſaid, *This is my body which was given, and my blood which was ſhed* ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν, *for you*; and before he had ſaid, That *the Son of man came to give his life* λύτρον ἀντὶ πολλῶν,

1 Pet. 3. 18. 2. 21. 4. 1. 2 Cor. 5. 14. Rom. 5. 6. 1 Tim. 2. 6. Heb. 2. 9. Joh. 11. 50. Luke 22. 19, 20. Matt. 20. 28.

a ranſom for many. We are now to conſider, what arts our Adverſaries have made uſe of to pervert the meaning of theſe places, ſo as not to imply a ſubſtitution of Chriſt in our room: 1. They ſay, *That all theſe phraſes do imply no more than a final cauſe*; viz. *That Chriſt died for the good of mankind*; for the Apoſtle tells us, *We are bound to lay down our lives for the Brethren, and St.* Paul *is ſaid to ſuffer for the Church.* To which I anſwer; 1. This doth not at all deſtroy that which we now plead for, *viz.* That theſe phraſes do imply a ſubſtitution of Chriſt in our room: For when we are bid to lay down *our lives for our brethren*, a ſubſtitution is implied therein; and ſuppoſing that dying for another, doth ſignifie dying for ſome benefit to come to him, yet what doth this hinder ſubſtitution, unleſs it be proved, that one cannot obtain any benefit for another, by being ſubſtituted in his room. Nay, it is obſervable, that although we produce ſo many places of *Scripture*, implying ſuch a ſubſtitution, they do not offer to produce one that is inconſiſtent with Chriſt's ſuffering in our ſtead; all that they ſay is, *That* ὑπὲρ *doth not always ſignifie ſo*, which we never ſaid it did,

1 Joh. 3. 16.

Col. 1. 24.

who

who ſay, that Chriſt ſuffered ὑπὲρ ἁμαρτιῶν, not *inſtead* of our ſins, but *by reaſon* of them; but we aſſert, that when one perſon is ſaid to die for others, as in the places mentioned, no other ſenſe can be ſo proper and agreeable, as dying in the ſtead of the other. 2. *Socinus* himſelf grants, "That there is a peculiarity "implied in thoſe phraſes, when attributed to Chriſt, above what they have "when attributed to any other. And "therefore, *he ſaith*, it cannot be properly ſaid, That one Brother dies for "another, or that *Paul* ſuffered for the "*Coloſſians*, or for the Church, as Chriſt "may truly and properly be ſaid to ſuffer "and to die for us. And from hence, "*ſaith he*, St. *Paul* ſaith, was *Paul* crucified for you? implying thereby, that "there never was or could be any, who "truly and properly could be ſaid to die "for Men, but Chriſt alone. How unreaſonable then is it, from the uſe of a *particle* as applied to others, to inferr, that it ought to be ſo underſtood, when applied to Chriſt? when a peculiarity is acknowledged in the death of Chriſt for us, more than ever was or could be in one mans dying for another. 3. It is not the bare force of the particle ὑπὲρ that we

Soc. de ſervat. l.2.c.8.

1 Cor.1.13.

inſiſt

insist upon; but that a *substitution* could not be more properly expressed, than it is in Scripture, by this and other particles, for not only ὑπὲρ is used, but ἀντὶ too: which *Socinus* saith, *Although it may signifie something else besides in the stead of another, yet in such places, where it is spoken of a ransom or price, it signifies the payment of something which was owing before, as* Matt. 17. 27. ἀντὶ ἐμοῦ καὶ σοῦ, *and so he acknowledges, that where redemption is spoken of, there* ἀντὶ *doth imply a commutation, because the price is given, and the person received, which,* he saith, *holds in Christ only metaphorically*: for the redemption according to him being only metaphorical, the commutation must be supposed to be so too.

Socin. ib.

In what sense a surrogation of Christ in our room is asserted by us.

V. And this now leads us to the larger Answer of *Crellius* upon this argument. Wherein we shall consider, what he yields, what he denies, and upon what reasons. 1. *He yields,* and so he saith *doth* Socinus, *very freely, a commutation*; but it is necessary that we should throughly understand what he means by it: to that end he tells us, *That they acknowledge a twofold commutation; one of the person suffering, the kind of suffering being changed, not actually but intentionally, because*

Crell. c. 9. sect. 3. ib. sect. 2.

becauſe we are not actually freed by Chriſt dying for us, but only Chriſt died for that end, that we might be freed. And this commutation, he ſaith, *that* Socinus *doth not deny to be implied in the particle* ὑπὲρ, *in the places where Chriſt is ſaid to die for us. Another commutation,* which he acknowledges, is, *that which is between a price, and the thing or perſon which is bought or redeemed by it; where the price is paid, and the thing or perſon is received upon it. And this kind of commutation,* he ſaith, *is to be underſtood in the places where* ἀντὶ *is mentioned; which price,* he ſaith, *by accident may be a perſon; and becauſe the perſon is not preſently delivered,* he therefore ſaith, *that the commutation is rather imperfect than metaphorical; and although,* he ſaith, ἀντὶ *doth not of it ſelf imply a commutation,* yet he grants, *that the circumſtances of the places do imply it.* 2. He denies, *that there is any proper ſurrogation in Chriſt's dying for us, which,* he ſaith, *is ſuch a commutation of perſons, that the ſubſtituted perſon is in all reſpects to be in the ſame place and ſtate wherein the other was; and if it refers to ſufferings, then it is when one ſuffers the very ſame which the other was to ſuffer, he being immediately delivered*

Ib. ſect. 6.

Ib. ſect. 7.

by

by the others ſufferings. And againſt this kind of ſurrogation, *Crellius* needed not to have produced any reaſons; for *Grotius* never aſſerted it; neither do we ſay, that Chriſt ſuffered eternal death for us, or that we were immediately freed by his ſufferings. But that which *Grotius* aſſerts, that he meant by ſubſtitution was this, that *unleſs Chriſt had died for us, we muſt have died our ſelves, and becauſe Chriſt hath died, we ſhall not die eternally.*

Ib. ſect. 3. *But if this be all,* ſaith *Crellius, he meant by it, we grant the whole thing, and he complains of it as an injury for any to think otherwiſe of them.* If ſo, they cannot deny but that there was a ſufficient capacity in the death of Chriſt to be made an expiatory Sacrifice for the ſins of the world. But notwithſtanding all theſe fair words, *Crellius* means no more than *Socinus* did; and tho' he would allow the words which *Grotius* uſed, yet not in the ſenſe he underſtood them in; for *Crellius* means no more by all this, but that *the death of Chriſt was an antecedent condition to the expiation of ſins in Heaven,* *Grotius* underſtands by them, that *Chriſt did expiate ſins by becoming a Sacrifice for them in his death.* However, from hence it appears, that our Adverſaries can

can have no plea againſt the death of Chriſt's being an expiatory Sacrifice (from want of a ſubſtitution in our room) ſince they profeſs themſelves ſo willing to own ſuch a ſubſtitution. But if they ſay, that there could be no *proper ſubſtitution*, becauſe *the death of Chriſt was a bare condition, and no puniſhment*, they then expreſs their minds more freely; and if theſe places be allowed to prove a ſubſtitution, I hope the former diſcourſe will prove that it was by way of puniſhment. Neither is it neceſſary, *that the very ſame kind of puniſhment be undergone in order to ſurrogation*, but that it be ſufficient in order to the accompliſhing the end for which it was deſigned. For this kind of *ſubſtitution* being in order to the delivery of another by it, whatever is ſufficient for that end, doth make a *proper ſurrogation*. For no more is neceſſary to the delivery of another perſon than the ſatisfying the ends of the Law and Government, and if that may be done by an equivalent ſuffering, though not the ſame in all reſpects, then it may be a proper ſurrogation. If *David* had obtained his wiſh, that he had died for his Son *Abſolom*, it had not been neceſſary in order to his Son's eſcape,

that he had *hanged by the hair of his head*, as his Son did; but his death, though in other circumſtances, had been ſufficient. And therefore when the Lawyers ſay, *ſubrogatum, ſapit naturam ejus in cujus locum ſubrogatur: Covarruvias* tells us, it is to be underſtood, *ſecundum primordialem naturam non ſecundum accidentalem*; from whence it appears, that all circumſtances, are not neceſſary to be the ſame in *ſurrogation*; but that the nature of the puniſhment remain the ſame. Thus *Chriſt dying for us*, to deliver us from death, and the curſe of the Law, he underwent an *accurſed death* for that end; although not the very *ſame* which we were to have undergone, yet ſufficient to ſhew, that he underwent the puniſhment of our iniquities in order to the delivering us from it. And if our Adverſaries will yield us this, we ſhall not much contend with them about the name of a *proper ſurrogation.*

Covarru. 3. *Th.* 1. *p.* 1. *ſect.* 4. *n.* 3.

Our Redemption by Chriſt proves a ſubſtitution.

VI. But in *the matter of Redemption*, or where ἀντὶ is uſed, *Crellius* will by no means yield *that there was a commutation of perſons between Chriſt and us, but all the commutation he will allow here is only a commutation between a thing, or a prince, and a perſon.* Which he therefore aſſerts,

Crell. c. 9. *ſect.* 2.

aſſerts, that ſo there may be no neceſſity of Chriſt's undergoing the puniſhment of ſin in order to *redemption*, becauſe *the price that is to be paid, is not ſuppoſed to undergo the condition of the perſon delivered by it.* Which will evidently appear to have no force at all, in caſe we can prove, that a proper redemption may be obtained by the puniſhment of one in the room of another; for that puniſhment then comes to be the λύτρον or price of redemption; and he that pays this, muſt be ſuppoſed to undergo puniſhment for it. So that the commutation being between the puniſhment of one, and the other redeemed by it, here is a proper commutation of perſons implied in the payment of the price. But hereby we may ſee that the great ſubtilty of our Adverſaries is deſigned on purpoſe to avoid the force of the places of *Scripture*, which are ſo plain againſt them: For when theſe places where λύτρον and ἀντὶ are joyned together, are ſo clear for a ſubſtitution, that they cannot deny it; then they ſay, by it is meant only a commutation of a price for a perſon; but when the word λύτρον is urged to prove a redemption purchaſed by Chriſt, by the payment of a price

for it, then they deny that λύτρον doth ſignifie a proper price, but is only taken metaphorically; and yet if it be ſo taken, then there can be no force in what *Crellius* ſaith, for a bare metaphorical price may be a real puniſhment: Two things I ſhall then prove againſt *Crellius*. 1. That the λύτρον as applied to Chriſt, is to be taken in a proper ſenſe. 2. That although it be taken in a proper ſenſe, yet it doth not imply a bare commutation of a price and a perſon, but a ſubſtitution of one perſon in the room of another.

Of the true notion of Redemption.

VII. Both theſe will be cleared from the right ſtating the notion of redemption between our Adverſaries and us. For they will not by any means have any other proper notion of redemption *but from captivity*, and that *by the payment of a price to him that did hold in captivity, and therefore becauſe Chriſt did not pay the price to the Devil, there could be no proper ſenſe either of the redemption, or the price which was paid for it.* This is the main ſtrength of all the arguments uſed by *Socinus* and *Crellius*, to enervate the force of thoſe places of *Scripture* which ſpeak of *our redemption by Chriſt*, and *of the price which he paid in order*

Socin. de ſervat. l. 2. c. 1, 2. Crell. c. 8. ſect. 11.

order to it. But how weak theſe exceptions are, will appear upon a true examination of the proper notion of Redemption, which in its primary importance ſignifies no more, than *the obtaining of one thing by another as a valuable conſideration for it.* Thence *redimere* anciently among the *Latins* ſignified barely *to purchaſe* by a valuable price, for the thing which they had a right to by it; and ſometimes to purchaſe that which a man hath ſold before, thence the *pactum redimendi* in contracts: ſtill in whatever ſenſe it was uſed by the Lawyers or others, the main regard was, to the conſideration upon which the thing was obtained, thence *redimere delatorem pecunia*, h. e. *eum à delatione deducere*; ſo *redimere litem*; and *redemptor litis* was one that upon certain conſideration took the whole charge of a ſuit upon himſelf: and thoſe who undertook the farming of cuſtoms at certain rates, were called *redemptores vectigalium, qui redempturis auxiſſent vectigalia*, ſaith *Livy.* And all thoſe who undertook any publick work at a certain price, *redemptores antiquitus dicebantur*, ſaith *Feſtus* and *Ulpian.* From hence it was applied to the delivery of any perſon from any in-

Ulpian l. 29. D. de jure fiſci.

Budæus ad Pandect. p. 189. Liv. l. 23. Feſtus v. red. Ulpian. l. 39. D. de rei vend.

convenience that he lay under, by ſomething which was ſuppoſed a valuable conſideration for it. And that it doth not only relate to captivity, but to any other great calamity, the freedom from which is obtained by what another ſuffers; is apparent from theſe two remarkable expreſſions of *Cicero* to this purpoſe. *Quam quidem ego* (ſaith he, ſpeaking of the ſharpneſs of the time) *à rep. meis privatis & domeſticis incommodis libentiſſimè redemiſſem.* And more expreſly elſewhere, *Ego vitam omnium civium, ſtatum orbis terræ, urbem hanc denique, &c. quinque hominum amentium ac perditorum pœna redemi.* Where it is plain, that redemption is uſed for the delivery of ſome by the puniſhment of others; not from mere captivity, but from a great calamity which they might have fallen into, without ſuch a puniſhment of thoſe perſons. So vain is that aſſertion of *Socinus*, *Redimere, nihil aliud propriè ſignificat, quam eum captivum è manibus illius, qui eum detinet, pretio illi dato liberare.*

Cic ep fam. l. 2. ep. 16.

Orat. pro Syllâ.

Soc. de ſervat. l. 2. c. 1.

No neceſſity of paying the price to him that detains captive.

VIII. And yet ſuppoſing we ſhould grant that *redemption* as uſed in ſacred Authors doth properly relate to *captivity*, there is no neceſſity at all of that which

which our Adverſaries contend ſo earneſtly for, viz. *That the price muſt be paid to him that detains captive.* For we may very eaſily conceive a double ſort of captivity, from whence a redemption may be obtained; the one by *force*, when a Captive is detained purpoſely for advantage to be made by his redemption: and the other in a *judicial manner*, when the Law condemns a perſon to captivity, and the thing deſigned by the Law is not a meer price, but ſatisfaction to be made to the Law, upon which a redemption may be obtained; now in the former caſe it is neceſſary, that the price be paid to the perſon who detains, becauſe the reaſon of his detaining, was the expectation of the price to be paid; but in the latter, the detainer is meerly the inſtrument for execution of the Law, and the price of redemption is not to be paid to him; but to thoſe who are moſt concerned in the honour of the Law. But *Crellius* objects, *that the price can never be ſaid to be paid to God, becauſe our redemption is attributed to God as the author of it, and becauſe we are ſaid to be redeemed for his uſe and ſervice, now*, ſaith he, *the price can never be paid to him for whoſe ſervice the perſon is redeemed.* But all this

Crell. c. 8. ſect. 11.

this depends upon the former miſtake, as though we ſpake all this while of ſuch a redemption, as that is of a *Captive* by force; in whom the detainer is no further concerned, than for the advantage to be made by him; and in that caſe the price muſt be paid to him who detains, becauſe it would otherwiſe be unſucceſsful for his deliverance: but in caſe of captivity by Law, as the effect of diſobedience, the Magiſtrate who is concerned in the life of the perſon, and his future obedience may himſelf take care that ſatisfaction may be given to the Law for his redemption, in order to his future ſerviceableneſs. From hence we ſee both that the λύτρον is *proper* in this caſe of our redemption, and that it is not a meer *commutation* of a *price* for a *perſon*, but a *commutation* of one *perſons* ſuffering for *others*, which ſuffering being a puniſhment in order to ſatisfaction is a valuable conſideration, and therefore a *price* for the redemption of others by it. Which *price* in this ſenſe doth imply a proper ſubſtitution; which was the thing to be proved. Which was the firſt thing to be made good concerning the death of Chriſt being a ſacrifice for ſin, *viz.* that there was a ſubſtitution of Chriſt

Chriſt in our ſtead as of the ſacrifices of old under the Law; and in this ſenſe the death of Chriſt was a proper λύτρον or price of redemption for us. Nothing then can be more vain, than the way of our Adverſaries, to take away the force of all this, becauſe ἀπολύτρωσις *is ſometimes taken for a meer deliverance without any price*, which we deny not; but the main force of our argument is from the importance of ἀπολύτρωσις, where the λύτρον is mentioned; and then we ſay that ἀπολύτρωσις when applied to ſins, ſignifies expiation, (as *Heb.* 9. 15. εἰς ἀπολύτρωσιν τῶν παραβάσεων,) but when applied to perſons, it ſignifies the deliverance purchaſed by the λύτρον, which is not to be conſidered as a bare price, or thing given, but as a thing undergone in order to that deliverance: and is therefore not only called λύτρον, but ἀντίλυτρον too, which *Crellius* confeſſeth doth imply a *commutation*, and we have ſhewed, doth prove a *ſubſtitution* of Chriſt in our place.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

I. *The notion of a ſacrifice belongs to the death of Chriſt, becauſe of the Oblation made therein to God.* Crellius *his ſenſe of Chriſt's Oblation propoſed.* II. *Againſt him it is proved, that the Prieſtly office of Chriſt had a primary reſpect to God, and not to us. Expiatory Sacrifices did divert the wrath of God.* III. *Chriſt not a bare Metaphorical High-Prieſt.* IV. Crellius *deſtroys the Prieſthood of Chriſt by confounding it with the exerciſe of his Regal Power.* V. *No proper expiation of ſin belongs to Chriſt in Heaven, if* Crellius *his Doctrine be true.* VI. Epheſ. 5. 2. *proves the death of Chriſt an Expiatory Sacrifice, and an Oblation to God. The Phraſe of* a ſweet-ſmelling ſavour, *belongs to expiatory Sacrifices;* Crellius *his groſs notion of it.* VII. *His miſtakes about the kinds of Sacrifices. Burnt-offerings were Expiatory Sacrifices both before and under the Law. A new diſtribution of ſacrifices propoſed.* VIII. *What influence the mactation of the Sacrifice had on Expiation. The High-*

High Priest only to slay the Sin-offering on the day of Atonement; from whence it is proved, that Christ's Priesthood did not begin from his entrance into Heaven. The mactation in Expiatory Sacrifices no bare preparation to a Sacrifice, proved by the Jewish Laws, and the customs of other Nations. IX. *Whether Christ's Oblation of himself once to God, were in Heaven, or on Earth? Of the proper notion of Oblations under the Levitical Law. Several things observed from thence to our purpose.* X. *All things necessary to a legal Oblation, concurr in the death of Christ.* XI. *His entrance into Heaven hath no correspondency with it; if the blood of Christ were no Sacrifice for sin. In Sin-offerings for the People, the whole was consumed; no eating of the Sacrifices allowed the Priests, but in those for private Persons.* XII. *Christ's exercise of Power in Heaven, in no sense an Oblation to God.* XIII. Crellius, *his sense repugnant to the circumstances of the places in dispute.* XIV. *Objections answered.*

THE

Of the Oblation made by Christ unto God.

I. THE second thing to prove the *death* of *Christ* a Sacrifice for sin, is the *Oblation of it to God* for that end. " *Grotius* towards the conclusion of his Book, makes a twofold " oblation of Christ, parallel to that of " the Sacrifices under the Law, the first " of Mactation, the second of Repre- " sentation; whereof the first was done " in the Temple, the second in the Ho- " ly of Holies; so the first of Christ was " on Earth, the second in Heaven; the " first is not a bare preparation to a Sa- " crifice, but a Sacrifice: the latter not " so much a Sacrifice, as the commemo- " ration of one already past. Where- " fore, since appearing and interceeding " are not properly sacerdotal acts, any " further than they depend on the effi- " cacy of a sacrifice already offered, he " that takes away that Sacrifice, doth " not leave to Christ any proper " Priesthood, against the plain authori- " ty of the Scripture, which assigns to " Christ the office of a Priest distinct " from that of a Prophet and a King. To which *Crellius* replies: *That the expiation of sin doth properly belong to what Christ doth in Heaven; and may be applied*

Crell. c. 10. *sect.* 45.

plied to the death of Chriſt only, as the condition by which he was to enjoy that power in Heaven, whereby he doth expiate ſins; but the Prieſt was never ſaid to expiate ſins when he killed the beaſt, but when the blood was ſprinkled or carried into the Holy of Holies, to which the Oblation of Chriſt in Heaven does anſwer: Ib. ſect. 55.

but mactation, ſaith he, *was not proper to the Prieſts, but did belong to the* Levites *alſo. And Chriſt was not truly a Prieſt, while he was on Earth, but only prepared by his ſufferings to be one in Heaven, where by the perpetual care he takes of his People, and exerciſing his power for them, he is ſaid to offer up himſelf, and intercede for them, and by that means he diſchargeth the Office of a High Prieſt for them. For his Prieſtly Office,* he ſaith, *is never in Scripture mentioned as diſtinct from his Kingly, but is comprehended under it; and the great difference between them is, that one is of a larger extenſion than the other is, the Kingly Office extending to puniſhing, and the Prieſtly only to expiation.* Ib. ſect. 47. Ib. ſect. 53. Ib. ſect. 54. Sect. 56.

This is the ſubſtance of what *Crellius* more at large diſcourſeth upon this ſubject. Wherein he aſſerts theſe things. That the Prieſtly Office of Chriſt doth not in reference to the expiation of ſins reſpect

reſpect *God* but us; his Interceſſion and Oblation wherein he makes the ſacerdotal function of Chriſt to conſiſt, being the exerciſe of his power for the good of his People. 2. That Chriſt did offer up no Sacrifice of expiation to God upon Earth, becauſe the *mactation* had no reference to expiation, any other than as a preparation for it; and Chriſt not yet being conſtituted a *High Prieſt* till after his Reſurrection from the dead. Againſt theſe two aſſertions I ſhall direct my following diſcourſe, by proving; 1. That the Prieſtly Office of Chriſt had a primary reſpect to God, and not to us. 2. That Chriſt did exerciſe this Prieſtly Office in the Oblation of himſelf to God upon the Croſs.

That the Prieſtly Office of Chriſt had a primary reſpect to God, and not us. *Crell. in Heb.* 5. 1.

II. 1. That the Prieſtly Office of Chriſt had a primary reſpect *to God, and not to us*; which appears from the firſt Inſtitution of a *High Prieſt*, mentioned by the *Apoſtle*, Heb. 5. 1. *For every High Prieſt taken from among men, is ordained for men in things pertaining to God, that he may offer both gifts and ſacrifices for ſins: Id eſt*, ſaith *Crellius* elſewhere, *ut procuret & peragat ea quæ ad colendum ac propitiandum numen pertinent*; i. e. That he may perform the things which appertain

tain to the *worſhipping* and *propitiating God*: We deſire no more, but that *the propitiating God*, may as immediately be ſaid to reſpect him, as the *worſhipping* of *God* doth; or let *Crellius* tell us, what ſenſe *the propitiating God* will bear; if all that the *High-Prieſt* had to do, did immediately reſpect the people: nay, he ſaith not long after, That it was the "chief Office of a High-Prieſt, to plead "the cauſe of ſinners with God, and to "take care, that they may find him kind "and propitious, and not angry or diſ-"pleaſed. In what ſenſe *God* was ſaid to be *moved* by the Expiatory Sacrifices, is not here our buſineſs to diſcuſs; it is ſufficient for our purpoſe, that they were inſtituted with a reſpect to *God*, ſo as to procure his favour, and divert his wrath. In which ſenſe, the Prieſt is ſo often in the *Levitical Law* ſaid, by the offering up of Sacrifices, to expiate the ſins of the people. But *Crellius* ſaith, *Crell. c.* 10. "This ought not ſo to be underſtood, *ſect.* 3. "as though God by Expiatory Sacri-"fices, were diverted from his anger, "and inclined to pardon; which is a plain contradiction, not only to the words of the Law, but to the inſtances that are recorded therein; as when *Aa-*

ron

ron was bid in the time of the *Plague to*
Numb. 16. 46. *make an Atonement for the people, for there is wrath gone out from the Lord: and*
Verſ. 48. *he ſtood between the living and the dead, and the plague was ſtayed.* Was not God's anger then diverted here, by the making this Atonement? The like inſtance we read in *David's* time, that *by the offering burnt-offerings*, &c. *the Lord was in-*
2 Sam. 24. 25. *treated for the Land, and the plague was ſtayed from* Iſrael: By which nothing can be more plain, than that the primary intention of ſuch Sacrifices, and conſequently of the Office of the *Prieſt* who offered them, did immediately reſpect the *Atoning God:* But yet *Crellius* urgeth, "This cannot be ſaid of all, or of the "moſt proper Expiatory Sacrifices; but we ſee it ſaid of more than the meer *Sacrifices for ſin*, as appointed by the Law; *viz. of burnt-offerings, and peace-offerings, and incenſe*, in the examples mentioned. So that theſe Levitical Sacrifices did all reſpect the atoning God; although in ſome particular caſes, different Sacrifices were to be offered; for it is ſaid, *the*
Lev. 1. 4. 4. 20. 5. 7. *burnt-offering was to make atonement for them, as well as the ſin and treſpaſs-offerings* (excepting thoſe ſacrifices which were inſtituted in acknowledgment of God's

God's Sovereignty over them, and presence among them, as the daily Sacrifices, the meat and drink offerings, or such as were meerly occasional, &c.) Thus it is said, that *Aaron and his sons were appointed to make an Atonement for Israel*: So that as *Grotius* observes out of *Philo*, "The High-Priest was a Mediator between God and man, by whom "men might propitiate God, and God "dispense his favours to men. But the means whereby he did procure favours to men, was by atoning God by the Sacrifices, which he was by his Office to offer to him. We are now to consider, how far this holds in reference to Christ, for whose sake the Apostle brings in these words; and surely would not have mentioned this as the primary Office of a High-Priest, in order to the proving Christ to be our *High-Priest*, after a more excellent manner than the *Aaronical* was, unless he had agreed with him in the nature of his Office, and exceeded him in the manner of performance.

1 Chron. 6. 49.

Grot. in Heb. 5. 1.

III. For the *Apostle* both proves, that he was a true and proper, and not a bare *Metaphorical High-Priest*, and that in such a capacity, he very far exceeded

Christ no barely metaphorical High-Priest.

the *Prieſts* after the Order of *Aaron*. But how could that poſſibly be, if he failed in the primary Office of a *High-Prieſt*; viz. *In offering up gifts and ſacrifices to God?* If his Office as *High-Prieſt* did primarily reſpect men, when the Office of the *Aaronical Prieſt* did reſpect *God*? To avoid this, *Crellius* makes theſe words to be only an alluſion to the Legal Prieſthood, and ſome kind of ſimilitude between Chriſt and the Aaronical Prieſts; but it is ſuch a kind of alluſion, that the *Apoſtle* deſigns to prove Chriſt to be an *High-Prieſt* by it; and which is of the greateſt force, he proves the neceſſity of Chriſt's having ſomewhat to offer from hence: *For every High-Prieſt is ordained to offer gifts and ſacrifices; wherefore it is of neceſſity, that this man have ſomewhat alſo to offer.* This is that which he looks at as the peculiar and diſtinguiſhing character of a *High-Prieſt*; for interceding for others, and having compaſſion upon them, might be done by others beſides the *High-Prieſt*; but this was that, without which he could not make good his name, what order ſoever he were of. If Chriſt then had no proper ſacrifice to offer up to God, to what purpoſe doth the *Apoſtle* ſo induſtriouſly

Crell. c. 10. *ſect.* 3.

Heb 8. 2.

ſet

ſet himſelf to prove, that he is our *High-Prieſt*? when he muſt needs fail in the main thing, according to his own aſſertion? How eaſie had it been for the *Jews*, to have anſwered all the *Apoſtles* Arguments concerning the *Prieſthood* of Chriſt, if he had been ſuch a *Prieſt*, and made no other Oblation than *Crellius* allows him? When the *Apoſtle* proves againſt the *Jews*, that there was no neceſſity, that they ſhould ſtill retain the *Moſaical* Diſpenſation, becauſe now they had a more excellent *High-Prieſt* than the *Aaronical* were; and makes uſe of that character of a *High-Prieſt*, that *he was one taken out from among men, in things pertaining to God to offer gifts and ſacrifices for ſins*: "Well, *ſay the Jews*, we accept "of this character, but how do you "prove concerning Chriſt, that he was "ſuch a one? Did he offer up a *Sacri-* "*fice for ſin* to God upon earth, as our "*High-Prieſts* do? *No*, ſaith *Crellius*, *his ſufferings were only a preparation for his Prieſthood in Heaven*: "But did he "then offer up ſuch a Sacrifice to God in "Heaven? *Yes*, ſaith *Crellius*, *he made an Oblation there*. "But is that Oblation "ſuch a Sacrifice to God for ſin, as "our *High-Prieſts* offer? Yes, ſaith

Crellius, it may be called ſo *by way of alluſion*. " Well then, ſay they, you grant " that your *Jeſus* is only a *High-Prieſt* " by way of *alluſion*, which was againſt " your firſt deſign to prove; *viz.* That " he was a true *High-Prieſt*, and more " excellent than ours. But ſuppoſe it " be by way of alluſion, doth he make " any Oblation to God in Heaven or not? *No*, ſaith *Crellius*, *really and truly he doth not: for all his Office doth reſpect us, but the benefits we enjoy coming originally from the kindneſs of God, you may call it an Oblation to God if you pleaſe.* " But how is " it poſſible then, ſay the *Jews*, you can " ever convince us, that he is any " *High-Prieſt*, or *Prieſt* at all, much " leſs, that he ſhould ever exceed the " *Aaronical High-Prieſts* in their Office? " for we are aſſured, that they do offer " *Sacrifices for ſin*, and that *God* is a- " toned by them: but if your *High-* " *Prieſt* make no atonement for ſin, he " falls far ſhort of ours, and therefore " we will ſtill hold to our *Levitical* " *Prieſthood*, and not forſake that for " one barely Metaphorical, and having " nothing really anſwering the name of " a High-Prieſt. Thus the force of all the *Apoſtles* Arguments is plainly taken away,

away, by what *Crellius* and his Brethren assert concerning the Priesthood of Christ. But *Crellius* thinks to make it good by saying, *That things that are improper and figurative, may be far more excellent than the things that are proper, to which they are opposed; so that Christ's Priesthood may be far more excellent than the Aaronical, although his be only figurative, and the other proper.* But the question is not, Whether Christ's *Priesthood* by any other adventitious considerations, as of greater Power and Authority than the *Aaronical Priests* had, may be said to be far more excellent than theirs was; but, Whether in the notion of *Priesthood*, it doth exceed theirs? Which it is impossible to make good, unless he had some proper Oblation to make unto God, which in it self did far exceed all the Sacrifices and Offerings under the Law.

Crell. cap. 10. *sect.* 3. *Id. sect.* 56. *p.* 547.

IV. But what that oblation of Christ in Heaven was, which had any correspondency with the Sacrifices under the Law, our Adversaries can never assign; nay, when they go about it, they speak of it in such a manner, as makes it very evident they could heartily have wished the Epistle to the *Hebrews* had said as little of the *Priesthood* of *Christ*, as they

Crellius destroys the Priesthood of Christ

Smalc. c. Smiglect. Crell. cap. 10. p. 544.

ſay, any other part of the New Teſtament doth. Thence *Smalcius* and *Crellius* inſiſt ſo much upon *the Prieſthood of Chriſt, being diſtinctly mentioned by none but the Author to the Hebrews; which*, ſay they, *had ſurely been done, if Chriſt had been a proper Prieſt, or that Office in him diſtinct from his Kingly.* Which ſufficiently diſcovers what they would be at; *viz.* That the Teſtimony of the Author to the *Hebrews*, is but a ſingle Teſtimony in this matter; and in truth, they do (as far as is conſiſtent with not doing it in expreſs words) wholly take away the *Prieſthood* of Chriſt: For what is there which they ſay his *Prieſthood* implies, which he might not have had, ſuppoſing he had never been called a *Prieſt?* His *being in Heaven*, doth not imply that he is a *Prieſt*, unleſs it be impoſſible for any but *Prieſts* ever to come there: *His Power and Authority over the Church*, doth not imply it; for that power is by themſelves confeſſed to be a Regal power: *his readineſs to uſe that power*, cannot imply it, which is the thing *Smalcius* inſiſts on; for his being a King of the Church, doth neceſſarily imply his readineſs to make uſe of his power for the good of his Church.

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His receiving his power from God, doth not imply that he was a Prieſt, although *Crellius* inſiſt on that, unleſs all the Kings of the Earth are Prieſts by that means too, and Chriſt could not have had a ſubordinate power as King, as well as Prieſt. But *his death is more implied*, ſaith *Crellius*, *in the name of a Prieſt than of a King*; true, if his death be conſidered as a *Sacrifice*, but not otherwiſe: For what is there of a *Prieſt* in bare dying, do not others ſo too? *But this repreſents greater tenderneſs and care in Chriſt, than the meer title of a King*: What kind of *King* do they imagine *Chriſt* the mean while, if his being ſo, did not give the greateſt encouragment to all his ſubjects? nay, it is plain, the name of a *King* muſt yield greater comfort to his people, becauſe that implies his power to defend them, which the bare name of a *Prieſt* doth not. So that there could be no reaſon at all given, why the name of a *High-Prieſt* ſhould be at all given to Chriſt, if no more were implied in it, than *the exerciſe of his power with reſpect to us*, without any proper oblation to *God*: For here is no proper Sacerdotal act at all attributed to him; ſo that upon their *hypotheſis*,

the name of *High-Priest*, is a meer insignificant title used by the Author to the *Hebrews*, without any foundation at all for it. *By no means*, saith *Crellius*, *for his expiation of sin is implyed by it, which is not implied in the name of King*: True, if the expiation of sin were done by him in the way of a *Priest* by an oblation to God, which they deny; but though they call it *Expiation*, they mean no more than *the exercise of his divine power* in the delivering his people. But what parallel was there to this in the *expiation* of sins by the *Levitical Priesthood*? that was certainly done by a Sacrifice offered to *God* by the *Priest*, who was thereby said *to expiate the sins of the people*; how comes it now to be taken quite in another sense, and yet still called by the same name?

Levit. 4. 26. *v.* 34, 35.

No proper expiation of sin belongs to Christ in Heaven, if *Crellius* his doctrine be true.

V. But this being the main thing insisted on by them, I shall prove from their own Principles, that no *expiation* of sin in their own sense can belong to Christ in Heaven, by vertue of his Oblation of himself there, and consequently that they must unavoidably overthrow the whole notion of the *Priesthood* of Christ. For this we are to consider, what their notion of the *expiation*

on of ſins is, which is ſet down briefly by *Crellius* in the beginning of his diſcourſe of *Sacrifices*, "There is a two- *Crell. c.* 10. "fold power, *ſaith he*, of the ſacrifice *ſect.* 2. "of Chriſt towards the expiation of ſin, "one taking away the guilt and the pu- "niſhment of ſin, and that partly by "declaring, that God will do it, and giv- "ing us a right to it, partly by actual "deliverance from puniſhment; the o- "ther is by begetting Faith in us, and ſo "drawing us off from the practice of ſin: Now the firſt and laſt *Crellius* and *Socinus* attribute to the death of Chriſt, as that was a confirmation of the Covenant God made for the remiſſion of ſin; and as it was an argument to perſwade us to believe the truth of his Doctrine; and the other, viz. *the actual deliverance from puniſhment*, is by themſelves attributed to *the ſecond coming* of Chriſt; for then only, they ſay, the juſt ſhall be actually delivered from the puniſhment of ſin, viz. *eternal death*; and what expiation is there now left to the Oblation of Chriſt in Heaven? Doth Chriſt in Heaven declare the pardon of ſin any other way than it was declared by him upon Earth? What efficacy hath his Oblation in Heaven upon perſwading men

men to believe? or is his *ſecond coming* when he ſhall ſit as Judge, the main part of his *Prieſthood*; for then the expiation of ſins in our Adverſaries ſenſe is moſt proper? And yet nothing can be more remote from the notion of Chriſt's *Prieſthood*, than that is; ſo that expiation of ſins according to them can have no reſpect at all to the Oblation of Chriſt in Heaven, or (which is all one in their ſence) his continuance in Heaven to his ſecond coming. *Yes*, ſaith *Crellius*, *his continuance there, is a condition in order to the expiation by actual deliverance, and therefore it may be ſaid, that God is as it were moved by it to expiate ſins.* The utmoſt then, that is attributed to Chriſt's being in Heaven, in order to the expiation of ſins, is that he muſt continue there without doing any thing in order to it; for if he does, it muſt either reſpect God or us; but they deny (though contrary to the importance of the words, and the deſign of the places where they are uſed) that the terms of *Chriſt's interceding for us*, or *being an Advocate with the Father for us*, do note any reſpect to God, but only to us; if he does any thing with reſpect to us in expiation of ſin, it muſt be either declaring, perſwa-

*Crell. c.*10. *ſect.* 3. *p.* 476.

Heb. 7. 25. Rom. 8. 3. 1 Joh. 2. 1.

ding,

ding, or actual deliverance; but it is none of these by their own assertions; and therefore that which they call *Christ's Oblation*, or *his being in Heaven*, signifies nothing as to the *expiation* of sin: and it is unreasonable to suppose that a thing, which hath no influence at all upon it, should be looked on as a condition in order to it. From whence it appears, that while our Adversaries do make the exercise of *Christ's Priesthood* to respect *us* and not *God*, they destroy the very nature of it, and leave Christ only an empty name without any thing answering to it: But if Christ be truly a *High-Priest*, as the *Apostle* asserts that he is, from thence it follows that he must have a respect to *God* in *offering up gifts and sacrifices for sin:* which was the thing to be proved.

VI. 2. That Christ did exercise this *Priestly Office* in the Oblation of himself *to God* upon the Cross. Which I shall prove by two things. 1. Because the death of Christ is said in Scripture to be an Offering, and a Sacrifice to God. 2. Because Christ is said to offer up himself antecedently to his entrance into Heaven. 1. Because the death of Christ is said *to be an offering and a sacrifice to God*,

Ephes. 5. 2. Proves the death of Christ an Expiatory Sacrifice and an oblation to God.

God, which is plain from the words of
Eph. 5. 2. St. *Paul*, *as Christ also hath loved us, and given himself for us, an offering and a sacrifice to God, for a sweet-smelling savour.* Our Adversaries do not deny that the death of Christ is here called an *Oblation*, but they deny, "That it is meant of an "Expiatory Sacrifice, but of a Free-will
Crell. c. 10. sect. 47. "offering; *and the reason* Crellius *gives* "*is*, because that phrase of a sweet-smel- "ling savour is generally and almost al- "ways used of sacrifices which are not Ex- "piatory; but if ever they be used of an "Expiatory Sacrifice, they are not applied "to that which was properly expiatory "in it, *viz.* the offering up of the blood, "for no smell, *saith he*, went up from "thence, but to the burning of the fat, "and the Kidneys, which although re- "quired to perfect the expiation, yet "not being done till the High-Priest re- "turned out of the Holy of Holies, hath "nothing correspondent to the expiato- "ry Sacrifice of Christ, where all things "are perfected before Christ the High- "Priest goes forth of his Sanctuary. How inconsistent these last words are with what they assert concerning the *expiation* of sin by actual deliverance at the great day, the former discourse hath already

already discovered. For what can be more absurd, than to say, *that all things which pertain to the expiation of sin are perfected before Christ goes forth from his Sanctuary*, and yet to make the most proper *expiation* of sin to lie in that act of Christ which is consequent to his going forth of the *Sanctuary*, *viz.* when he proceeds to judge the quick and the dead. But of that already. We now come to a punctual and direct answer, as to which two things must be enquired into. 1. What the importance of the phrase of a *sweet-smelling savour* is? 2. What the *Sacrifices* are to which that phrase is applied? 1. For the importance of the phrase. The first time we read it used in Scripture was upon the occasion of *Noah*'s Sacrifice after the flood, of which it is said, *that he offered burnt-offerings on the Altar, and the Lord smelled a savour of rest, or a sweet savour.* Which we are not wont to imagine in a gross corporeal manner, as *Crellius* seems to understand it, when he saith, *the blood could not make such a savour as the fat and the Kidneys*; for surely, none ever thought the smell of flesh burnt was a *sweet-smelling savour* of it self, and we must least of all imagine that of *God*, which *Porphyry* Gen. 8.20, 21.

phyry ſaith, was the property only of the worſt of *Dæmons* to be *pleaſed*, and as it were, *to grow fat*, ταῖς ἐκ τῶν αἱμάτων καὶ σαρκῶν κνίσσαις, *with the ſmell and vapours of blood, and fleſh*, (by which teſtimony, it withal appears, that the ſame *ſteams* in Sacrifices were ſuppoſed to ariſe from the *blood* as the *fleſh*:) But we are to underſtand that phraſe in a ſenſe agreeable to the divine nature, which we may eaſily do, if we take it in the ſenſe the Syriack Verſion takes it in, when it calls it, *Odorem placabilitatis*, or *the favour of reſt*, as the word properly ſignifies; for נוחה is the word formed from the Verb נוח which is uſed for the *reſting* of the Ark, *v.* 4. of the ſame Chapter, and ſo it imports a *reſt* after ſome *commotion*, and in that ſenſe is very proper to *Atonement*, or that whereby God makes *his anger to reſt*; ſo *Aben Ezra* upon that place expounds *the Savour of reſt, to be ſuch a one which makes God ceaſe from his anger*: Thence in Hiphil הנוח ſignifies to *appeaſe*, or *to make peace*; in which ſenſe it is uſed by *R. Solom.* upon *Iſa.* 27. 5. *Munſter* tells us the ſenſe is, *Deus nunc quievit ab ira & placatus fuit*, and to the ſame purpoſe *Vatablus*: which ſenſe is moſt agreeable

Porphyr. de abſtinent. l.2. ſect.42.

greeable to the design of the following words, in which God expresseth his great kindness, *and the Lord said in his heart, I will not again curse the ground any more for mans sake*; which are words highly expressing, how much God was propitiated by the Sacrifice which *Noah* offered, and therefore *Josephus* doth well interpret this to be a proper *Expiatory Sacrifice*; that *God would now be atoned, and send no more such a deluge upon the world*; which he saith was the substance of *Noah's prayer*, when he offered this Burnt-offering, and *that God would receive his Sacrifice*, καὶ μηδεμίαν ὀργὴν ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν ὁμοίαν λάβειν, *That he would no more receive such displeasure against the earth*: So that the first time ever this expression was used, it is taken in the proper sense of an *Expiatory Sacrifice*.

Joseph. Antiq. Jud. l. 1. c. 4.

VII. And by that the second enquiry may be easily resolved; *viz.* What kind of *Sacrifices* it doth belong to, which we see in the first place is, to Expiatory, which *Crellius* denies by a great mistake of the sense of the phrase, and of the nature of the *Offerings*, concerning which this expression is most used; *viz. Holocausts*, as though those were not Expiatory Sacrifices: But if we can make it appear,

Crellius his mistakes about the kinds of sacrifices.

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Porphyr. de abſtinent. l. 2. *ſect.* 42.

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appear, that the *Holocausts* were *Expiatory Sacrifices*, then it will follow, that this phrase doth most properly agree to a Sacrifice designed for Expiation. But *Crellius* here speaks very confusedly concerning Sacrifices, opposing *Holocausts* and *Freewill-offerings* to Expiatory Sacrifices; whereas the *Freewill-offerings* might be *Expiatory* as well as *Eucharistical*; that denomination not respecting the end the Sacrifices were designed for, but that the precise time of offering them was not determined by the Law; as in the stated and solemn Sacrifices. For the general distribution of Sacrifices, seems proper into *Propitiatory* and *Eucharistical*; which distinction is thought by some to hold from the first time we read of Sacrifices in Scripture; because the Sacri-
Gen. 4. 3, 4. fice of *Cain was of the fruits of the ground, and of* Abel, *of the Firstlings of his flock.* Although there seems to be nothing meant by this difference of Sacrifices, but the diversity of their imployments, either of them Sacrificing according to them; and I cannot say what some do, that the reason of God's rejecting *Cain's Sacrifice*, was because it was not designed for expiation. But the practice of after ages, wherein we have a fuller account of the grounds of the several Sacrifices,

makes

makes it appear, that the Expiatory Sacrifices before the Law, were all *Burnt-offerings*; and of all thoſe who were not under the particular obligation of that Law: As is plain in the Expiatory Sacrifices of *Job* for his Sons, and for his friends, which were *Burnt-offerings*; and among the *Jews*, all the Sacrifices that were offered up before the *Levitical Law*, were, as the *Jews* themſelves tell us, only *Burnt-offerings*: And after the ſetling of their Worſhip among themſelves, they did receive *Burnt-offerings* for expiation from ſtrangers, as Mr. *Selden* at large proves from the *Jewiſh Writers*. It ſeems then very ſtrange, that ſince *Burnt-offerings* before the Law were Expiatory, and under the Law they continued ſo for ſtrangers, they ſhould be of another nature for the *Jews* themſelves. But what reaſon is there for it in the Text? not the leaſt that I can find, but expreſly the contrary. For in the beginning of *Leviticus*, where the Law for *Burnt-offerings* is delivered, the words are, *And he ſhall put his hand upon the head of the Burnt-offering, and it ſhall be accepted for him, to make atonement for him*; which is as much as is ever ſaid of any Expiatory Sacrifices: And in the

Job 1. 5. 42. 8.

Selden de jure nat. & gent. apud Ebræ. l. 3. c. 2. & c. 6.

Levit. 1. 4.

Verſe before, where we render לרצנו *of his own voluntary will*; it is by the vulgar *Latin* rendred, *Ad placandum ſibi Dominum*; by the *Syriack* Verſion, *Ad placationem ſibi obtinendam à Domino*; and to the ſame purpoſe by the *Chaldee Paraphraſt*; but no one Verſion conſiderable that ſo renders it, as to make *Burnt-offerings* to be Free-will offerings here, which are ſpoken of diſtinctly, and by themſelves afterwards: And the *Chaldee Paraphraſt*, *Jonathan* thus explains, *This is the Law of the Burnt-offering*; i. e. *Quod venit ad expiandum pro cogitationibus cordis*; but although the *Jews* be not fully agreed what the *Burnt-offerings* were deſigned to expiate, yet they conſent that they were of an Expiatory nature. Which might make us the more wonder, that *Crellius* and others ſhould exclude them from it, but the only reaſon given by him is, *becauſe they are diſtinguiſhed from Sacrifices for ſin*, as though no Sacrifices were of an Expiatory nature but they, and then the *Treſpaſs-offerings* muſt be excluded too, for they are diſtinguiſhed from *Sin-offerings* as well as the other. The ignorance of the *Jews* in the reaſon of their own cuſtoms, hath been an occaſion of great miſtakes among

Lev. 7. 16. 22. 18. *&c.* Lev. 6. 7.

Crell. c. 10. *p.* 530.

mong Christians, concerning the nature of them; when they judge of them according to the blind or uncertain conjectures which they make concerning them: So that the Text is oft-times far clearer than their Commentaries are. Setting aside then the intricate and unsatisfactory niceties of the *Jewish* Writers, about the several reasons of the *Burnt-offerings* and *Sin* and *Trespass-offerings*, and the differences they make between them, which are so various and incoherent, I shall propose this conjecture concerning the different reasons of them, *viz.* That some *Sacrifices* were assumed into the Jewish Religion, which had been long in use in the world before, and were common to them with the *Patriarchs*, and all those who in that age of the world did fear and serve God, and such were the *Burnt-offerings* for expiation of sin, and the fruits of the earth by way of gratitude to God. Other Sacrifices were instituted among them, with a particular respect to themselves, as a people governed by the Laws of God: And these were of several sorts; 1. *Symbolical*, of God's presence among them, such was *the daily Sacrifice*, instituted as a testimony of God's presence, *Exod.* 29.

from *v* 38. to the end. 2. *Occaſional*, for ſome great mercies vouchſafed to them, as the *Paſſover* and the Solemn *Feſtivals*, &c. 3. *Expiatory*, for the ſins committed againſt their *Law*: And theſe were of three ſorts; 1. Such as were wholly conſumed to the honour of God, which were *the Burnt-offerings*. 2. Such, of which ſome part was conſumed upon the *Altar*, and ſome part fell to the ſhare of the *Prieſts*; and theſe were either ſins particularly enumerated by God himſelf, under the אשם, or elſe generally comprehended under the חטאת as being allowed to be expiated, becauſe committed through inadvertency. 3. Such, whereof a leſs part was conſumed, as in the *Peace-offerings of the Congregation*, mentioned *Levit.* 23. 19. whereof *the blood was ſprinkled, only the inwards burnt, and the fleſh not eaten by the perſons that offered them*, as it was in the *Peace-offerings* of particular perſons (of which as being *private Sacrifices*, I have here no occaſion to ſpeak) but only *by the Prieſts in the Court*; and theſe had ſomething of expiation in them: For thence, ſaith *Vatablus*, the *Peace-offering* was called by the Greeks τελειωτὸν, *i. e. Expiatorium*, and the LXX. commonly render it, θυσία σωτηρίου,

שלמים, and ſeveral of the *Jews* think the reaſon of the name was, *That it made peace between God and him that offered it:* But the great reaſon I inſiſt on, is, Becauſe all the things which were uſed in an Expiatory Sacrifice, were in this too; the ſlaying of the Beaſt, the ſprinkling of the blood, and the conſumption of ſome part of it upon the Altar as an Oblation to God, which are the three ingredients of an *Expiatory Sacrifice*; for the *ſhedding of the blood*, noted the bearing the puniſhment of our iniquity; and, *the ſprinkling of it on the Altar*, and *the conſuming of the part of the Sacrifice, or the whole there*, that it was deſigned for the expiation of ſin. From whence it follows, that the phraſe of a *ſweet-ſmelling ſavour*, being applied under the Law to *Expiatory Sacrifices*, is very properly uſed by St. *Paul*, concerning Chriſt's giving up himſelf for us. ſo that from this phraſe, nothing can be inferred contrary to the Expiatory nature of the death of Chriſt, but rather it is fully agreeable to it.

VIII. But *Crellius* hath yet a farther Argument, to prove that Chriſt's death cannot be here meant as the Expiatory Sacrifice; *viz. That the notion of a ſacrifice*, What influence the maſtation of the ſacrifice had on expiation.

Crell. c. 10 p. 533. *fice, doth consist in the oblation whereby the thing is consecrated to the honour and service of God, to which the mactation is but a bare preparation,* which he proves, *Because the slaying the sacrifice might belong to others besides the Priests,* Ezek. 44. 10, 11. *but the oblation only to the Priests.* To this I answer, 1. The *mactation* may be considered two ways, either with a respect to the bare *instrument* of taking away the life, or to the design of the *Offerer* of that which was to be sacrificed: As the *mactation* hath a respect only to the instruments, so it is no otherways to be considered than as a *punishment*; but as it hath a respect to him that designs it for a Sacrifice, so the shedding of the blood, hath an immediate influence on the expiation of sin. And that by this clear Argument, *The blood is said* Levit. 17. 11. *to make an Atonement for the soul*; and the reason given is, because *the life of the flesh is in the blood*: So that which was *the life*, is the great thing which makes the *Atonement*; and when the *blood* was shed, the *life* was then given; from whence it follows, that the great efficacy of the sacrifice for *Atonement* lay in the *shedding of the blood* for that end. Thence the *Apostle* attributes remission of sins to the

the αἱματεκχυσία, *the ſhedding of the blood*; and not to the bare *Oblation* of it on the Altar, or the carrying it into the Holy of Holies, both which ſeem to be nothing elſe but a more ſolemn repreſentation of that *blood* before God, which was already ſhed for the expiation of ſins, which was therefore neceſſary to be performed, that the concurrence of the *Prieſt* might be ſeen with the ſacrifice in order to expiation. For if no more had been neceſſary but the bare ſlaying of the Beaſts, which was the meaneſt part of the ſervice, the people would never have thought the inſtitution of the *Prieſthood* neceſſary, and leaſt of all that of the *High-Prieſt*, unleſs ſome ſolemn action of his had been performed, ſuch as the entring into the Holy of Holies, on the day of expiation, and carrying it, and ſprinkling the blood of the *ſin-offering* in order to the expiation of the ſins of the people. And it is obſervable, that although the *Levitical Law* be ſilent in the common Sacrifices, who were to kill them whether the *Prieſts* or the *Levites*; yet on that day whereon the *High-Prieſt* was to appear himſelf for the expiation of ſin, it is expreſly ſaid, *that he ſhould not only* Heb. 9. 22.

Levit. 16. 11, 15. *kill the bullock of the ſin-offering, which is for himſelf, but the goat of the ſin offering, which is for the people.* And although the *Talmudiſts* diſpute from their Traditions on both ſides, whether any one elſe might on the day of expiation, ſlay the ſin-offerings beſides the High-Prieſt; yet it is no news for them to diſpute againſt the Text, and the *Talmud* it ſelf is clear, *that the High-Prieſt did it.* From whence it appears, there was ſomething peculiar on that day as to the ſlaying of the *ſin-offerings*; and if our Adverſaries opinion hold good, *that the Sacrifices on the day of expiation did, if not atone, yet chiefly repreſent the Sacrifice of Chriſt*, no greater argument can be brought againſt themſelves than this is, for the office of the *High-Prieſt* did not begin at his carrying the *blood* into the *Holy of Holies*, but the *ſlaying* the *ſacrifice* did belong to him too: from whence it will unavoidably follow, that Chriſt did not enter into his Office of *High-Prieſt*, when he entred into Heaven, but when the Sacrifice was to be ſlain which was deſigned for the expiation of ſins. It is then to no purpoſe at all, if *Crellius* could prove that ſometimes in ordinary Sacrifices, (which he will not ſay, the

Codex Jomæ cap. 4. ſect. 3. cap. 5. ſect. 4.

Sacrifice

Sacrifice of Chriſt was repreſented by) the *Levites* might kill the beaſts for Sacrifice; for it appears, that in theſe Sacrifices, wherein themſelves contend that Chriſt's was repreſented, the office of the *High-Prieſt* did not begin with entring into the *Sanctuary*, but with the *mactation* of that Sacrifice whoſe blood was to be carried in thither. Therefore if we ſpeak of the bare inſtruments of *mactation* in the death of Chriſt, thoſe were the *Jews*, and we make not them *Prieſts* in it, for they aimed at no more than taking away his life (as the *Popæ* among the *Romans*, and thoſe whoſe bare Office it was to kill the beaſts for Sacrifice among the *Jews* did:) but if we conſider it with a reſpect to him that offered up his life to God, then we ſay, that Chriſt was the *High-Prieſt* in doing it; it being deſigned for the expiation of ſin; and by vertue of this *blood ſhed* for that end, he enters into Heaven as the *Holy of Holies*, there *ever living to make interceſſion for us*. But the vertue of the conſequent acts, depends upon the efficacy of the *blood* ſhed for expiation; otherwiſe the *High-Prieſt* might have entred with the ſame effect into the *Holy of Holies* with any other blood beſides that which

which was ſhed on purpoſe as a *ſin-offering*, for expiation of the ſins of the people; which it was unlawful for him to do. And from hence it is, that the *Apoſtle* to the *Hebrews* inſiſts ſo much on the compariſon between the *blood of Chriſt*, and the *blood* of the *legal Sacrifices*, and the efficacy of the one far above the other, in its power of expiation; which he needed not to have done, if the ſhedding of his blood, had been only a preparation for his entrance on his *Prieſthood* in Heaven. So that the proper notion of a *Sacrifice for ſin*, as it notes the giving the life of one for the expiation of the ſins of another, doth properly lie in the *maſtation*, though other ſacrificial acts may be conſequent upon it. So it was in the *animales hoſtiæ* among the *Romans*, in which, ſaith *Macrobius*, *Sola anima Deo ſacratur*: of which he tells us *Virgil* properly ſpeaks in thoſe words,

Heb. 9. 13, 14. 10. 4, 10.

Macrob. Saturn. l. 3. c. 5.

Hanc tibi Eryx meliorem animam pro morte Daretis.

And that we may the better underſtand what he means by the *anima* here, he ſaith elſewhere (as *Macrobius* and *Servius*

μι obſerve out of his excellent Skill and accuracy in the *Pontifical* rites)

Sanguine placaſtis ventos & virgine cæſa,
Cum primum Iliacas Danai veniſtis ad oras:
Sanguine quærendi reditus, animaque litandum
Argolica.

Which ſhews, that the expiation was ſuppoſed to lie in the *blood* which they called the *Soul*, as the Scripture doth. And the *Perſians*, as *Strabo* tells us, looked upon the bare *maſtation* as the Sacrifice, for they did not *porricere* as the *Romans* called it, they laid none of the parts of the Sacrifice upon the Altar to be conſumed there, ὁ γὰρ ψυχῆς φασὶ τὸν ἱερεῖα δεῖσθαι τὸν Θεὸν ἄλλα δ' οὐδέν. *For God regarded nothing but the Soul in the ſacrifice:* which words *Euſtathius* likewiſe uſeth upon *Homer*, of the Sacrifices of the *Magi*. And *Strabo* affirms of the ancient *Luſitani*, that they cut off nothing of the Sacrifice, but conſumed the entrails whole; but though ſuch Sacrifices which were for divination were not thought expiatory, and therefore

Strabo, l. 15.

Euſtath. in Hom. Iliad. 1.

Strabo. l. 3.

fore different from the *animales hostiæ*, yet among the *Persians*, every Sacrifice had a respect to expiation of the whole people. For *Herodotus* tells us, that every one that offers Sacrifice among them, πᾶσι τοῖσι Πέρσησι κατεύχεται εὖ γίνεσθαι ὑπὲρ τοῦ βασιλέος, *prays for good to all Persians and the King*. But thus much may serve to prove against *Crellius*, that the *mactation* in an Expiatory Sacrifice, was not a meer preparation to a Sacrifice, but that it was a proper Sacrificial act, and consequently that Christ acted as High-Priest, when he gave himself for us, an offering and a Sacrifice to God for a *sweet-smelling savour*.

Herod. l. 1.

Whether Christ's Oblation of himself once to God, were in Heaven or on Earth.

IX. But this will further appear from those places wherein Christ is said *to offer up himself once to God:* the places to this purpose are, Heb. 7. 27. *Who needeth not daily as those High-Priests to offer up Sacrifice, first for his own sins, and then for the Peoples, for this he did once, when he offered up himself.* Heb. 9. 14. *How much more shall the blood of Christ, who through the eternal Spirit offered himself without spot to God, purge your Conscience from dead works, to serve the living God.* V. 25, 26, 27, 28. *Nor yet that he should offer himself often, as the High-Priest entreth*

treth into the holy place every year with the blood of others; for then muſt he often have ſuffered ſince the foundation of the World: but now once in the end of the World hath he appeared to put away ſin by the Sacrifice of himſelf. And as it is appointed to men once to die, but after this the Judgment: ſo Chriſt was once offered to bear the ſins of many, and unto them that look for him ſhall he appear the ſecond time without ſin unto ſalvation. Heb. 10. 10, 11, 12. *By the which will we are ſanctified through the offering of the Body of Jeſus Chriſt once for all. And every High-Prieſt, ſtandeth daily miniſtring and offering oftentimes the ſame ſacrifices, which can never take away ſins: but this man after he had offered one ſacrifice for ſins for ever, ſate down on the right hand of God.* To theſe places *Crellius* gives this anſwer, "That the name of Oblation as "applyed to Chriſt, primarily ſignifies "Chriſt's firſt entrance into Heaven, and "appearance before the face of God, "there, but conſequently the continu-"ance of that appearance; ſo that when "a thing is once actually exhibited and "preſented, it is ſaid to be once offered, "although being offered, it always re-"mains in the ſame place, and ſo may "be

Crell. cap. 10. ſect. 54.

" be ſaid to be a continual Oblation.
" But this firſt appearance, *ſaith he*, hath
" a peculiar agreement with the legal
" Oblation; and therefore the name of
" Oblation doth moſt properly belong
" to that, becauſe Chriſt by this means
" obtained that power on which the
" perfect remiſſion of our ſins depends:
" but although the continuance of that
" appearance, ſeems only conſequenti-
" ally to have the name of Oblation
" belonging to it, yet in its own nature,
" it hath a nearer conjunction with the
" effect of the Oblation, *viz.* the remiſſion
" of ſins, or deliverance from puniſh-
" ment, and doth of it ſelf confer more
" to it than the other doth. And there-
" fore in regard of that, Chriſt is ſaid
" moſt perfectly to exerciſe his Prieſt-
" hood, and to offer and intercede for
" us, from the time he is ſaid to ſit down
" at the right hand of God. Againſt
this anſwer, I ſhall prove theſe two things, 1. That it is incoherent, and repugnant to it ſelf. 2. That it by no means agrees to the places before mentioned. 1. That it is incoherent and repugnant to it ſelf in two things. 1. In making that to be the proper *Oblation* in correſpondency to the Oblations of the

the Law, which hath no immediate respect to the expiation of sins. 2. In making that to have the most immediate respect to the expiation of sins, which can in no tolerable sense be called an *Oblation*. For the first, since *Crellius* saith, that the proper notion of *Oblation* is to be taken from the *Oblations* in the *Levitical Law*, we must consider what it was there, and whether *Christ's* first entrance into Heaven can have any correspondency with it. An *Oblation* under the *Law* was in general, any thing which was *immediately dedicated to God*, but in a more limited sense it was proper to what was dedicated to him by way of *Sacrifice* according to the appointments of the *Levitical Law*. We are not now enquiring what was properly called an *Oblation* in other Sacrifices, but in those which then were for expiation of sin; And in the Oblation was, first of the persons for whom the Sacrifice was offered. So in the *Burnt-offering*, the person who brought it, *was to offer it at the door of the Tabernacle of the Congregation*: Lev. 1. 3. i. e. as the *Jews* expound it, at the entrance of the Court of the *Priests*, and there he was *to lay his hands upon the head of it, and it shall be accepted for him* V. 4.

to

to make atonement for him. This Offering was made before the Beaſt was ſlain; after the killing the Beaſt, then *the Prieſts were to make an Offering of the blood, by ſprinkling it round about the Altar of Burnt-offerings*; the reſt of the *blood*, ſay the *Jews*, was poured out by the *Prieſts*, at the South-ſide of the *Altar* upon the foundation, where the two holes were for the paſſage into the Channel, which convey'd the blood into the valley of *Kidron*; thus the *blood* being offered, the *parts* of the beaſt, were by the *Prieſts to be laid upon the Altar, and there they were all to be conſumed by fire; and then it was called an Offering made by fire, of a ſweet ſavour unto the Lord.* The ſame rites were uſed in the *Peace-offerings*, and *Treſpaſs-offerings*, as *to the laying on of hands*, and *the ſprinkling the blood*, and *conſuming ſome part by fire:* and in the *ſin-offerings*, there was to be the ſame impoſition of hands: but concerning the *ſprinkling of the blood*, and the way of conſuming the remainders of the Sacrifice, there was this conſiderable difference; that in the common *ſin-offerings* for particular perſons, *the blood was ſprinkled upon the horns of the Altar of Burnt-offerings*, but *in the ſin-offerings for the High-Prieſt and*

Lev. 4. 25, 30.

the

the Congregation, or all the People, he was to carry *the blood within the Sanctuary, and to ſprinkle of it ſeven times before the Veil of the Sanctuary; and ſome of the blood was to be put upon the horns of the Altar of Incenſe*; but the remainder of the *blood*, and the ſame things (which were offered by fire in *Peace-offerings*) were to be diſpoſed of accordingly, on the Altar of *Burnt-offerings*. And withal, there was this great difference, that in other *ſin-offerings* the *Prieſts* were *to eat the remainder of the ſacrifice in the Holy place*; but in theſe there was *nothing* to be *eaten* by them; for the *whole Bullock was to be carried forth without the Camp, and there he was to be burned till all were conſumed*. For it was an expreſs Law, *That no ſin-offerings, whereof any of the blood is brought into the Tabernacle of the Congregation, to reconcile withal in the Holy place, ſhall be eaten: it ſhall be burnt in the fire*. All the difference that was on the great day of *Atonement*, was this, that the *High-Prieſt* himſelf was to ſlay the *Sin-offerings*, and then *to carry the blood of them into the Holy of Holies, and there was to ſprinkle the blood with his finger towards the mercy-ſeat ſeven times: after which, & the ſending away the ſcape-goat,*

V. 6.

Lev. 6. 26.

Lev. 4. 11, 12.

Lev. 6. 30.

Lev. 16. 14, 15.

the ceremonies were the same for the Atonement of the people, which were at other solemn sin-offerings, for the Priest or the people.

X. From all which being thus laid together, we shall observe several things, which are very material to our purpose:

All things necessary to a legal oblation concur in the death of Christ.

1. That in the Oblations which were made for expiation of sins, the difference between the mactation and the oblation, did arise from the difference between the *Priest* and the *Sacrifice*. For the *Priest*'s Office was to *atone*, but he was to *atone* by the *Sacrifice*; on which account, although the *Priest* were to offer the Sacrifice for himself, yet the oblation did not lie in the bare presenting himself before God, but in the presenting the *blood* of that Sacrifice, which was shed in order to expiation. If we could have supposed, that the *High-Priest* under the Law, instead of offering a Goat for a *Sin-offering* for the people, on the day of *Atonement*, should have made an oblation of himself to God, by dying for the expiation of their sins: In this case, his death being the Sacrifice, and himself the *Priest*, the *mactation*, as it relates to his own act, and his *oblation* had been one and the same thing. For his death had been nothing else, but the offering up himself to God,

in

in order to the expiation of the ſins of the people; and there can be no reaſon, why the oblation muſt be of neceſſity ſomething conſequent to his death, ſince all things neceſſary to a perfect *oblation* do concur in it. For where there is ſomething ſolemnly devoted to God, and in order to the expiation of ſins, and by the hand of a *Prieſt*, there are all things concurring to a legal oblation; but in this caſe, all theſe things do concur, and therefore there can be no imaginable neceſſity of making the oblation of Chriſt, only conſequent to his Aſcenſion, ſince in his death all things concur to a proper oblation. In the Law, we grant that the oblation made by the *Prieſt*, was conſequent to the death of the beaſt for Sacrifice; but the reaſon of that was, becauſe the beaſt could not offer up it ſelf to *God*, and *God* had made it neceſſary, that the Prieſt ſhould expiate ſins, not by himſelf, but by thoſe Sacrifices, and therefore the oblation of the blood was after the Sacrifice was ſlain; neither could this have been ſolved barely *by the Prieſt's ſlaying of the Sacrifices*; for this being an act of violence towards the beaſts that were thus killed, could not be a proper obla-

tion, which must suppose a consent antecedent to it. All which shewed the great imperfection of the *Levitical Law*, in which so many several things were to concur, to make up a *sacrifice for sin*; *viz.* The *first offering* made by the *party* concerned, of what was under his dominion, *viz.* The beast to be sacrificed *at the door of the Tabernacle of the Congregation*, but the beast not being able to offer up it self, if was necessary for the offering up its *blood*, that it must be *slain* by others; and for the better understanding, not only of the efficacy of the *blood*, but the concurrence of the *Priest* for *expiation*, he was *to take the blood, and sprinkle some of it on the Altar*, and pour out the rest at the foundation of it. But since we assert a far more noble and excellent Sacrifice, by the Son of God freely offering up himself, to be made a Sacrifice for the sins of the world, why may not this be as proper an *oblation* made unto *God*, as any was under the *Law*, and far more excellent, both in regard of the *Priest* and the *Sacrifice*: why should his oblation of himself then be made only consequent to his death and resurrection? Which latter, being by our Adversaries made not his own act,

act, but God's upon him, and his entrance into Heaven, being given him (as they aſſert) *as a reward of his ſufferings*, in what tolerable ſenſe can that be called an *oblation* of himſelf, which was conferred upon him as a reward of his former ſufferings? From whence it follows, that upon our Adverſaries own grounds, the death of Chriſt may far more properly be called the *oblation* of himſelf, than his *entrance into Heaven*; and that there is no neceſſity of making the oblation of Chriſt conſequent to his death, there being ſo great a difference between the Sacrifice of Chriſt, and that of the Sacrifices for ſin under the *Levitical Law*.

2. We obſerve, That the oblation as performed by the *Prieſt*, did not depend upon his preſenting *himſelf* before *God*, but upon the preſenting the *blood* of a *Sacrifice*, which had been already *ſlain* for the expiation of ſins. If the *Prieſt* had gone into the *Holy of Holies*, and there only preſented himſelf before the *Mercy-ſeat*, and that had been all required in order to the expiation of ſins, there had been ſome pretence for our Adverſaries making Chriſt's preſenting himſelf in Heaven, to be the oblation of himſelf to God; but under the Law, the efficacy

of the *High Prieſt*'s entrance into the *Holy of Holies*, did depend upon the *blood* which he carried in thither, which was the *blood* of the *Sin-offering*, which was already ſlain for the expiation of ſins; And in correſpondency to this, Chriſt's efficacy in his *entrance into Heaven*, as it reſpects our *expiation*, muſt have a reſpect to that Sacrifice which was offered up to God antecedent to it. And I wonder our Adverſaries do ſo much inſiſt on the *High Prieſt's entring into the moſt holy place once a year*, as though all the *expiation* had depended upon that; whereas all the promiſe of *expiation*, was not upon his bare entrance into it, but upon the *blood* which he carried along with him, and *ſprinkled* there: In correſpondency to which, our Saviour is not barely ſaid to
Heb. 9.12. *enter into Heaven*, and preſent himſelf to God, but *that he did this by his own blood, having obtained eternal Redemption for us.*

3. We obſerve, That there was ſomething correſpondent in the death of Chriſt, to ſomewhat conſequent to the oblation under the Law, and therefore there can be no reaſon to ſuppoſe, that the oblation of Chriſt muſt be conſequent to his death: for that deſtroys the correſpondency between them. Now this

appears

appears in this particular, in the ſolemn *Sacrifices for ſin*, after the *ſprinkling* of *the blood*, which was carried into the *Holy place to reconcile withall*, all the remainder of the *Sacrifice* was *to be burnt without the Camp*, and this held on the *day of Atonement*, as well as in other *Sin-offerings* for the Congregation. Now the Author to the *Hebrews* tells us, That in correſpondency to this, *Jeſus that he might ſanctifie the people with his own blood, ſuffered without the gate:* What force is there in this, unleſs the blood of Chriſt did anſwer to the Sin-offerings for the people, and his oblation was ſuppoſed to be made before; and therefore that he might have all things agreeable to thoſe Sin-offerings, the laſt part was to be compleated too; viz. *That he was to ſuffer without the gate*; which after the peoples ſettlement in *Jeruſalem*, anſwered to the *being burnt without the Camp* in the Wilderneſs. Heb. 13. 12.

4. We obſerve, That the Oblation in Expiatory Sacrifices under the Law, by the Prieſt, had always relation to the *conſumption* of what was offered: Thus the offering of the *blood*, in token of the deſtruction of the life of the beaſt, whoſe blood was offered; for no *blood* was to be offered of a *living creature*, nor of one

killed upon any other account, but for that end to be a *ſacrifice for ſin*, and after the *ſprinkling* and pouring out of the blood, the *inwards* of ſome, and all of the other, were to be conſumed by fire. And it is obſervable, that the greater the *Sacrifice for ſin* was, always the more was *conſumed* of it; as appears plainly by the forementioned difference of the *Sin-offerings* for *private perſons*, and for the *people*; of the former, the *Prieſts* were allowed to eat, but not at all of the latter. And ſo it was obſerved among the *Egyptians*, in the moſt ſolemn Sacrifices for expiation, nothing was allowed to be eaten of that part which was deſigned for that end. For *Herodotus* gives us an account why the *Egyptians* never eat the head of any living Creature; which is, *That when they offer up a Sacrifice, they make a ſolemn execration upon it, that if any evil were to fall upon the perſons who Sacrificed, or upon all* Egypt, *it might be turned upon the head of that beaſt*: And *Plutarch* adds, that after this ſolemn execration, *They cut off the head, and of old, threw it into*

Καταρέονται δὲ τάδε λέγοντες τῇσι κεφαλῇσι, εἴτε μέλλοι ἢ σφίσι τοῖσι θύουσι, ἢ τῇ Αἰγύπτῳ τῇ συναπάσῃ κακὸν γενέσθαι, εἰς κεφαλὴν ταύτην τρέπεσθαι. Herodot. l. 2. c. 39.

Τῇ μὲν κεφαλῇ τὰ ἱερεῖα καθαρσάμενοι, καὶ ἀποκόψαντες εἰς τὸ πλαμὸν ἐρρίπτουν πάλαι, νῦν δὲ τοῖς ξένοις ἀποδίδοσθαι. Plutarch. de Iſide.

to the River, but then gave it to ſtrangers. From which cuſtom we obſerve, that in a ſolemn Sacrifice for expiation, the guilt of the offenders, was by this rite of execration ſuppoſed to be transferred upon the head of the Sacrifice, as it was in the Sacrifices among the Jews, by the laying on of hands; and that nothing was to be eaten of what was ſuppoſed to have that guilt transferred upon it. From hence all Expiatory Sacrifices were at firſt whole Burnt-offerings, as appears by the Patriarchal Sacrifices, and the cuſtoms of other Nations, and among the Jews themſelves, as we have already proved in all ſolemn offerings for the people. And although in the ſacrifices of private perſons, ſome parts were allowed to be eaten by the Prieſts; yet thoſe which were deſigned for expiation were conſumed. So that the greater the offering was to God, the more it implied the *Conſumption* of the thing which was ſo offered: How ſtrangely improbable then is it, That the Oblation of Chriſt ſhould not (as under the Law) have reſpect to his death and ſufferings; but to his *entrance into Heaven*, wherein nothing is ſuppoſed to be conſumed, but all things given him with far greater power, as our Adverſaries

Xenoph. Cyropæd. l. 7. 8. Strab. l. 4. Plutarch Symp. l. 6. probl. 8.

ſaries ſuppoſe, than ever he had before. But we ſee the *Apoſtle* parallels Chriſt's *ſuffering* with the *burning of the Sacrifices*, and his *blood* with the *blood* of them, and conſequently his offering up himſelf, muſt relate not to *his entrance into Heaven*, but to that *act* of his whereby he ſuffered for ſins, and offered up *his blood* as a *Sacrifice* for the ſins of the world.

Chriſt's entrance into Heaven could not be the Oblation of himſelf mentioned.

XI. From all which it appears; how far more agreeably to the *Oblations* under the Law, Chriſt is ſaid to offer up himſelf for the expiation of ſins by his *death* and *ſufferings*, than by his *entrance into Heaven*; For it is apparent, that the *Oblations* in expiatory Sacrifices under the Law, were ſuch upon which the expiation of ſin did chiefly depend; but by our Adverſaries own confeſſion, Chriſt's oblation of himſelf by his entrance into Heaven, hath no immediate reſpect at all to the expiation of ſin: only *as the way whereby he was to enjoy that power by which he did expiate ſins*, as *Crellius* ſaith; now, let us conſider, what more propriety there is in making this preſenting of Chriſt in Heaven to have a correſpondency with the legal Oblations, than the offering up himſelf upon the Croſs. For, 1. on the very ſame reaſon that his

his entrance into Heaven is made an *Oblation*, his death is ſo too; viz. *Becauſe it was the way whereby he obtained the power of expiation*; and far more properly ſo than the other, ſince they make Chriſt's entrance and power the reward of his ſufferings, but they never make his ſitting at the right hand of God, the reward of his *entrance into Heaven*. 2. His offering up himſelf to God upon the Croſs, was his own act, but his entrance into Heaven was *God's*, as themſelves acknowledge, and therefore could not in any propriety of ſpeech be called *Chriſt's offering up himſelf*. 3. If it were his own act, it could not have that reſpect to the *expiation* of ſins, which his death had; for our Adverſaries ſay, *that his death was by reaſon of our ſins*, and that he ſuffered to purge us from ſin; but his *entrance into Heaven* was upon his own account, to enjoy that power and authority, which he was to have at the right hand of God. 4. How could *Chriſt's entrance into Heaven*, be the way for his enjoying that power which was neceſſary for the expiation of ſin, when Chriſt before his entrance into Heaven, ſaith, *that all power was given to him in Heaven and Earth*: and the reaſon aſſigned in Scripture of that power and authority which *God* gave

Mat. 28. 18.

Phil. 2. 8, 9.

gave him is, *becauſe he humbled himſelf, and became obedient to death, even the death of the Croſs:* So that the *entrance of Chriſt into Heaven*, could not be the means of obtaining that power which was conferred before; but the death of Chriſt is mentioned on that account in *Scripture*. 5. If the death of Chriſt were no expiatory Sacrifice, the entrance of Chriſt into Heaven could be no *Oblation* proper to a *High Prieſt*; for his *entrance into the Holy of Holies*, was on the account of the *blood* of the *ſin-offering* which he carried in with him. If there were then no expiatory Sacrifice before, that was ſlain for the ſins of men; Chriſt could not be ſaid to make any *Oblation in Heaven*, for the Oblation had reſpect to a Sacrifice already ſlain; ſo that if men deny that Chriſt's death was a proper Sacrifice for ſin, he could make no Oblation at all in Heaven, and Chriſt could not be ſaid to enter thither, as the *High Prieſt* entred into the Holy of Holies with the blood of the Sacrifice; which is the thing which the *Author* to the *Hebrews* aſſerts concerning Chriſt.

Chriſt's exerciſe of power in Heaven in no ſenſe an Oblation to God.

XII. 2. There is as great an inconſiſtency in making the exerciſe of Chriſt's power in Heaven, an *oblation* in any ſenſe, as in making Chriſt's entrance into Heaven,

ven, to be the Oblation which had correſpondency with the *Oblations* of the Law. For what is there which hath the leaſt reſemblance with an *Oblation* in it? Hath it any reſpect *to God*, as all the legal Oblations had? no, *for his interceſſion and power, Crellius* ſaith, *reſpect us, and not God.* Was there any Sacrifice at all in it for *expiation*? how is it poſſible, that the mere exerciſe of power ſhould be called a *Sacrifice*? What analogy is there at all between them? And how could he be then ſaid *moſt perfectly to exerciſe his Prieſthood*, when there was no conſideration at all of any *Sacrifice* offered up to *God*? ſo that upon theſe ſuppoſitions the Author to the *Hebrews* muſt argue upon ſtrange ſimilitudes, and fancy reſemblances to himſelf, which it was impoſſible for the *Jews* to underſtand him in, who were to judge of the nature of *Prieſthood* and *Oblations* in a way agreeable to the Inſtitutions among themſelves. But was it poſſible for them to underſtand ſuch *Oblations* and a *Prieſthood* which had no reſpect at all to *God*, but wholly to the People; and ſuch a *entrance into the Holy of Holies* without the *blood* of an *expiatory Sacrifice* for the ſins of the people? But ſuch abſurdities do men betray themſelves into, when they are forced to ſtrain expreſs places

of

of Scripture to ſerve an *hypotheſis*, which they think themſelves oblig'd to maintain.

XIII. We now come to ſhew that this interpretation of *Crellius* doth not agree with the circumſtances of the places before mentioned, which will eaſily appear by theſe brief conſiderations. 1. That the *Apoſtle* always ſpeaks of the offering of Chriſt *as a thing paſt and once done, ſo as not to be done again*; which had been very improper, if by the Oblation of Chriſt, he had meant the continual appearance of Chriſt in Heaven for us, which yet is, and will never ceaſe to be till all his enemies be made his footſtool. 2. That he ſtill ſpeaks in alluſion to the Sacrifices which were in uſe among the *Jews*, and therefore the Oblation of Chriſt muſt be in ſuch a way as was agreeable to what was uſed in the *Levitical Sacrifices*, which we have already at large proved he could not do in our Adverſaries ſenſe. 3. That the *Apoſtle* ſpeaks of ſuch *a Sacrifice for ſins* to which the *ſitting at the right hand of God* was conſequent; ſo that the Oblation antecedent to it muſt be properly that Sacrifice for ſins which he offered to God; and therefore *the exerciſe of his power for expiation of ſins*, which they ſay is meant *by ſitting*

Crellius his ſenſe repugnant to the circumſtances of the places.

Heb. 7.27. 9.26.10.10.

Heb.9.12, 13.10 4,5.

ting at the right hand of God, cannot be that Sacrifice for ſins: Neither can *his entrance into Heaven* be it, which in what ſenſe it can be called a *Sacrifice for ſins*, ſince themſelves acknowledge it had no immediate relation to the *expiation* of them, I cannot underſtand. 4. The *Apoſtle* ſpeaks of ſuch an Offering of Chriſt once, which if it had been repeated, doth imply, that *Chriſt's ſufferings* muſt have been repeated too. *For then muſt he often have ſuffered ſince the foundation of the World:* but the repeated exerciſe of *Chriſt's power* in Heaven doth imply no neceſſity at all of Chriſt's frequent *ſuffering*, nor his frequent entrance into Heaven; which might have been done without *ſuffering*, therefore it muſt be meant of ſuch an offering up himſelf as was implyed in his death and ſufferings. 5. He ſpeaks of the offering up of that body which God gave him *when he came into the World*; but our Adverſaries deny, that he carried the ſame Body into Heaven, and therefore he muſt ſpeak not of an offering of Chriſt in Heaven, but what was performed here on Earth. But here our Adverſaries have ſhewn us a tryal of their skill, when they tell us with much confidence that the *World* into

Heb. 10. 12.

Heb. 9. 26.

Heb. 10. 5, 10.

into which Christ is here said *to come*, is not to be understood of *this World*, but of *that to come*, which is not only contrary to the general acceptation of the word when taken absolutely as it is here, but to the whole scope and design of the place. For he speaks of that *World* wherein *Sacrifices and Burnt-offerings were used, and the Levitical Law* was observed, although not sufficient for perfect expiation, and so rejected for that end; and withal he speaks of that *World* wherein the chearful obedience of Christ to the will of his Father was seen, for he saith, *Lo I come to do thy will, O God*, which is repeated afterwards; but will they say, that this *World* was not the place into which Christ came to obey the *Will* of his Father? and how could it be so properly said of the future World, *Lo I come to do thy will*; when they make the design of his ascension to be the receiving the reward of his doing and suffering the will of God upon Earth?

Crell. cap. 10. sect. 53.

Heb 10. 7, 9.

Objections answered. Heb. 7. 26. 8. 4. 7. 16.

XIV. But yet they attempt to prove from the same *Author* to the *Hebrews*, that Christ's entrance into Heaven, was necessary to his being a perfect *High-Priest*; for he was to be made *higher than the Heavens*; *and if he were on earth,*

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he ſhould not be a Prieſt; but he was a Prieſt after the power of an endleſs life: Neither could he, ſay they, *be a perfect High-Prieſt, till thoſe words were ſpoken to him, Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee; which as appears by other places, was after the Reſurrection: But all the ſufferings he underwent in the world, were only to qualify him for this Office in Heaven; therefore it is ſaid, That in all things it behoved him to be made like unto his brethren, that he might be a merciful and faithful High-Prieſt, &c.* This is the ſubſtance of what is produced by *Crellius* and his *Brethren*, to prove that Chriſt did not become a perfect *High-Prieſt*, till he *entred into Heaven:* But it were worth the knowing, what they mean by a *perfect High-Prieſt*; Is it that Chriſt did then begin the Office of a *High-Prieſt*, and that he made no offering at all before? No, that they dare not aſſert at laſt, but that there was no *perfect Sacrifice* offered for ſin, otherwiſe *Socinus* contends, *That Chriſt did offer upon earth, and that for himſelf too:* So that all kind of offering is not excluded by themſelves, before Chriſt's er ce into Heaven: But if they mean by *perfect High-Prieſt* in Heaven, that his Office

5. 5.

2. 17.

Crell. c. 10. ſect. 53.

Socin. prælect. c. ult.

fice of *High-Prieſt was not conſummated* by what he did on earth, but that a very conſiderable part of the *Prieſthood* of Chriſt was ſtill remaining to be performed in Heaven; it is no more than we do freely acknowledge, and this is all we ſay is meant by thoſe places: For the *Apoſtles* deſign is to prove, the excellency of the *Prieſthood* of Chriſt above the *Aaronical*; which he doth, not only from the excellency of the Sacrifice which he offered, above *the blood of Bulls and Goats*; but from the excellency of the *Prieſt*, who did excel the *Aaronical Prieſts*; both in regard of *his calling from God*, which is all the *Apoſtle* deſigns, *Heb.* 5. 5. not at all intending to determine the time *when he was made*, but *by whom* he was made *High-Prieſt*, even by him *that had ſaid, Thou art my Son*, &c. and in regard of the excellency of the *Sanctuary* which he entred into, which was not an *earthly*, but a *heavenly Sanctuary*; and in regard of the perpetuity of his function there, *Not going in once a year, as the High-Prieſts under the Law did*, but there *ever living to make interceſſion for Us*; Now this being the *Apoſtles* deſign, we may eaſily underſtand why he ſaith, *That he was to be a heavenly High-Prieſt,*

and

and if he had been on earth, he could not have been a Prieſt: The meaning of which is only this, that if Chriſt's Office had ended in what he did on earth, he would not have had ſuch an excellency as he was ſpeaking of; for then he had ceaſed to be at all ſuch a *High Prieſt*, having no *Holy of Holies* to go into, which ſhould as much tranſcend the earthly Sanctuary, as his Sacrifice did the *blood of Bulls and Goats:* Therefore in correſpondency to that *Prieſthood*, which he did ſo far excell in all the parts of it, he was not to end his *Prieſthood* merely with *the blood* which was ſhed for a *Sacrifice*, but he was to carry it into Heaven, and preſent it before God, and to be a perpetual interceſſor in the behalf of his people: And ſo was in regard of the perpetuity of his Office, *a Prieſt after the Law of an endleſs Life:* But leſt the people ſhould imagine, that ſo great and excellent a *High Prieſt*, being ſo far exalted above them, ſhould have no ſenſe or compaſſion upon the infirmities of his people, therefore to encourage them to adhere to him, he tells them, *That he was made like to his Brethren*; and therefore they need not doubt, but by the ſenſe which he had of the infirmi-

ties of humane nature, he will have *pity* on the weakneſſes of his people; which is all the *Apoſtle* means by thoſe expreſſions. So that none of theſe places do deſtroy the *Prieſthood of Chriſt on earth*, but only aſſert the *excellency*, and the *continuance* of it *in Heaven*: Which latter, we are as far from denying, as our Adverſaries are from granting the former. And thus much may ſuffice for the ſecond thing, to prove the death of Chriſt a proper ſacrifice for ſin; viz. *The Oblation which Chriſt made of himſelf to God by it.*

CHAP.

CHAP. VI.

I. *That the effects of proper Expiatory Sacrifices belong to the death of Christ, which either respect the sin or the person. Of the true notion of expiation of sin, as attributed to Sacrifices. Of the importance of* כפר, *as applied to them.* Socinus *his proper sense of it examined.* II. Crellius *his Objections answered.* III. *The Jews notion of* כפר. *The Sacrifices not bare conditions of pardon, nor expiated merely as a slight part of obedience.* IV. *God's expiating sin, destroys not expiation by Sacrifice.* V. *The importance of* καθαρίζειν *and* ἁγιάζειν, *relating to Sacrifices.* VI. *Expiation attributed to the Sacrifice of Christ, in the same sense that it was to other Sacrifices.* VII. *And from thence, and the places of Scripture which mention it, proved not to be merely declarative. If it had been so, it had more properly belonged to his Resurrection than his death.* VIII. *The Death of Christ not taken Metonymically for all the Consequents of it; because of the peculiar effects of the death of Christ in Scripture.* IX. *And*

because Expiation is attributed to him antecedently to his entrance into Heaven. X. *No distinction in Scripture of the effects of Christ's entrance into Heaven from his sitting at the right hand of God.* XI. *The effects of an Expiatory Sacrifice, respecting the person, belong to the death of Christ, which are Atonement and Reconciliation. Of the signification of* ἱλασμὸς *and* ἱλάσκεσθαι. XII. *The Reconciliation by Christ's death, doth not merely respect us, but God; why the latter less used in the New Testament. A twofold Reconciliation with God mentioned in Scripture.* Crellius *his evasion answered.* XIII. *The Objections from God's being reconciled in the sending his Son.* XIV. *And the inconsistency of the Freeness of Grace with the Doctrine of Satisfaction answered, and the whole concluded.*

Of the true notion of Expiation, as attributed to Sacrifices.

I. THE last thing to prove the death of Christ a proper Expiatory Sacrifice, is, That the effects of a proper Sacrifice for sin are attributed to it. Which do either respect the *sins* committed, and are then called *Expiation* and *Remission*, or the *persons*, who were guilty of them, as they stand

ſtand obnoxious to the diſpleaſure of God, and ſo the effect of them is *Atonement* and *Reconciliation.* Now theſe we ſhall prove do moſt properly and immediately refer to the death of Chriſt; and are attributed to it, as the procuring cauſe of them; and not as a bare condition of Chriſt's entrance into Heaven, or as comprehending in it the conſequents of it. I begin with the *Expiation* and *Remiſſion* of *ſins*; as to which *Socinus* doth acknowledge, *That the great correſpondency doth lie between Chriſt's and the Legal Sacrifices.* We are therefore to enquire: 1. What reſpect the Expiation of ſins had to the Sacrifices under the Law. 2. In what ſenſe the Expiation of ſins is attributed to the Sacrifice of Chriſt: For the due explication of the reſpect which Expiation of ſins had to the Legal Sacrifices, we are to conſider in what ſenſe *Expiation* is underſtood, and in what reſpect it is attributed to them. For this we are to enquire into the importance of the ſeveral phraſes it is ſet forth by, which are כפר and חטא in the Old Teſtament, καθαρίζειν, ἁγιάζειν, ἱλάσκεσθαι in the New; all which are acknowledged by our Adverſaries to have a peculiar reſpect to the

Socin. de Chriſto ſervat. p. 2. l. 13. Crell. cap. 10. ſect. 26.

Crell. c. 10. *sect.* 38. Expiation made by a *Sacrifice.* We ſhall begin with the former, becauſe *Crellius* objects this againſt *Grotius*, *That he imployed his greateſt diligence in the explication of the Greek and Latin words for Expiation of ſin, and was contented only to ſay, that the Hebrew words would bear the ſame ſignification: Whereas*, ſaith he, *he ought to have proved, that the Hebrew words do require that ſenſe which he takes them in.* But by *Crellius* his leave, *Grotius* took the beſt courſe was to be taken in words, whoſe ſignification is ſo obſcure as thoſe are in the Hebrew Language. For כפר being ſo very rarely uſed in *Scripture* in that which *Socinus* and *Crellius* contend to be the proper and natural ſignification of it; *viz. To hide or cover*, and ſo frequently in the ſenſe of *Expiation*, what better way could be taken for determining the ſenſe of it, as applied to *Sacrifices*, than by inſiſting upon thoſe words which are uſed in the *New Teſtament*, to the very ſame purpoſe that כפר is uſed in the Old? For they cannot pretend that which they ſay is the moſt proper ſenſe, can be applied to this ſubject, *viz. To cover* with pitch, or a bituminous matter, which is called כפר, *Gen.* 6. 14. therefore it muſt of neceſſity

ceſſity be taken in another ſenſe here. But *Socinus* contends, *That it ought to be taken in a ſenſe moſt agreeable to that, which is*, ſaith he, *that the Expiation of ſin be nothing elſe, but the covering of it, by God's grace and benignity. Thence*, ſaith he, *David ſaith, Bleſſed is the man whoſe iniquity is covered.* But how can this prove, that the proper ſignification of כפר as applied to ſin, is covered by God's Grace, when neither the word כפר is here uſed, nor is there any reſpect at all mentioned of an *Expiation* by Sacrifice, which is the thing we are diſcourſing of? And is the *covering of ſin* ſuch an eaſie and intelligible phraſe, that this ſhould be made choice of to explain the difficulty of כפר by? What is it that they would have us underſtand by *the covering ſin?* ſurely not to make it ſtronger and more laſting, as the Ark was covered, with that bituminous matter for that end, and yet this would come the neareſt to the proper ſenſe of כפר. So that from their own interpretation it appears, that כפר as applied to the expiation of ſin by Sacrifices, cannot be taken ſo much as in alluſion to that other ſenſe; for their ſenſe of Expiation, is either by the deſtruction of ſin, or deliverance of the ſinner

Socin. de Servat. p. 2. c. 11.

Pſal. 32. 1.

ſinner from the puniſhment of it, but what reſemblance is there between the covering of a thing, in order to its preſervation, and the making it not to be, or at leaſt deſtroying all the power of it? But ſuppoſing we ſhould grant that it hath ſome alluſion to the ſenſe of covering, why muſt it neceſſarily be ſuppoſed to be done by the *meer Grace of God*, as excluding all antecedent cauſes which ſhould move to it? would not the propriety of the ſenſe remain as well, ſuppoſing a *moving cauſe*, as excluding it? What ſhould hinder, but that God may be ſaid as well to *cover ſin* upon a Sacrifice as *to forgive it*, and this is very frequently uſed upon a Sacrifice, *That the ſin ſhall be forgiven*? But yet themſelves acknowledge, that the Sacrifices were conditions required in order to expiation; if then כפר hath an immediate reſpect to God's immediate favour and benignity, how comes it to be uſed where a condition is neceſſarily ſuppoſed in order to it? Had it not been more agreeable to this benignity of God to have pardon'd ſin without requiring any ſacrifice for it, than ſo ſtrictly inſiſting upon the offering up Sacrifice in order to it, and then declaring that the *ſin is expiated*,

Lib. 4. 26. Ver. 31, 35.

ted, and it ſhould be forgiven? from hence we ſee that there is no neceſſity why כפר ſhould be uſe as applied to ſacrifices in a ſenſe moſt agreeable to that of *covering* with pitch, nor that it is not poſſible it ſhould have ſuch a ſenſe when applied to *ſins*; and withal that it is very conſiſtent with an antecedent condition to it, and therefore can by no means deſtroy ſatisfaction.

Crellius his Objections anſwered.

II. *Yes*, ſaith *Crellius*, *it doth, for expiation is explained in the Law by non imputation*, Deut. 21. 8. *Be merciful, O Lord, unto thy people Iſrael whom thou haſt redeemed, and lay not innocent blood unto thy people of Iſrael's charge; and the blood ſhall be forgiven them. But not to impute*, ſaith he, *and to receive true and full ſatisfaction overthrow each other: and ſo expiation being the ſame with that, will overthrow it too.* To this I anſwer, 1. I grant that כפר is here uſed both as applied *to God*, and *to the ſin*, and that the ſenſe of it is uſed as *to the people*, when the prayer is *that God would not lay it to their charge*, which is the ſame with *expiating* of it. 2. We are to conſider, what the foundation of this Prayer was, viz. *the ſlaying of the Heifer for expiation of the uncertain murder*; and when the Elders

Crell. c. 10. *ſect.* 9.

Elders had washed their hands over the head of the Heifer, then they were to protest their own innocency, and to use this prayer. כפר למעך וישראל *Expiate thy people Israel*, &c. i. e. accept of this Sacrifice as an expiation for them, and so charge not on them the innocent blood, &c. and upon doing of this it is said, ונכפר להם הדם, *and the blood shall be expiated*, i. e. as the *Vulgar Latin* explains it, *the guilt of the blood shall be taken from them.* But how then should the expiating sin upon a Sacrifice slain in order thereto, destroy that satisfaction which we assert by the blood of Christ being shed in order to the expiation of our sins? Nay, it much rather sheweth the consistency and agreeableness of these one with another. For we have before proved, that the Sacrifice here did expiate the sin by a substitution, and bearing the guilt which could not have been expiated without it. But *Crellius* further urgeth, *That God himself is here said to expiate, and therefore to expiate cannot signifie to atone or satisfie; in which sense Christ may be said to expiate too, not by atoning or satisfying, but by not imputing sins, or taking away the punishment of them by his power.* To which we need no other

other anſwer than what *Crellius* himſelf elſewhere gives, *viz. That* Socinus *never denies but that* כפר *doth ſignifie to appeaſe or atone*; which is moſt evidently proved from the place mention'd by *Grotius*, Gen. 32. 20. אכפרה פניו במנחה *Expiabo faciem ejus in munere*, ſaith the interlineary Verſion, *placabo illum muneribus*, the Vulg. Lat. ἐξιλάσομαι τὸ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ, the LXX. and all the circumſtances of the place make it appear to be meant in the proper ſenſe of *appeaſing* the anger of a perſon by ſomething which may move him to ſhew favour. And if *Crellius* will yield this to be the ſenſe of *expiation* as applied to the ſacrifice of Chriſt, he need not quarrel with the word *ſatisfaction*. But why ſhould he rather attribute that ſenſe of expiation to Chriſt, which is alone given to God, wherein the *expiation* is attributed to him that receives the Sacrifice, rather than to him that offers the ſacrifice in order to the atonement of another? ſince it is acknowledged that Chriſt did offer a *ſacrifice*; and therefore there can be no reaſon why that ſenſe of expiation ſhould not belong to him, which was moſt peculiar to that; which we ſhall now ſhew to be of the ſame kind with what is

Cum non neget, Socinus hoc verbum placandi ſignificationem habere. Crell. *c.* 20. *ſect.* 38.

is here mentioned, *viz.* an *appeasing* by a gift offered up to God. So we find the word used to the same sense, 2 *Sam.* 21. 3. ובמה אכפר ἐν τινι ἐξιλάσομαι, *and wherewith shall I make the atonement*, i. e. wherewith shall I satisfie you for all the wrong which *Saul* hath done unto you? and we see afterwards it was *by the death of* Saul's *sons*. In which place it cannot be denied but that כפר not only signifies to *appease*, but such a kind of satisfaction as is by the death of some for the faults of others; and so comes home, not only to the importance of the *expiation* belonging to a Sacrifice in general; but to such a kind of expiation as is by the suffering of some in the place of others. Which though it be more clear and distinct, where one man suffers for others, yet this was sufficiently represented in the sacrifices under the Law, in which we have already proved that there was a substitution of them in the place of the offenders.

The *Jews* notion of כפר.

III. And in this sense the *Jews* themselves do understand כפר, *viz.* such an *expiation* as is made by the substitution of one in the place of another. Of which many instances are collected by *Buxtorf*, wherein כפרה is taken by the *Rabbinical* Writers

Buxtorf. Lexic. Talmud. v. כפר.

Writers for ſuch an *expiation*, whereby one was to undergo a puniſhment in the place of another. So when in the title *Sanhedrin* the people ſay to the High-Prieſt לו אנו כפרתך *ſimus nos expiatio tua, let us be for an expiation for you*, the *Gloſs* explains it thus, *hoc eſt, in nobis fiat expiatio tua, noſq; ſubeamus tuo loco quicquid tibi evenire debet.* And when they tell us how Children ought to honour their Parents after their death, they ſay when they recite any memorable ſpeech of their Fathers, they are not barely to ſay, *My Father ſaid ſo:* but *my Lord and Father ſaid ſo, would I had been the expiation of his death:* i. e. as they explain it themſelves, *would I had undergone what he did*, and they give this general rule, *where ever it is ſaid, behold I am for expiation, it is to be underſtood, behold I am in the place of another to bear his iniquities.* So that this ſignifies the ſame with λύτρον or a price of redemption for others. Hence כפר is taken for a *price of redemption of the life of another*, and rendred by λύτρον, Exod. 21. 30.— 30. 12. Numb. 35. 31, 32. where we render it ſatisfaction, and by ἐξίλασμα, Pſal. 48. 7. and thereby we fully underſtand, what our Saviour meant when he ſaid, that he gave

Matth. 20. 28. gave his Soul, λύτρον ἀντὶ πολλῶν, *a ranſome for many*, and to this day the *Jews* call the Cock which they kill for Expiation on the day of Atonement, by the name of *Cappara*; and when they beat the Cock againſt their heads thrice, they every time uſe words to this purpoſe, *Let this Cock be an exchange for me, let him be in my room, and be made an Expiation for me: let death come to him, but to me and all* Iſrael *life and happineſs.* I inſiſt on theſe things, only to let us underſtand, that the *Jews* never underſtood כפר in the ſenſe our Adverſaries contend for, when applyed to an Expiatory Sacrifice, but as implying a *Commutation*, and a *Subſtitution* of one in the place of another, ſo as by the puniſhment of that, the other in whoſe room he ſuffers, may obtain deliverance. Which is the ſenſe we plead for. But the utmoſt which * *Socinus* and *Crellius* will allow to the Sacrifices in order to Expiation, is barely this, *That the offering of them is to be conſidered as a meer condition* (that hath no other reſpect to the expiation of ſins, than the paring a mans nails would have had, if God had required it) *upon which ſlight obedience, the pardon of ſome light ſins might be obtained.* But can any one imagine,

* *Socin. l. 2. c. 11. Docet Socinus victimarum oblationem obedientiam quandam Deo præſtandam, quanquam levem continuiſſe, quam ex promiſſo Dei levium quorundam erratorum ac peccatorum venia conſequeretur.* Crell. c. 10. ſect. 10.

imagine, that this was all that was designed by the Sacrifices of old, who considers the antiquity and universality of them in the world in those elder times before the Law, the great severity by which they were requir'd under the Law, the punctual prescriptions that were made in all circumstances for them, the vast and almost inestimable expence the people were at about them, but above all, the reason that God himself assigns in the Law, *That the blood was given for expiation, because it was the life*, and the correspondency so clearly expressed in the New Testament, between the Sacrifice of Christ, and those Levitical Sacrifices? Can any one, I say, imagine upon these considerations, that the Sacrifices had no other respect to the expiation of sin, than as they were a slight testimony of their obedience to God? Why were not an inward sorrow for sin, and tears and prayers rather made the only conditions of Expiation than such a burthensome and chargeable service imposed upon them, which at last signified nothing, but that a command being supposed, they would have sinned if they had broken it? But upon our supposition a reasonable account is given of all the

expiatory Sacrifices; *viz.* That God would have them ſee, how highly he eſteemed his Laws, becauſe an expiation was not to be made for the breach of them, but by the ſacrificing of the life of ſome Creature which he ſhould appoint inſtead of the death of the Offender; and if the breach of thoſe Laws which he had given them muſt require ſuch an expiation, what might they then think would the ſins of the whole world do, which muſt be expiated by a Sacrifice infinitely greater than all thoſe put together were; *viz.* The death and ſufferings of the Son of God for the ſins of men? But if the offering Sacrifice had been *a bare condition required of the perſon who committed the fault, in order to expiation*; Why is it never ſaid, That the perſon who offered it, did expiate his own fault thereby? For that had been the moſt proper ſenſe; for if the expiation did depend on the offering the Sacrifice, as on the condition of it, then the performing the condition, gave him an immediate right to the benefit of the promiſe. If it be ſaid, *That his own act was not only neceſſary in bringing the Sacrifice, but the Prieſts alſo in offering up the blood:* This will not make it at all the more reaſonable;

ble; becauſe the pardon of ſin ſhould not only depend upon a man's own act, but upon the act of another, which he could not in reaſon be accountable for, if he miſcarried in it. If the Prieſt ſhould refuſe to do his part, or be unfit to do it, or break ſome Law in the doing of it, how hard would it ſeem that a mans ſins could not be expiated, when he had done all that lay in his own power in order to the expiation of them, but that another perſon, whoſe actions he had no command over, neglected the doing his duty? So that if the Sacrifice had no other influence on expiation, but as a part of obedience, in all reaſon the expiation ſhould have depended on no other conditions but ſuch as were under the power of him, whoſe ſins were to be expiated by it.

Gods expiating ſin, deſtroys not expiation by ſacrifices. *Crell. ib. ſect.* 39.

IV. But *Crellius* urgeth againſt our ſenſe of Expiation, *That if it were by Subſtitution, then the Expiation would be moſt properly attributed to the Sacrifices themſelves; whereas it is only ſaid, that by the Sacrifices the Expiation is obtained; but that God or the Prieſt do expiate and to God it belongs properly, becauſe he takes away the guilt and puniſhment of ſin; which is,* ſaith he, *all meant by expiation;*

to the Prieſt only conſequently, as doing what God requires in order to it; and to the Sacrifices only as the conditions by which it was obtained. But if the Expiation doth properly belong to God, and implies no more than bare pardon, it is hard to conceive that it ſhould have any neceſſary relation to the *blood* of the Sacrifice: but the Apoſtle to the *Hebrews* tells us, that Remiſſion had a neceſſary reſpect to the *ſhedding of blood*, ſo that *without* Heb. 9.22. *that there was no remiſſion.* How improperly doth the *Apoſtle* diſcourſe throughout that *Chapter*, wherein he ſpeaks ſo much concerning the *blood* of the *Sacrifices purifying*, and in correſpondency to Ver. 13, 14. that, *the blood of Chriſt purging our Con-* Ver. 18, 19, 20, 21, 23. *ſciences*; and that *all things under the Law, were purified with blood*; Had all this no other ſignification, but that this was a bare condition that had no other importance, but as a mere act of obedience when God had required it? why doth not the *Apoſtle* rather ſay, *without God's favour* there is no remiſſion, than *without the ſhedding of blood*; if all the expiation did properly belong to that, and only very remotely to the *blood* of the Sacrifice? What imaginable neceſſity was there, that Chriſt muſt ſhed his

blood

blood in order to the *expiation* of our ſins, if all that *blood* of the Legal Sacrifices did ſignifie no more than a bare condition of pardon, though a ſlight part of obedience in it ſelf? Why muſt Chriſt lay down his life in correſpondency to theſe *Levitical Sacrifices*? for that was ſurely no *ſlight part* of his obedience. Why might not this condition have been diſpenſed with in him, ſince our *Adverſaries* ſay, that in it ſelf it hath no proper efficacy on the expiation of ſin? And doth not this ſpeak the greateſt repugnancy to the kindneſs and *Grace* of *God* in the *Goſpel*, that he would not diſpenſe with the ignominious death of his Son, although he knew it could have no influence of it ſelf on the expiation of the ſins of the world? But upon this ſuppoſition, that the *blood* of Sacrifices under the *Law* had no proper influence upon Expiation, the *Apoſtles* diſcourſe proceeds upon weak and inſufficient grounds. For what neceſſity in the thing was there, becauſe the blood of the Sacrifices was made a condition of pardon under the *Law*, therefore the *blood* of *Chriſt* muſt be ſo now; although in it ſelf it hath no proper efficacy for that end? But the *Apo-*

ſtles words and way of Argumentation doth imply, that there was a peculiar efficacy both in the one and the other, in order to Expiation; although a far greater in the *blood* of Chriſt, than could be in the other; as the thing typified, ought to exceed that which was the repreſentation of it. From hence we ſee, that the *Apoſtle* attributes what Expiation there was under the Law, not immediately to God, as belonging properly to him, but *to the blood of Bulls and Goats, and the aſhes of an Heifer, ſprinkling the unclean.* Which he had very great reaſon to do, ſince *God* expreſly ſaith to the *Jews*, that the blood was given them לכפר *ad expiandum, to expiate for their*
Lev. 17.11. *ſouls, for the blood* כי הנפש יכפר *ſhall expiate the ſoul.* Than which words, nothing could have been more plainly ſaid to overthrow *Crellius* his aſſertion, that Expiation is not properly or chiefly attributed to the Sacrifices, but primarily to *God*, and conſequentially to the *Prieſt:* who is never ſaid to *expiate*, but by the *Sacrifice* which he offered, ſo that his Office was barely Miniſterial in it. But from this we may eaſily underſtand, in what ſenſe *God* is ſaid to *expiate* ſins, where it hath reſpect to a Sacrifice (which

(which is that we are now diſcourſing of, and not in any larger or more improper uſe of the word) for ſince *God* himſelf hath declared, that the *blood* was given for Expiation, the Expiation which belongs to *God*, muſt imply his acceptance of it for that end, for which it was offered. For the execution or diſcharge of the puniſhment belonging to him, he may be ſaid in that ſenſe to expiate, becauſe it is only in his power to diſcharge the ſinner from that obligation to puniſhment he lies under by his ſins. And we do not ſay, that where expiating is attributed *to him that accepts the Atonement*, that it doth imply his undergoing any puniſhment which is impoſſible to ſuppoſe; but that where it is attributed to a *Sacrifice*, as the means of *Atonement*, there we ſay it doth not imply a bare condition, but ſuch a Subſtitution of one in the place of another, that on the account of that, the fault of the offender himſelf is expiated thereby.

V. And to this ſenſe the other word נשא doth very well agree; for *Socinus* and *Crellius* cannot deny, *But that* Gen. 31. 39. *it properly ſignifies* Luere, *or to bear puniſhment*; although they ſay, *it no where elſe ſignifies ſo, and the reaſon is,* The importance of καθαείζειν, and ἀγιάζειν, relating to ſacrifices.

becauſe it is applied to the Altar, and ſuch other things, which are not capable of it; but doth it hence follow, that it ſhould not retain that ſignification where the matter will bear it, as in the caſe of Sacrifices. And although it be frequently rendred by ἁγιάζειν, καθαίζειν, ἐξιλάσκεσθαι, yet that will be no prejudice to the ſenſe we plead for in reſpect of Sacrifices, becauſe thoſe words when uſed concerning them, do ſignifie Expiation too. " *Grotius* proves, that they do from " their own nature and conſtant uſe in " *Greek Authors*, not only ſignifie an " antecedency of order, but a peculiar " efficacy in order to Expiation. Thence " expiatory Sacrifices among the *Greeks* " were called ἱλαστικὰ, ἁγνιστικὰ, καθαρτικὰ " and ἱλάσκεσθαι, frequently in *Homer*, " applied to Sacrifices, ἁγνίζειν τῳ πόλιν " καθαρμοῖς in *Plutarch*, and ἁγιάζειν uſed " in the ſame ſenſe; an Expiatory Sacri- " fice in *Herodotus* is call'd καθάρσιον, and " to the ſame purpoſe it is uſed in *Her-* " *mogenes*, *Plato* and *Plutarch*: as among " the *Latins*, *placare*, *purgare*, *purificare*, " *conciliare*, *luſtrare* in the ſame ſenſe, " and *piare* when uſed in Sacrifices, he " proves to ſignifie *Luere per ſucceſſionem* " *rei alterius in locum pœnæ debitæ.*

" Thence

" Thence *piaculum* uſed for an Expiatory " Sacrifice, and *expiare* is to appeaſe by " ſuch a Sacrifice, ſo *Cereris numen expi-* " *are* is uſed in *Cicero*; *filium expiare* in " *Livy*. So that all theſe Sacrifices a- " mong them were ſuppoſed ſtill to per- " tain to the atoning the Deity, and ob- " taining a remiſſion of ſins committed " by them. And from hence (becauſe " where there was a greater equality and " nearneſs, there might be the greater " efficacy of the Sacrifice for expiation) " came the cuſtom of ſacrificing men, " which *Grotius* at large ſhews to have " almoſt univerſally obtained before the " coming of Chriſt. We are now to con- ſider what *Crellius* anſwers to this; the ſubſtance of which lies in theſe two things. 1. He denies not *but that* καθα- ρίζειν and ἁγιάζειν *do in their proper uſe in the Greek Tongue ſignifie the purging of guilt, and the averſion of the wrath of God and puniſhment, but that thoſe and ſuch other words are attributed to Sacrifices, becauſe thoſe were ſuppoſed to be the effects of them among the Heathen; but the attributing ſuch effects to them, did ariſe from their ſuperſtition, whereby greater things were attributed to Sacrifices, than God would have given to them, either be-* Crell. c. 10. ſect. 23, & 24.

fore

Itaq; quod ad voces Græcas καθαρίζειν & ἁγιάζειν attinet, quibus in hoc argumento non ſemel utitur D. ſcriptor ad Heb. ea ad Chriſti Sacrificium & Sacerdotii functionem relata eo etiam ſenſu uſurpantur quem Græca lingua receperat, h. e. de expurgatione reatus & averſione iræ numinis aut pœnæ. Crell. c. 10. p. 499.

fore or under the Law. 2. *He denies not, but that thoſe words,* καθαρίζειν *and* ἁγιάζειν, *being uſed by the Author to the* Hebrews *more than once with reſpect to the Sacrifices and Prieſthood of Chriſt, were taken in the ſame ſenſe in which they are uſed in the Greek Tongue,* viz. *For the purging of guilt, and the averſion of the wrath of God, and the puniſhment conſequent upon it:* But all that he contends for is, *That there is a difference in the manner of effecting it, which he acknowledges the words themſelves do not imply;* and the reaſons he gives for it are, *That the other were proper, but Chriſt's an improper Sacrifice; and that the other Sacrifices were offered by men to God, but the Sacrifice of Chriſt was given by God to men, and therefore he muſt be ſuppoſed to be reconciled before.* From whence he would at leaſt have other ſenſes of theſe words joyned together with the former; *viz.* Either *for purging away the filth of ſin,* or *for a declaration of a deliverance from guilt and puniſhment,* in imitation of the *Idiom of the Hebrew,* in which many words are uſed in the *New Teſtament.* From hence it follows, that *Crellius* doth yield the main cauſe, if

if it appear, that Christ did offer up an *expiatory Sacrifice* to *God* in his death, for then he grants that καθαρίζειν and ἁγιάζειν being applied to the Sacrifice of *Christ*, are to be taken *for the purging away of guilt*, and the *aversion of the wrath of God*, and *the punishment of sin*. And it is to no purpose to say, that it is not a proper Sacrifice, for if the effects of a proper Sacrifice do belong to it, that proves that it is so; for these words being acknowledged to be applied to the Sacrifice of Christ by the Author to the *Hebrews*, what could more evince that *Christ's* was a proper *Sacrifice*, than that those things are attributed to it, which by the consent of all Nations, are said to belong to proper *Sacrifices*, and that in the very same sense in which they are used by those who understood them in the most proper sense. And what reason could *Crellius* have to say, *that it was only the superstition of the Heathens, which made them attribute such effects to sacrifices*; when himself acknowledges that the very same sense doth belong to the Sacrifice of *Christ* under that notion? and as to the *Jews* we have already proved that the sense of expiation among them was by vertue of the Law to be taken

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in as proper a ſenſe as among the *Heathens*, for the purging of guilt, and the averſion of the wrath of God. And why ſhould *Crellius* deny that effect of the Sacrifice of Chriſt as to the atonement of God, *becauſe God's love was ſeen in giving him who was to offer the Sacrifice?* ſince that effect is attributed to thoſe *Sacrifices* under the Law which God himſelf appointed to be offered, and ſhewed his great kindneſs to the people in the Inſtitution of ſuch a way, whereby their ſins might be expiated, and they delivered from the puniſhment of them. But of the conſiſtency of theſe two, I ſhall ſpeak more afterwards, in the effect of the Sacrifices as relating to Perſons.

Expiation attributed to the Sacrifice of Chriſt in the ſame ſenſe that it was to other Sacrifices.

VI. We now come to conſider in what ſenſe the *expiation* of ſins is in *Scripture* attributed to the Sacrifice of Chriſt, and therein I ſhall prove theſe two things. 1. That the Expiation is attributed to the Sacrifice of Chriſt in the ſame ſenſe that it is attributed to other Sacrifices, and as the words in themſelves do ſignifie. 2. That what is ſo attributed doth belong to the Sacrifice of Chriſt in his death, antecedent to his entrance into Heaven. 1. That the *expiation* is to be taken in a proper ſenſe, when it is attributed to the Sacri-

Sacrifice of Chriſt. *Crellius* tells us, *The controverſie is not about the thing*, viz. *whether expiation in the ſenſe we take it in for purging away guilt, and averſion of the wrath of God, doth belong to the Sacrifice of Chriſt, for he acknowledges it doth, but all the queſtion is about the manner of it:* which in the next Section he thus explains: *There are three ſenſes in which Chriſt may be ſaid to expiate ſins; either by begetting Faith in us, whereby we are drawn off from the practice of ſin, in which ſenſe*, he ſaith, *it is a remoter antecedent to it; or as it relates to the expiation by actual deliverance from puniſhment*, ſo he ſaith, *it is an immediate antecedent to it: or as he declares that they are expiated, but this*, he ſaith, *doth not ſo properly relate to Chriſt as a Sacrifice, but as a Prieſt.* But never a one of theſe ſenſes comes near to that which *Crellius* grants to be the proper importance of καθαίρειν and ἁγιάζειν, as applied to a Sacrifice, *viz. the purging away guilt, and the averſion of the wrath of God, and puniſhment*, not any way, but by the means of the Sacrifice offered. For in the *Legal Sacrifices* nothing can be more plain than that the expiation was to be by the Sacrifice offered for *Atonement:* ſuppoſing then that

Crell. c. 10. ſect. 24.

that in ſome other way (which could be by no means proper to thoſe Sacrifices) Chriſt may be ſaid to expiate ſins, what doth this prove that there was an expiation belonging to his Sacrifice agreeable to the Sacrifices of old? But as I urged before in the caſe of *Chriſt*'s being *High Prieſt*, that by their aſſertions the *Jews* might utterly deny the force of any argument uſed by the *Author* to the *Hebrews* to prove it: ſo I ſay as to the expiation by Chriſt's Sacrifice, that it hath no analogy or correſpondency at all with any Sacrifice that was ever offered for the expiation of ſins. For by that they always underſtood ſomething which was immediately offered to *God* for that end, upon which they obtain'd remiſſion of ſins; but here is nothing anſwerable to it in their ſenſe of Chriſt's Sacrifice; for here is no Oblation at all made *unto God* for this end; all the efficacy of the Sacrifice of Chriſt, in order to expiation doth wholly and immediately reſpect us; ſo that if it be a proper Sacrifice to any, it muſt be a Sacrifice to us, and not to God: for a Sacrifice is always ſaid to be made to him whom it doth immediately reſpect; but Chriſt in the planting Faith, in actual

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deliverance, in declaring to us this deliverance, doth wholly reſpect us, and therefore his Sacrifice muſt be made to men, and not to God. Which is in it ſelf a groſs abſurdity, and repugnant to the nature and deſign of Sacrifices from the firſt inſtitution of them; which were always eſteemed ſuch immediate parts of divine worſhip, that they ought to reſpect none elſe but God, as the object to which they were directed, though for the benefit and advantage of mankind. As well then might Chriſt be ſaid *to pray for us*, and by that no more be meant but that *he doth teach us to underſtand our duty*; as be made an expiatory Sacrifice for us, and all the effect of it only reſpect us and not God. And this is ſo far *from adding to the perfection of Chriſt's Sacrifice above the Legal* (which is the thing pleaded by *Crellius*) that it deſtroys the very nature of a *Sacrifice*, if ſuch a way of expiation be attributed to it (which though conceived to be more excellent in it ſelf) yet is wholly incongruous to the end and deſign of a *Sacrifice* for *Expiation*. And the excellency of the manner of expiation ought to be in the ſame kind, and not quite of another nature; for, will any one ſay, that

Crell. c. 10. *ſect.* 26.

that a *General* of an *Army* hath a more *excellent conduct* than all that went before him, becauſe he can make *finer ſpeeches*; or that the *Aſſomanæan* Family diſcharg'd the Office of *Prieſthood* beſt, becauſe they had a *greater power* over the people; or that *Nero* was the moſt *excellent Emperour* of *Rome* becauſe he excelled the reſt in *Muſick* and *Poetry*: by which we ſee that to aſſert an excellency of one above another, we muſt not go to another kind, but ſhew its excellency in *that* wherein the compariſon lies: So that this doth not prove the excellency of the *Sacrifice* of *Chriſt*, becauſe he hath a greater power to perſwade, deliver and govern, than any *Sacrifice* under the Law; for theſe are things quite of another nature from the conſideration of a *Sacrifice*: But therein the excellency of a *Sacrifice* is to be demonſtrated, that it excells all other in the proper end and deſign of a *Sacrifice*, *i. e.* if it be more effectual towards *God* for obtaining the expiation of ſin; which was always thought to be the proper end of all *Sacrifices* for expiation. Although then Chriſt may be allowed to excel all other *Sacrifices* in all imaginable reſpects but that which is the proper intention of a

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Sacrifice; it may prove far greater excellency in Christ, but it doth withall prove a greater imperfection in his Sacrifice, if it fail in that which is the proper end of it. So that if we should grant that the expiation attributed to Christ's Sacrifice signified no more than reclaiming men from their sins, or their deliverance by his power, or a declaration of God's decree to pardon, this may prove that there are better arguments to believe the remission of our sins now under the Gospel; but they do not in the least prove that *Christ* is to be consider'd as a *Sacrifice*; much less that he doth far excell in the notion of an Expiatory Sacrifice all those which were offered up to God for that end under the Law.

Expiation by Christ not meerly declarative.

VII. But we must now further consider, whether this be all attributed to Christ in order to expiation in *Scripture*; *i. e.* Whether those words which of themselves do imply *the aversion of the wrath of God*, when used concerning other Sacrifices, when applied to the Sacrifice of Christ, do only imply the begetting faith in us, or a declaration of pardon. The words which are used to this purpose, are καθαρίζειν, ἁγιάζειν, ῥαντίζειν, λύειν, which are all applied to the blood

of Christ, and the dispute is, whether they signifie no more but a declaration of pardon, or a means to beget faith in us. *The first words* καθαρίζειν *and* ἁγιάζειν Crellius *acknowledgeth do frequently signifie deliverance from guilt and punishment*; *but*, he saith, *they may likewise signifie a declaration of that deliverance, as decreed by God, or a purging from the sins themselves, or from the custom of sinning.* So that by *Crellius* his own confession, the sense we contend for is most proper and usual, the other are more remote, and only possible; why then should we forsake the former sense, which doth most perfectly agree to the nature of a *Sacrifice*, which the other senses have no such relation to, as that hath? For these being the words made use of in the *New Testament*, to imply the force and efficacy of a *Sacrifice*, why should they not be understood in the same sense which the *Hebrew* words are taken in, when they are applied to the *Sacrifices* under the Law? We are not enquiring into all possible senses of words, but into the most natural and agreeable to the scope of them that use them: and that we shall make it appear to be the same, we plead for in the places in dispute between us;

Crell. cap. 10. sect. 28. p. 506.

as,

as, 1 John 1. 7. *The blood of Jesus Christ his Son,* καθαρίζει ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ πάσης ἁμαρτίας, *purgeth us from all sin,* Heb. 9. 13, 14. *If the blood of bulls, and of goats, and the ashes of an heifer, sprinkling the unclean,* ἁγιάζει πρὸς τὴν τῆς σαρκὸς καθαρότητα, *sanctifieth to the purifying of the flesh, How much more shall the blood of Christ purge your consciences from dead works,* καθαριεῖ τὴν συνείδησιν? Heb. 1. 3. δι' ἑαυτοῦ καθαρισμὸν ποιησάμενος τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ἡμῶν, *when he had by himself purged our sins.* So ῥαντίζειν *and* λούειν are used with a respect to the blood of Christ, *Heb.* 10. 22. *Apocalyp.* 1. 5. And because remission of sin was looked on as the consequent of expiation by Sacrifice under the Law; therefore that is likewise attributed to the blood of Christ, *Matth.* 26. 28. *This is the blood of the New Testament which was shed for many,* εἰς ἄφεσιν ἁμαρτιῶν, *for the remission of sins,* Eph. 1. 7. *In whom we have redemption through his blood, the remission of sins,* and to the same purpose, *Coloss.* 1. 14. And from hence we are said *to be justified by his blood,* Rom. 5. 9. and Christ is said to be *a propitiation through faith in his blood,* Rom. 3. 25. The substance of all that *Crellius* replies to these places is, *That* Crell. c. 10. sect. 28.

thoſe words which do properly ſignifie the thing it ſelf, may very conveniently be taken only for the declaration of it, when the performance of the thing doth follow by vertue of that declaration: which then happens, when the declaration is made of the thing decreed by another, and that in the name and by the command of him who did decree it. And in this ſenſe, Chriſt by his blood may be ſaid to deliver us from the puniſhment of our ſins, by declaring or teſtifying to us the will and decree of God for that purpoſe. But this anſwer is by no means ſufficient, upon theſe conſiderations; 1. Becauſe it doth not reach the proper and natural ſenſe of the words, as *Crellius* himſelf confeſſeth; and yet he aſſigns no reaſon at all, why we ought to depart from it, unleſs the bare poſſibility of another meaning be ſufficient. But how had it been poſſible for the efficacy of the *blood* of Chriſt for *purging away the guilt of our ſins*, to have been expreſſed in clearer and plainer terms than theſe, which are acknowledged of themſelves to ſignifie as much as we aſſert? If the moſt proper expreſſions for this purpoſe, are not of force enough to perſwade our Adverſaries, none elſe could ever do it: ſo that it had been impoſſible

for

for our Doctrine to have been delivered in ſuch terms, but they would have found out ways to evade the meaning of them. It ſeems very ſtrange, that ſo great an efficacy ſhould not only once or twice, but ſo frequently be attributed to the blood of Chriſt for expiation of ſin, if nothing elſe were meant by it, but that Chriſt by his death did only declare that God was willing to pardon ſin? If there were danger in underſtanding the words in their proper ſenſe, why are they ſo frequently uſed to this purpoſe? why are there no other places of Scripture that might help to undeceive us, and tell us plainly, that Chriſt dyed only to declare his Father's will? but what ever other words might ſignifie, this was the only true meaning of them. But what miſerable ſhifts are theſe, when men are forced to put off ſuch Texts which are confeſſed to expreſs our Doctrine, only by ſaying that they may be otherwiſe underſtood? which deſtroys all kind of certainty in words; which by reaſon of the various uſe of them, may be interpreted to ſo many ſeveral ſenſes, that if this liberty be allowed, upon no other pretence, but that *another meaning is poſſible*, men will never agree about

the intention of any perſon in ſpeaking. For upon the ſame reaſon, if it had been ſaid, *That Chriſt declared by his death God's readineſs to pardon*, it might have been interpreted, *That the blood of Chriſt was therefore the declaration of God's readineſs to pardon, becauſe it was the conſideration upon which God would do it:* So that if the words had been as expreſs for them, as they are now againſt them, according to their way of anſwering places, they would have been reconcileable to our opinion. 2. The Scripture in theſe expreſſions, doth attribute ſomething *peculiar* to the *blood of Chriſt*; but if all that were meant by it were no more, than the *declaring God's* will to pardon, this could in no ſenſe be ſaid to be peculiar to it. For this was the deſign of the Doctrine of Chriſt, and all his miracles were wrought to confirm the truth of that part of his Doctrine, which concerned remiſſion of ſins as well as any other: but how abſurd would it have been to ſay, that the *miracles* of Chriſt *purge us from all ſin*, that through *Chriſt healing the ſick, raiſing the dead*, &c. we have *redemption, even the forgiveneſs of ſins*, which are attributed to the *blood of Chriſt?*

Chriſt? but if no other reſpect, than as a teſtimony to the truth of the Doctrine of Remiſſion of ſins, they were equally applicable to one as to the other. Beſides, if this had been all intended in theſe expreſſions, they were the moſt incongruouſly applied to the *blood* of Chriſt; nothing ſeeming more repugnant to the Doctrine of the Remiſſion of ſins, which was declared by it, than that very thing by which it was declared, if no more were intended by it: For how unſuitable a way was it to declare the pardon of the guilty perſons, by ſuch ſeverities uſed towards the moſt Innocent! Who could believe, That God ſhould declare his willingneſs to pardon others, by the death of his own Son; unleſs that death of his be conſidered as the *meritorious cauſe* for procuring it? And in that ſenſe we acknowledge, That the death of Chriſt was a *declaration* of God's will and decree to pardon, but not meerly as it gave *teſtimony* to the truth of his Doctrine (for in that ſenſe the *blood* of the *Apoſtles* and *Martyrs* might be ſaid *to purge us from ſin*, as well as the *blood of Chriſt*) but becauſe it was the *conſideration* upon which God had decreed to pardon. And ſo as the acceptance

tance of the condition required, or the price paid, may be ſaid to declare or manifeſt, the intention of a perſon to releaſe or deliver a Captive: So God's acceptance of what Chriſt did ſuffer for our ſakes, may be ſaid to *declare* his readineſs to pardon us upon his account. But then this *declaration* doth not belong properly to the act of Chriſt in ſuffering; but to the act of God in accepting: and it can be no other ways known, than *God's* acceptance is known; which was not by the *Sufferings*, but by the *Reſurrection* of *Chriſt*. And therefore the declaring God's will and decree to pardon, doth properly belong to that: and if that had been all which the *Scripture* had meant, by *purging of ſin by the blood of Chriſt*, it had been very incongruouſly applied to that, but moſt properly to his *Reſurrection*. But theſe phraſes being never attributed to that which moſt properly might be ſaid *to declare* the will of God; and being peculiarly attributed to the *death* of Chriſt, which cannot be ſaid properly to do it; nothing can be more plain, than that theſe expreſſions ought to be taken in that which is confeſſed to be their proper ſenſe; *viz.* That *Expiation* of ſin, which doth belong to the

the death of Chriſt, as a *Sacrifice* for the ſins of the world.

VIII. But yet *Socinus* and *Crellius* have another ſubterfuge, (for therein lies their great art, in ſeeking rather by any means to eſcape their enemies, than to overcome them.) For being ſenſible, that the main ſcope and deſign of the *Scripture* is againſt them, they ſeldom, and but very weakly aſſault: but ſhew all their ſubtlety in avoiding by all imaginable arts, the force of what is brought againſt them. And the *Scripture* being ſo plain in attributing ſuch great effects to the death of Chriſt, when no other anſwer will ſerve turn, then they tell us, *That the death of Chriſt is taken Metonymically for all the conſequents of his death*; viz. *His Reſurrection, Exaltation, and the Power and Authority which he hath at the right hand of his Father.* But how is it poſſible to convince thoſe, who by *death*, can underſtand *life*; by *ſufferings*, can mean *glory*; and by the *ſhedding of blood, ſitting at the right hand of God*? And that the *Scripture* is very far from giving any countenance to theſe bold Interpretations, will appear by theſe conſiderations; 1. Becauſe the *effect* of *Expiation of our ſins*, is attributed to the *death*

The death of Chriſt not taken Metonymically for all the conſequents of it.

Crell c. 1. *ſect.* 103. *ſect.* 119. c. 10. *ſect.* 45. *p.* 527.

death of Chriſt, as diſtinct from his *Reſurrection*; viz. *Our reconciliation with God*, Rom. 5. 10. *For if when we were enemies, we were reconciled to God by the death of his Son; much more being reconciled, we ſhall be ſaved by his life.* To which *Crellius* anſwers, *That the Apoſtle doth not ſpeak of the death of Chriſt alone, or as it is conſidered diſtinct from the conſequences of it; but only that our Reconciliation was effected by the death of Chriſt intervening.* But nothing can be more evident to any one, who conſiders the deſign of the *Apoſtles* diſcourſe, than that he ſpeaks of what was peculiar to the death of Chriſt: for therefore it is ſaid, that *Chriſt died for the ungodly. For ſcarcely for a righteous man will one die: but God commendeth his love towards us, in that while we were yet ſinners, Chriſt died for us. Much more then being now juſtified by his blood, we ſhall be ſaved through him*; upon which thoſe words follow, *For if when we were enemies, we were reconciled to God by the death of his Son*, &c. The Reconciliation here mentioned, is attributed to the death of Chriſt in the ſame ſenſe, that it is mentioned before; but there it is not mentioned as a *bare condition intervening* in order

Crell. c. 1. ſect. 112.

Rom. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

der to ſomething farther; but as the great inſtance of the love both of *God and Chriſt*; of God, in ſending his Son; of Chriſt, in laying down his life for ſinners, in order to their being juſtified by his blood. But where is it that St. *Paul* ſaith, that the death of Chriſt had no other influence on the expiation of our ſins, but as a bare condition intervening in order to that power and authority whereby he would expiate ſins? what makes him attribute ſo much to the death of Chriſt, if all the benefits we enjoy depend upon the conſequences of it; and no otherwiſe upon that, than meerly as a preparation for it? what peculiar *emphaſis* were there in Chriſt's *dying for ſinners, and for the ungodly*; unleſs his death had a particular relation to the expiation of their ſins? Why are men ſaid *to be juſtified by his blood*, and not much rather by his *glorious Reſurrection*, if the blood of Chriſt be only conſidered as antecedent to the other? And that would have been the great demonſtration of the love of God which had the moſt immediate influence upon our advantage: which could not have been the death in this ſenſe, but the life and glory of Chriſt. But nothing can be more abſurd

ſurd than what *Crellius* would have to be the meaning of this place, viz. *that the Apoſtle doth not ſpeak of the proper force of the death of Chriſt diſtinct from his life; but that two things are oppoſed to each other for the effecting of one of which the death of Chriſt did intervene, but it ſhould not intervene for the other*; viz. *it did intervene for our reconciliation, but it ſhould not for our life.* For did not the death of Chriſt equally intervene for our *life* as for our *reconciliation?* was not our eternal deliverance the great thing deſigned by Chriſt, and our reconciliation in order to that end? what oppoſition then can be imagined, that it ſhould be neceſſary for the death of Chriſt to intervene in order to the one than in order to the other? But he means, *that the death of Chriſt ſhould not intervene any more*; what need that, when it is acknowledged by themſelves, that Chriſt died only for this end before, that he might have power to beſtow eternal life on them that obey him? But the main force of the Apoſtles argument lies in the compariſon between *the death of Chriſt* having reſpect to us *as enemies* in order to *reconciliation*, and the *life of Chriſt* to us conſidered as *reconciled*; ſo that if he

he had ſo much kindneſs for enemies, to die for their reconciliation, we may much more preſume that he now living in Heaven will accompliſh the end of that reconciliation, in the eternal ſalvation of them that obey him. By which it is apparent that he ſpeaks of the death of Chriſt, in a notion proper to it ſelf, having influence upon our reconciliation; and doth not conſider it *Metonymically* as comprehending in it, the conſequents of it.

IX. 2. Becauſe the expiation of ſins is attributed to Chriſt antecedently to the great conſequents of his death, viz. *his ſitting at the right hand of God*, Heb. 1. 3. *When he had by himſelf purged our ſins, ſate down on the right hand of his Majeſty on high*, Heb. 9. 12. *But by his own blood he entred in once into the Holy Place, having obtained eternal redemption for us.* To theſe places *Crellius* gives a double anſwer. 1. *That indefinite particles* (εὑράμενος and ποιησάμενος) *being joyned with Verbs of the preterperfect tenſe do not always require that the action expreſſed by them, ſhould precede that which is deſigned in the Verbs to which they are joyned; but they have ſometimes the force of particles of the preſent or imperfect tenſe;*

Expiation attributed to Chriſt antecedently to his entrance into heaven.

Crell. c. 10. *ſect.* 50.

tenſe; which ſometimes happens in particles of the preterperfect tenſe, as Matth. 10. 5. ἀπέστειλαν παραγγείλας αὐτοῖς, ſo ἀπεκρίθεις εἶπεν; and ſeveral other inſtances produced by him: according to which manner of interpretation the ſenſe he puts upon thoſe words, *Heb.* 9. 12. is *Chriſt by the ſhedding of his blood entred into the Holy of Holies, and in ſo doing he found eternal redemption, or the expiation of ſins.* But not to diſpute with *Crellius* concerning the importance of the *Aoriſt* being joyned with a *Verb* of the *preterperfect* tenſe, which in all reaſon and common acceptation doth imply the action paſt by him who writes the words antecedent to his writing of it, as is plain in the inſtances produced by *Crellius*; but according to his ſenſe of Chriſt's expiation of ſin, it was yet to come after Chriſt's entrance into Heaven, and ſo it ſhould have been more properly εὑρησόμενος than εὑρέμενος; not I ſay to inſiſt upon that, the *Apoſtle* manifeſts, that he had a reſpect to the *death* of Chriſt in the obtaining this *eternal redemption*, by his following diſcourſe: for *v.* 14. he compares the *blood of Chriſt* in point of efficacy for expiation of ſin, with the *blood* of the Legal Sacrifices:

whereas

whereas if the expiation meant by him had been found by *Chriſt's Oblation* of himſelf in Heaven, he would have compared *Chriſt's entrance into Heaven* in order to it, with the *entrance of the High-Prieſt into the Holy of Holies*, and his argument had run thus. For if the *High-Prieſt* under the Law did expiate ſins by entring into the Holy of Holies; How much more ſhall the Son of God entring into Heaven expiate the ſins of Mankind? but we ſee the *Apoſtle* had no ſooner mention'd the *redemption* obtained for us; but he preſently ſpeaks of the efficacy of the *blood* of Chriſt in order to it, and as plainly aſſerts the ſame, v. 15. *And for this cauſe he is the Mediator of the New Teſtament, that by means of death, for the redemption of the tranſgreſſions which were under the firſt Teſtament, they which were called might receive the promiſe of eternal inheritance.* Why doth the *Apoſtle* here ſpeak of the ἀπολύτρωσις τῷ θανάτων, *the expiation of ſins by the means of death*; if he had ſo lately aſſerted before that the redemption or expiation was found not by his death, but by his entrance into Heaven? and withal the *Apoſtle* here doth not ſpeak of ſuch a kind of expiation as wholly reſpects the *future*,

future, but of *ſins that were under the firſt Teſtament*, not barely ſuch as could not be expiated by vertue of it, but ſuch as were committed during the time of it, although the Levitical Law allowed no expiation for them. And to confirm this ſenſe, the *Apoſtle* doth not go on to prove the neceſſity of *Chriſt's entrance into Heaven*; but *of his dying*, v. 16, 17, 18. But granting that he doth allude to the *High Prieſt's* entring into the *Holy of Holies*, yet that was but the repreſentation of a Sacrifice already offer'd, and he could not be ſaid to find expiation by his entrance; but that was already found by the *blood* of the Sacrifice, and his entrance was only to accompliſh the end for which the blood was offer'd up in Sacrifice. And the benefit which came to men is attributed to the *Sacrifice*, and not to the *ſprinkling of blood* before the *Mercy-ſeat*: and whatever effect was conſequent upon his entrance into the Sanctuary, was by vertue of the blood which he carried in with him, and was before ſhed at the Altar. Neither can it with any reaſon be ſaid, that if the redemption were obtained by the blood of Chriſt, *there could be no need of his entrance into Heaven*;

ven; since we do not make the *Priesthood* of Christ to expire at his death; but that he is in Heaven a merciful High-Priest in negotiating the affairs of his People with God, and *there ever lives to make intercession for them.*

X. *Crellius* answers, *That granting the Aorist being put before the Verb,* ἐκάθισεν *should imply such an action which was antecedent to Christ's sitting at the right hand of God, yet it is not there said, that the expiation of sins was made before Christ's entrance into Heaven; for those,* saith he, *are to be considered as two different things; for a Prince first enters into his Palace, before he sits upon his throne. And therefore,* saith he, *Christ may be said to have made expiation of sins, before he sate down at the right hand of his Father, not that it was done by his death, but by his entrance into Heaven, and offering himself to God there, by which means he obtained his sitting on the right hand of the Majesty on high, and thereby the full Power of remission of sins, and giving eternal life.* To which I answer, 1. That the *Scripture* never makes such a distinction between *Christ's entrance into Heaven, and sitting at the right hand of God;* which latter implying no more but the glori-

No distinction in Scripture of the effects of Christ's entrance into Heaven from his sitting at the right hand of God.

Crell. c. 10. *sect.* 50. *p.* 537.

ous ſtate of Chriſt in Heaven, his entrance into Heaven doth imply it: For therefore *God exalted him to be a Prince and a Saviour:* and the reaſon of the power and authority given him in Heaven is no where attributed to his *entrance* into it as the means of it; but our Saviour before that tells us, *that all power and authority was committed to him;* and his very entrance into Heaven was a part of his glory; and given him in conſideration of his ſufferings; as the *Apoſtle* plainly aſſerts; *and he became obedient to death, even the death of the Croſs, wherefore God hath highly exalted him,* &c. There can be then no imaginable reaſon to make the entrance of Chriſt into Heaven, and preſenting himſelf to God there, a condition or means of obtaining that power and authority which is implyed in his *ſitting at the right hand of God.* 2. Suppoſing, we ſhould look on theſe as diſtinct, there is as little reaſon to attribute the expiation of ſin to his *entrance*, conſidered as diſtinct from the other: For the expiation of ſins in Heaven being by *Crellius* himſelf confeſſed to be by the exerciſe of Chriſt's power, and this being only the means to that power, how could Chriſt expiate

Matth. 28. 18.

Phil. 2. 8, 9.

ſins

ſins by that power which he had not? But of this I have ſpoken before, and ſhewed that in no ſenſe allowed by themſelves the expiation of ſins can be attributed to the entrance of Chriſt into Heaven as diſtinct from his ſitting at the right hand of God. Thus much may ſuffice to prove, that thoſe effects of an Expiatory Sacrifice, which do reſpect the ſins committed, do properly agree to the death of Chriſt.

Of the Atonement made by Chriſt's death.

XI. I now come to that which reſpects the perſon, conſidered as obnoxious to the wrath of God by reaſon of his ſins; and ſo the effect of an Expiatory Sacrifice is *Atonement* and *Reconciliation*. By the *wrath of God*, I mean, the reaſon which God hath from the holineſs and juſtice of his nature, to puniſh ſin in thoſe who commit it: by the means of *Atonement* and *Reconciliation*, I mean, that in conſideration of which, God is willing to releaſe the ſinner from the obligation to puniſhment he lies under by the Law of God, and to receive him into favour upon the terms which are declared by the Doctrine of Chriſt. And that the death of Chriſt was ſuch a means of *Atonement* and *Reconciliation* for us, I ſhall prove by thoſe places of

Scripture which ſpeak of it. But *Crellius* would ſeem to acknowledge, *That if* Grotius *ſeem to contend for no more, than that Chriſt did avert that wrath of God which men had deſerved by their ſins, they would willingly yield him all that he pleads for:* but then he adds, *That this deliverance from the wrath to come, is not by the death, but by the power of Chriſt.* So that the queſtion is, Whether the *death of Chriſt* were the means of Atonement and Reconciliation between God and us? and yet *Crellius* would ſeem willing to yield too, *that the death of Chriſt may be ſaid to avert the wrath of God from us, as it was a condition in order to it*; for in that ſence it had no more influence upon it than his *birth* had: but we have already ſeen, that the Scripture attributes much more to the *death and blood of Chriſt*, in order to the expiation of ſin. We do not deny, that the death of Chriſt may be called a condition, as the performance of any thing in order to an end, may be called the condition upon which that thing is to be obtained; but we ſay, that it is not a *bare condition*, but ſuch a one as implies a *conſideration*, upon which the thing is obtained, being ſuch as anſwers the end of him that grants it:

Crell. c. 7. ſect. 3.

it: by which means it doth propitiate or atone him, who had before juſt reaſon to puniſh, but is now willing to forgive and be reconciled to them, who have ſo highly offended him. And in this ſenſe we aſſert, that Chriſt is ſaid to be ἱλασμὸς, *a propitiation for our ſins*, 1 John 2.2.—4. 10. which we take in the ſame ſenſe that ἱλασμὸς, is taken for the *Sin-offering for atonement*, Ezek. 44.27. προσοίσουσι ἱλασμὸν, *they ſhall offer a ſin-offering*; for ſo חטא there ſignifies and in the ſame ſenſe ἐξιλασμὸς is taken, *Ezek.* 45.19. and *the Ram for Atonement* is called κριὸς τοῦ ἱλασμοῦ, *Numb.* 5.8. And thence the *High-Prieſt* when he made an *Atonement*, is ſaid ποιεῖν τὸν ἱλασμὸν, 2 *Maccab.* 3.33. which is of the greater conſequence to us, becauſe Crellius *would not have the ſenſe either of* ἱλασμὸς or ἱλάσκεσθαι, *to be taken from the common uſe of the word in the Greek Tongue; but from that which ſome call the Helleniſtical uſe of it*; viz. *That which is uſed in the Greek of the New Teſtament, out of the LXX. and the Apocryphal Greek*; in both which we have found the word ἱλασμὸς in a ſenſe fully correſpondent to what we plead for. But he yet urges, and takes a great deal of pains to prove, that ἱλάσκεσθαι and ἐξιλάσκεσθαι Crell. 7. ſect. 10.

σπένδω *do not always ſignifie to be appeaſed by another, but ſometimes ſignifies to be propitious and merciful in pardoning; and ſometimes to expiate, and then ſignifies the ſame with* καθαρίζειν and ἁγιάζειν: which if it be granted, proves nothing againſt us, having already proved, that thoſe words do ſignifie the *averſion of the wrath of God by a Sacrifice*, and that there is no reaſon to recede from that ſignification, when they are applied to the *blood* of *Chriſt*. And we do not contend, that when the word ἱλασμὸς or ἱλάσκεσθαι is applied to him that doth forgive, it doth imply *appeaſing*; but the effect of it, which is *pardoning*; but that which we aſſert, is, that when it is applied to a third perſon, or a thing made uſe of in order to forgiveneſs, then we ſay it ſignifies the propitiating him that was juſtly diſpleaſed: ſo as by what was done or ſuffered for that end, he is willing to pardon what he had juſt reaſon to puniſh. So *Moſes* is ſaid, *to make Atonement for the people by his prayers*, ἐξιλάσατο περὶ τοῦ λαοῦ, *Exod.* 34. 14. and we may ſee *Verſe* 11. how much God was diſpleaſed before. *And* Moſes *beſought the Lord his God*, and ſaid, *Why doth thy wrath wax hot againſt thy people?* and

Verſe

Verſe 12. *Turn from thy fierce wrath, and repent of this evil againſt thy people,* and then it is ſaid, Verſe 14. *The Lord was atoned for the evil which he thought to do unto his people.* I would therefore willingly know, why *Moſes* might not here properly be ſaid, ἱλάσκεσθαι θεὸν περὶ τῆς κακίας, as it is ſaid ἱλάσθη κύριος περὶ τῆς κακίας, and therefore ſince it is ſo very often ſaid in the Levitical Law, ἱλάσκεσθαι and ἐξιλάσκεσθαι περί τινος, as περὶ αὐτῶν, περὶ τοῦ οἴκου, περὶ ψυχῶν, and the accuſative caſe ſcarce ever put but in two caſes; (*viz.* When theſe words are applied to inanimate things, as the Altar, *&c.* or when to God himſelf, implying forgiveneſs) what reaſon can we aſſign more probable for this different conſtruction, than that when περὶ is uſed, the verb hath a reſpect to the offended party as the accuſative underſtood? as *Chriſt* is ſaid in the places mentioned to be ἱλασμὸς περὶ ἁμαρτιῶν, which ought in reaſon to be underſtood as thoſe words after *Moſes* his interceſſion, καὶ ἱλάσθη κύριος περὶ τῆς κακίας. But *Crellius* asks, *Why then do we never read once concerning the Prieſt, that he did* ἱλάσκεσθαι τὸν θεὸν περὶ ἁμαρτιῶν or περί τινος, *but we read that he did* ἐξιλάσκεσθαι

τὸ ἅγιον τὸ θυσιαστήριον, *and God is said,* ἐξιλάσκεσθαι τὰς ἁμαρτίας. To this I answer, 1. That the reason why the person propitiated, is not expressed, is, because it was so much taken for granted, that the whole Institution of Sacrifices did immediately respect God, and therefore there was no danger of mistaking, concerning the person who was to be atoned. 2. I wonder *Crellius* can himself produce no instance where ἐξιλάσκεσθαι τὰς ἁμαρτίας is used with respect to the Sacrifices, and the persons whose offences are remitted by the Atonement; but where ἱλάσκεσθαι hath a relation to that, it is still joyned with a Prepositition relating either to the person or to the offences; if no more were understood when it is so used, than when God himself is said to do it, why is not the phrase ἐξιλάσκεσθαι τὰς ἁμαρτίας, as well said of the Priest, as it is of God? From whence *Grotius* his sense of *Heb.*2.17. εἰς τὸ ἱλάσκεσθαι τὰς ἁμαρτίας for ἱλάσκεσθαι θεὸν περὶ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν, is far more agreeable to the use of the phrase in the Old Testament, than that which *Crellius* would put upon it. Therefore since the ἱλασμὸς περὶ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν is attributed to Christ, we ought to take it in the sense proper to a Propitiatory Sacri-

Sacrifice: ſo it is ſaid by *Moſes*, where God is left out, but is neceſſarily underſtood, after the people had provoked God by their Idolatry; *Ye have ſinned a great ſin: And now I will go up unto the Lord,* ἵνα ἐξιλάσομαι περὶ τῆς ἁμαρτίας ὑμῶν, *That I may make an Atonement for your ſin:* What way could *Moſes* be ſaid to make this *Atonement*, but by propitiating God; yet his name is not there expreſſed, but neceſſarily underſtood. So ἐξιλάσκεσθαι τὸ πρόσωπον is uſed in the moſt proper ſenſe for appeaſing the anger of a perſon, *Gen.* 32. 20. and ἐν τινι ἐξιλάσομαι, 2 *Sam.* 21. 3. which places have been already inſiſted on, in the ſignification of the word כפר. And that thoſe places wherein Chriſt is ſaid to be a propitiation for our ſins, are capable of no other ſenſe, will appear from the conſideration of Chriſt, as a middle perſon between God and us; and therefore his being ἱλασμὸς περὶ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν, cannot be parallel with that phraſe, where God himſelf is ſaid, ἐξιλάσκεσθαι τὰς ἁμαρτίας, for Chriſt is here conſidered as interpoſing between God and us, as *Moſes* and the *Prieſts* under the Law did between God and the people, in order to the averting his wrath from them. And when one doth thus interpoſe in order

order to the Atonement of the offended party, ſomething is always ſuppoſed to be done or ſuffered by him, as the means of that Atonement. As *Jacob* ſuppoſed the preſent he made to his Brother would propitiate him; and *David* appeaſed the *Gibeonites* by the death of *Saul's Sons*, both which are ſaid ἐξιλάσασθαι. So the *ſhedding of the blood of Sacrifices* before and under the Law, was the means of *atoning God* for the ſins they committed. What reaſon can there be then why ſo receiv'd a ſenſe of *Atonement*, both among the *Jews*, and all other Nations at that time when theſe words were written, muſt be forſaken; and any other ſenſe be embraced, which neither agrees with the propriety of the expreſſion, nor with ſo many other places of Scripture, which make the blood of Chriſt to be a Sacrifice for the Expiation of ſin?

Of Reconciliation by Chriſt's death.

XII. Neither is it only our Atonement, but our Reconciliation is attributed to Chriſt too, with a reſpect to his Death and Sufferings. As in the place before inſiſted on. *For if when we were enemies, we were reconciled to God by the death of his Son*; and more largely in the ſecond Epiſtle to the *Corinthians*. *And all things are of God, who hath reconciled*

Rom. 5. 10.

2 Cor. 18, 19, 21.

us

us to himſelf by Jeſus Chriſt, and hath given to us the miniſtry of reconciliation: To wit, that God was in Chriſt reconciling the world unto himſelf, not imputing their treſpaſſes unto them, and hath committed to us the word of reconciliation. For he hath made him to be ſin for us who knew no ſin, that we might be made the righteouſneſs of God in him. And to the *Epheſians, And that he might reconcile both* Eph. 2.16. *unto God in one body by his Croſs, having ſlain the enmity thereby.* To the ſame purpoſe to the *Coloſſians, And having made* Col. 1. 20, *peace through the blood of his Croſs, by* 21, 22. *him to reconcile all things to himſelf, by him I ſay whether they be things in Heaven or in Earth; and you that were ſometimes alienated and enemies in your mind by wicked works, yet now hath he reconciled, in the body of his fleſh through death.* Two things the ſubſtance of *Crellius* his anſwer *Crell. c. 7.* may be reduced to concerning theſe *ſect.* 15, 16, places. 1. *That it is no where ſaid that God* 17, 18, *&c.* *was reconciled to us, but that we are reconciled to God, and therefore this reconciliation doth not imply any averting of the anger of God.* 2. *That none of theſe places do aſſert any reconciliation with God antecedent to our converſion, and ſo that the Reconciliation mention'd implies only the laying*

laying aſide our enmity to God by our ſins. I begin with the firſt of theſe, concerning which we are to conſider not barely the phraſes uſed in Scripture, but what the nature of the thing implies; as to which a difference being ſuppoſed between God and man on the account of ſin, no reconciliation can be imagined but what is mutual. For did man only fall out with God, and had not God juſt reaſon to be diſpleaſed with men for their Apoſtaſie from him? If not, what made him ſo ſeverely puniſh the firſt ſin that ever was committed by man? what made him puniſh the old World for their impieties by a deluge? what made him leave ſuch Monuments of his anger againſt the ſins of the World in ſucceeding Ages? what made him add ſuch ſevere ſanctions to the Laws he made to the people of the *Jews*? what made the moſt upright among them ſo vehemently to deprecate his wrath and diſpleaſure upon the ſenſe of their ſins? what makes him declare not only his hatred of the ſins of men, but of the perſons of thoſe who commit them; ſo far as to expreſs the greateſt abhorrency of them? Nay, what makes our Adverſaries themſelves to ſay, *that impiety is in its own nature hateful to God,*

Pſal. 6. 1. 38. 1. Pſal. 5. 5. 7. 11. 11. 5. Levit. 26. 30.

Crell. de Deo & Attrib. l. 1. c. 30.

God, and ſtirs him up to anger againſt all who commit it? what means, I ſay, all this, if God be not angry with men on the account of ſin? Well then; ſuppoſing God to be averſe from men by reaſon of their ſins, ſhall this diſpleaſure always continue or not? if it always continues, men muſt certainly ſuffer the deſert of their ſins; if it doth not always continue, then God may be ſaid to be *reconciled* in the ſame ſenſe that an offended party is capable of being reconciled to him who hath provoked him. Now there are two ways whereby a party juſtly offended may be ſaid to be *reconciled* to him that hath offended him. Firſt, when he is not only willing to admit of terms of agreement, but doth declare his acceptance of the mediation of a third perſon, and that he is ſo well ſatisfied with what he hath done in order to it, that he appoints this to be publiſhed to the World to aſſure the offender, that if the breach continues, the fault wholly lies upon himſelf. The ſecond is, when the offender doth accept of the terms of agreement offered, and ſubmits himſelf to him whom he hath provoked, and is upon that received into favour. And theſe two we aſſert muſt

must neceſſarily be diſtinguiſhed in the reconciliation between God and us. For upon the death and ſufferings of Chriſt, God declares to the World he is ſo well ſatisfied with what Chriſt hath done and ſuffered in order to the reconciliation between himſelf and us, that he now publiſhes remiſſion of ſins to the World upon thoſe terms which the Mediator hath declared by his own doctrine, and the *Apoſtles* he ſent to preach it: But becauſe remiſſion of ſins doth not immediately follow upon the death of Chriſt, without ſuppoſition of any act on our part, therefore the ſtate of favour doth commence from the performance of the conditions which are required from us. So that upon the death of Chriſt *God* declaring his acceptance of Chriſt's mediation, and that the obſtacle did not lie upon his part; therefore thoſe Meſſengers who were ſent abroad into the world to perſwade men to accept of theſe terms of agreeement, do inſiſt moſt upon that which was the remaining obſtacle, *viz.* the ſins of Mankind, that men by laying aſide them, would be now reconciled to God, ſince there was nothing to hinder this reconciliation, their obſtinacy in ſin excepted. Which may be a very

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reaſonable account why we read more frequently in the Writings of the *Apoſtles*, of mens duty in being reconciled to God; the other being ſuppoſed by them as the foundation of their preaching to the world, and is inſiſted on by them upon that account, as is clear in that place to the *Corinthians*, *That God was in Chriſt reconciling the World to himſelf, not imputing unto men their treſpaſſes, and hath committed to us the word of Reconciliation*; and therefore adds, *Now then we are Ambaſſadors for Chriſt, as though God did beſeech you by us, we pray you in Chriſt's ſtead be ye reconciled to God*: And leaſt theſe words ſhould ſeem dubious, he declares that the reconciliation in Chriſt was diſtinct from that reconciliation he perſwades them to; for the reconciliation in Chriſt he ſuppoſeth paſt, *v.* 18. *All things are of God, who hath reconciled us to himſelf by Jeſus Chriſt*, and *v.* 21. he ſhews us how this Reconciliation was wrought: *For he hath made him to be ſin for us who knew no ſin, that we might be made the righteouſneſs of God in him.* *Crellius* here finds it neceſſary to acknowledge a twofold Reconciliation, but hopes to eſcape the force of this place by a rare diſtinction *of the Reconciliation*

2 Cor. 5. 19, 20.

Crell. c. 1. *ſect.* 118. *cap.* 7. *ſect.* 24.

conciliation as preached by Chriſt, and by his Apoſtles; and ſo God's having reconciled the world to himſelf by Jeſus Chriſt is nothing elſe but Chriſt's preaching the Goſpel himſelf, who afterwards committed that Office to his Apoſtles. But if ſuch ſhifts as theſe will ſerve to baffle mens underſtandings, both *they* were *made*, and the *Scripture* were *written* to very little purpoſe; for if this had been all the *Apoſtle* had meant, that Chriſt preached the ſame Doctrine of Reconciliation before them, what mighty matter had this been to have ſolemnly told the World, that *Chriſt's Apoſtles* preached no other Doctrine, but what their *Maſter* had preached before? eſpecially if no more were meant by it, but that men ſhould leave their ſins, and be reconciled to God. But beſides, why is *the Miniſtry of Reconciliation*, then attributed only to the *Apoſtles*, and not to *Chriſt*, which ought in the firſt place to have been given to him, ſince the *Apoſtles* did only receive it from him? Why is that *Miniſtry of Reconciliation* ſaid to be, viz. *that God was in Chriſt reconciling the World to himſelf?* was this all the ſubject of the *Apoſtles* preaching, to tell the World, that Chriſt perſwaded men to

leave

leave off their ſins? how comes God to reconcile the World to himſelf by the preaching of *Chriſt*, ſince *Chriſt* himſelf ſaith, he was not ſent to preach to the world; but *to the loſt ſheep of the houſe of Iſrael*? Was the World reconciled to God by the preaching of Chriſt, before they had ever heard of him? Why is God ſaid not to *impute to men their treſpaſſes* by the preaching of Chriſt, rather than his *Apoſtles*; if the not imputing were no more than declaring God's readineſs to pardon; which was equally done by the *Apoſtles* as by *Chriſt* himſelf? Laſtly, what force or dependance is there in the laſt words, *For he made him to be ſin for us, who knew no ſin*, &c. if all he had been ſpeaking of before had only related to Chriſt's preaching? How was he *made ſin* more than the *Apoſtles*, if he were only *treated as a ſinner* upon the account of the ſame Doctrine which they preached equally with him? and might not men be ſaid to be made *the righteouſneſs of God in the Apoſtles*, as well as in *Chriſt*, if no more be meant, but being perſwaded to be *righteous*, by the Doctrine delivered to them?

In the two latter places, *Eph.* 2. 16. *Coloſſ.* 1. 20. &c. it is plain, that *a two-*

fold reconciliation is likewiſe mentioned, the one of the *Jews* and *Gentiles* to one another, the other of both of them *to God*. For nothing can be more ridiculous than the Expoſition of *Socinus*, *who would have* τῷ Θεῷ *not to be joyned with the Verb*, ἀποκατηλλάξη, *but to ſtand by it ſelf, and to ſignifie that this reconciliation of the Jews and Gentiles did tend to the glory of God*. And *Crellius*, who ſtands out at nothing, hopes to bring off *Socinus* here too; by ſaying, *that it is very common, for the end to which a thing was appointed to be expreſſed by a Dative caſe following the Verb*; but he might have ſpared his pains in proving a thing no one queſtions; the ſhorter anſwer had been to have produced one place where ἀποκαταλλάσειν Θεῷ ever ſignifies any thing but to be reconciled to God as the offended party; or where-ever the Dative of the perſon following the Verb importing reconciliation, did ſignifie any thing elſe but the party with whom the reconciliation was to be made. As for that objection concerning *things in Heaven being reconciled*; that phraſe doth not import ſuch a Reconciliation of the *Angels* as of Men, but that Men and Angels upon the reconciliation of Men to God, become

Crell. c. 7. ſect. 30.

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one body under Christ, and are gathered together in him, as the *Apostle* expresseth it, *Eph.* 1. 10.

XIII. 1. Having thus far proved, that the effects of an Expiatory Sacrifice do belong to the death of Christ, nothing now remains but an answer to be made to two Objections, which are commonly insisted on by our Adversaries. The first is, *That God was reconciled before he sent his Son, and therefore Christ could not die to reconcile God to us.* The second is, *That the Doctrine of Satisfaction asserted by us, is inconsistent with the freeness of God's grace in the remission of sins:* Both which will admit of an easie Solution upon the principles of the foregoing discourse. To the first I answer, That we assert nothing inconsistent with that love of God, which was discovered in sending his Son into the world; we do not say, That God hated mankind so much on the account of sin, that it was impossible he should ever admit of any terms of Reconciliation with them, which is the only thing inconsistent with the greatness of God's love, in sending Christ into the world; but we adore and magnifie the infiniteness and unexpressible greatness of his love, that nothwithstand- Objections answered.

ing all the contempt of the former kindneſs and mercies of Heaven, he ſhould be pleaſed to ſend his own Son to die for ſinners, that they might be reconciled to him. And herein was the great love of God manifeſted, that *while we were enemies and ſinners, Chriſt died for us*, and that for this end, that we might be reconciled to God by his death. And therefore ſurely, not in the ſtate of favour or Reconciliation with God then. But it were worth the while, to underſtand what it is our Adverſaries mean, when they ſay, *God was reconciled when he ſent his Son, and therefore he could not die to reconcile God to us.* Either they mean, that God had decreed to be reconciled upon the ſending his Son, or that he was actually reconciled when he ſent him: if he only decreed to be reconciled, that was not at all inconſiſtent with Chriſt's dying to reconcile God and us in purſuance of that decree: if they mean, he was actually reconciled, then there was no need for Chriſt to die to reconcile God and us; but withal, actual Reconciliation implies pardon of ſin; and if ſin were actually pardoned before Chriſt came, there could be no need of his coming at all, and ſins would have been

been pardoned before committed; if they were not pardoned, notwithſtanding that love of God, then it can imply no more, but that God was willing to be reconciled. If therefore the not-remiſſion of ſins were conſiſtent with that love of God, by which he ſent Chriſt into the world, then notwithſtanding that he was yet capable of being reconciled by his death. So that our Adverſaries are bound to reconcile that love of God, with not preſently pardoning the ſins of the world, as we are to reconcile it with the ends of the death of Chriſt, which are aſſerted by us.

XIV. To the other Obje&tion, *Concerning the inconſiſtency of the Freeneſs of God's Grace with the Doctrine of Satisfaction.* I anſwer, Either God's Grace is ſo free as to exclude all conditions, or not: If it be ſo free, as to exclude all conditions, then the higheſt *Antinomianiſm* is the truſt Doctrine; for that is the higheſt degree of the Freeneſs of Grace, which admits of no conditions at all. If our Adverſaries ſay, *That the Freeneſs of Grace is conſiſtent with conditions required on our part*, Why ſhall it not admit of conditions on God's part? eſpecially, when the condition required, tends ſo highly

The freeneſs of Grace aſſerted in Scripture, deſtroys not ſatisfaction.

highly to the end of God's governing the world, in the manifeſtation of his hatred againſt ſin, and the vindication of the honour of his Laws by the Sufferings of the Son of God in our ſtead, as an Expiatory Sacrifice for our ſins. There are two things to be conſidered in ſin, the diſhonour done to God, by the breach of his Laws, and the injury men do to themſelves by it; now remiſſion of ſins, that reſpects the injury which men bring upon themſelves by it; and that is *Free*, when the penalty is wholly forgiven, as we aſſert it is by the Goſpel to all penitent ſinners: but ſhall not God be free to vindicate his own Honour, and *to declare his righteouſneſs to the world*, while he is *the Juſtifier of them that believe*? Shall men in caſe of Defamation, be bound to vindicate themſelves, though they freely forgive the Authors of the ſlander, by our *Adverſaries own Doctrine*? and muſt it be repugnant to *God's Grace*, to admit of a *Propitiatory Sacrifice*, that the world may underſtand, that it is no ſuch eaſie thing to obtain pardon of ſin committed againſt God; but that as often as they conſider the bitter Sufferings of Chriſt, in order to the obtaining the forgiveneſs of our ſins, that ſhould be

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the greateſt Argument to diſſwade them from the practice of them? But why ſhould it be more inconſiſtent with the Sacrifice of Chriſt, for God freely to pardon ſin, than it was ever preſumed to be in all the Sacrifices of either *Jews* or *Gentiles*? Who all ſuppoſed Sacrifices neceſſary in order to *Atonement*, and yet thought themſelves obliged to the goodneſs of God in the Remiſſion of their ſins? Nay we find that God himſelf, in the caſe of *Abimelech*, appointed *Abraham to pray for him*, in order to his pardon; And will any one ſay, this was a derogation to the Grace of God in his pardon? Or to the pardon of *Job's* Friends, becauſe *Job* was appointed to Sacrifice for them? Or to the pardon of the *Iſraelites*, becauſe *God* out of kindneſs to them, directed them by the *Prophets*, and appointed the means in order to it? But although *God* appointed our *High-Prieſt* for us, and out of his great love ſent him into the world, yet his Sacrifice was not what *was given him*, but what he *freely underwent himſelf*; he gave us Chriſt, but *Chriſt* offered up himſelf *a full, perfect and ſufficient Sacrifice, Oblation and Satisfaction for the ſins of the world.*

Gen. 20. 7.

Job 42. 7.

Thus, Sir, I have now given you a larger account of what I then more briefly diſcourſed of, concerning *the true Reaſon of the Sufferings of Chriſt*; and heartily wiſhing you a *right underſtanding in all things*, and requeſting from you an *impartial conſideration* of what I have written,

I am,

SIR,

Your, &c.

Jan. 6. 166⅘.

E. S.

THE MYSTERIES OF The Christian Faith

ASSERTED and *VINDICATED:*

IN A

SERMON

Preached at

S. Laurence-Jewry *in* London,

APRIL the 7th. 1691.

By the Right Reverend Father in GOD,
EDWARD Lord Bishop of *Worcester.*

LONDON,
Printed by *J. H.* for *Henry Mortlock* at the *Phœnix* in St. *Paul's* Church-Yard, 1697.

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A SERMON

Preached at

S. Laurence-Jury,

APRIL the 7th. 1691.

1 TIM. I. 15.

This is a faithful saying and worthy of all acceptation, That Christ Jesus came into the World to save Sinners, of whom I am chief.

IF these Words were to be understood without any Restriction or Limitation *that Christ Jesus came into the World to save sinners*, they would overthrow the great Design of the Gospel, and make its Excellent Precepts Useless and Ineffectual. For, to what purpose should men be put upon the severe Practice of Repentance, Mortification

tification and a continued Course of a Holy Life, if the meer being *Sinners* did sufficiently qualifie them for Salvation? This indeed would be thought a Doctrine *worthy of all Acceptation* by the *greatest Sinners*; but it could not be *a faithful saying*, being not agreeable either to the Nature of God, or Revelation of his Will by *Christ Jesus*. But S. *Paul* speaks of such *Sinners* as himself had been, *i. e.* such as had been great Sinners, but had truly and sincerely repented. *Of whom I am chief.* What then? Must we look on him as the Standard and Measure of such *Sinners* whom *Christ Jesus* came to save? What will then become of all those who have been Sinners of a higher Rank than ever he was? It's true in the Verses before the Text, he sets out his Sins, as a humble Penitent is wont to do, with the worst Colours and deepest Aggravations, *Who was before a blasphemer and a persecutor, and injurious*; but yet he adds, *that he obtained Mercy because he did it ignorantly, in unbelief.* How then is S. *Paul* the *Chief of Sinners*? Are Sins of *Ignorance* and *Mistake* the greatest of Sins, for which Christ died? Is there no *Expiation* for any other by *Jesus Christ*? What will be-

Ver. 13.

become then of all ſuch who ſin againſt Knowledge and Conſcience, and not *in Ignorance and Unbelief?* Can none of theſe hope for Mercy by *Chriſt Jeſus*, although they do truly Repent? But *the Blood of Chriſt* is ſaid elſewhere *to cleanſe us from all Sin*; not, while we continue in them, but if we repent and forſake them. And *Jeſus Chriſt* is ſaid *to be a Propitiation for our Sins; and not for ours only, but for the Sins of the whole World.* And therefore this Expreſſion of S. *Paul* notes his great Humility and deep Senſe of his own Sins; but doth not exclude others from the hopes of Pardon whoſe Sins have other Aggravations than his had. For, if we leave out the laſt words as peculiar to his Caſe, yet the other contain in them a true Propoſition and of the greateſt Importance to Mankind; *This is a faithful ſaying and worthy of all acceptation, that Chriſt Jeſus came into the world to ſave ſinners.*

1 Joh. 1.7. Ch. 2. v. 2.

This, you may ſay, is a matter out of all doubt among all ſuch who hope for Salvation by *Chriſt Jeſus*; for all are agreed, that one way or other we are to be *ſaved by him.* But there is great Difficulty as to the Way of *ſaving ſinners* by *Chriſt Jeſus*; whether by *the Doctrine*

ctrine and Example of the Man Chriſt Je-ſus, by the Power he attained through his Sufferings; Or, *by the Eternal Son of God's aſſuming our Nature and ſuffering in our ſtead in order to the Reconciling God to us and making a Propitiation for our Sins.* Theſe are two very different *Hypotheſes* or Notions of *Chriſt's coming to ſave Sinners*; and the former ſeems more eaſie to be underſtood and believed; and the other ſeems to have Inſuperable Difficulties in point of Reaſon; and to run our Religion into *Myſteries*, which expoſe our Faith and make Chriſtianity appear Contemptible to Men of Senſe and Underſtanding. Is it not therefore much better to embrace ſuch a Scheme of it, as will have the leaſt Objection againſt it, that ſo Men of Reaſon may not be tempted to Infidelity, and Men of Superſtition may not under the Colour of *Myſteries* bring in the moſt Abſurd and Unreaſonable Doctrines?

Theſe are plauſible Inſinuations, and would be apt to prevail on conſidering Mens minds, if they were to form and make a Religion that might be moſt accommodated to the *Genius* and *Humour* of the Age they live in. And truly no Men (by their own Authority) can pretend

pretend to a Right to impoſe on others any *Myſteries of Faith*, or any ſuch things which are above their Capacity to underſtand. But that is not our caſe; for we all profeſs to believe and receive *Chriſtianity* as a *Divine Revelation*; and God (we ſay) may require from us the belief of what we may not be able to comprehend, eſpecially if it relates to Himſelf, or ſuch things which are Conſequent upon the Union of the Divine and Human Nature. Therefore our buſineſs is to conſider, whether any ſuch things be contained in that *Revelation* which we all own; and if they be, we are bound to believe them, although we are not able to comprehend them.

Now here are two Remarkable *Characters* in theſe Words, by which we may examin theſe different *Hypotheſes* concerning the way of *Salvation by Jeſus Chriſt*.

I. *It is a faithfull ſaying*, and therefore muſt be contained in that Revelation which God hath made concerning our Salvation by Chriſt.

II. *It is worthy of all Acceptation*; *i. e.* moſt uſeful and beneficial to Mankind.

Now

Now by these two I shall proceed in the Examination of them.

I. Which is most agreeable to the Revealed Will of God.
II. Which doth offer fairest for the Benefit and Advantage of Mankind.

I. Which is most agreeable to the revealed Will of God. For that we are sure is the most *faithfull saying*; since Men of Wit and Reason may deceive us, but God cannot. When the Apostles first preached this Doctrine to the World, they were not bound to believe what they affirmed to be *a faithfull saying* till they gave sufficient Evidence of their Authority from God, by the wonderfull Assistance of the Holy Ghost. But now this *faithfull saying* is contained in the Books of the *New Testament*, by which we are to judge of the Truth of all *Christian* Doctrines. And when two different Senses of Places of Scripture are offer'd, we are to consider, which is most Reasonable to be preferr'd. And herein we are allow'd to Exercise our Reason as much as we please; and the more

we

we do ſo, the ſooner we ſhall come to Satisfaction in this matter.

Now according to Reaſon we may judge that Senſe to be preferr'd,

(1.) Which is moſt plain and eaſie and agreeable to the moſt receiv'd Senſe of Words; not that which is forced and intricate, or which puts improper and *metaphorical* Senſes upon Words which are commonly taken in other Senſes; eſpecially when it is no Sacramental thing, which in its own Nature is Figurative.

(2.) That which ſuits moſt with the Scope and Deſign not only of the particular Places, but of the whole *New Teſtament*; which is, to magnifie God and to depreſs Man? to ſet forth, the Infinite Love and Condeſcenſion of God *in giving his Son to be a Propitiation for our Sins*; to ſet up the Worſhip of one *true God* in Oppoſition to *Creatures*; to Repreſent and Declare the mighty Advantages Mankind receive by the *Sufferings* of *Chriſt Jeſus*.

(3.) That which hath been generally receiv'd in the *Chriſtian Church* to be the Senſe of thoſe places. For, we are certain, this was always look'd on as a matter of great Concernment to all Chriſtians;

and they had as great Capacity of understanding the Sense of the Apostles: and the Primitive Church had greater Helps for knowing it than others at so much greater Distance. And therefore the Sense is not to be taken from modern *Inventions*, or *Criticisms*, or pretences to *Revelation*; but that which was at first deliver'd to the *Christian Church* and hath been since received and embraced by it in the several Ages; and hath been most strenuously asserted, when it hath met with Opposition, as founded on *Scripture* and the *general Consent* of the *Christian Church*.

(4.) That which best agrees with the *Characters* of those Persons from whom we recive the Christian Faith; and those are *Christ Jesus* and his *holy Apostles*. For, if their *Authority* be lost, our Religion is gone; and their Authority depends upon their *Sincerity* and *Faithfulness*, and Care to inform the World aright in matters of so great Importance.

(1.) I begin with the Character which the Apostles give of *Christ Jesus* himself; which is, that he was a Person of the greatest Humility and Condescension, that he did not assume to himself that which

which he might juſtly have done. For let the Words of *S. Paul* be underſtood either as to the *Nature*, or *Dignity* of Chriſt, it is certain that they muſt imply thus much, that when *Chriſt Jeſus* was here on Earth, he was not of a vain aſſuming humour, that he did not boaſt of himſelf, nor magnifie his own Greatneſs, but was contented to be look'd on as other Men; although he had at that time far greater and Diviner Excellency in him than the World would believe. Leſs than this, cannot be made of thoſe Words of the Apoſtle, *Who being in the form of God, he thought it not robbery to be equal with God, but made himſelf of no Reputation, and took upon him the form of a Servant.* Phil. 2. 6, 7.

Now this being the *Character* given of him, let us conſider what he doth affirm concerning himſelf. For although he was far from drawing the People after him, by ſetting forth his own Perfections; yet upon juſt Occaſions, when the *Jews* conteſted with him, he did Aſſert ſuch things, which muſt ſavour of Vanity and Oſtentation, or elſe muſt imply that he was the *Eternal Son* of *God*. For, all Mankind are agreed that the higheſt degree of Ambition lies in Affe-

ving Divine Honour, or for a meer Man to be thought a *God*. How ſeverely did God puniſh *Herod* for being pleaſed with
Act. 12. 22. the Peoples folly in crying out, *the Voice of God and not of Man*? And therefore he could never have born with ſuch poſitive Aſſertions and ſuch repeated Defences of his being *the Son of God* in ſuch a manner as implied his being ſo from Eternity. This in his Diſputes with the *Jews* he affirms ſeveral times, *that*
Joh. 6. 32, 33. *he came down from Heaven*, not in a *Metaphorical* but in a proper Senſe, as appears by thoſe words, *What and if ye ſhall*
38. 50. 58. 62. *ſee the Son of Man aſcend up where he was before?* In another *Conference* he aſſert-
Joh. 8. 58. ed, *that he was before Abraham.* Which the *Jews* ſo literally underſtood, that
v. 59. without a *Metaphor they went about to ſtone him*; little imagining that by *Abraham* the calling of the *Gentiles* was to be underſtood. But above all, is that Expreſſion which he uſed to the *Jews* at ano-
Joh. 10. 30. ther Conference, *I and my Father are one*; which they underſtood in ſuch a
v. 31. manner that immediately *they took up ſtones to have ſtoned him.* What means all this Rage of the *Jews* againſt him? What? for ſaying *that he had Unity of Conſent with his Father?* No certainly.

But

But the Jews misunderstood him. Let us suppose it; would not our *Saviour* have immediately explained himself to prevent so dangerous a Misconstruction? But he asked them, what it was they stoned him for? They answer him directly and plainly, *because that thou being a man makest thy self God.* This was home to the purpose. And here was the time for him to have denied it, if it had not been so. But doth he deny it? Doth he say, it would be *Blasphemy* in him to own it? No; but he goes about to defend it; and proves it to be no *Blasphemy for him to say that he was the Son of God*; *i. e.* so *as to be God*, as the *Jews* understood it. Can we imagine that a *meer Man* knowing himself to be such, should Assume this to himself; and yet *God* to bear witness to him not only by *Miracles* but by a *Voice from Heaven*, wherein he was called his *beloved Son in whom he was well pleased?* Could God be pleased with a mortal, finite, despicable Creature, as the *Jews* thought him, that assumed to himself to be *God*, and maintained and defended it among his own People, in a solemn *Conference* at a very Publick Place, in one of the *Portico's* of the Temple? And this he persisted in to the last. For,

v. 32, 33.

v. 36.

Mat. 3. 17.

when *the High Priest adjured him by the*
Matth. 26. 63. *living God to tell, whether he were the Christ the Son of God*, (for he, no doubt, had heard of the *Result* of this *Conference* in *Solomon's Porch*)
v. 64. *Jesus said unto him,*
Mark 14. 62. *Thou hast said.* S. *Mark*, more expressly, *Jesus said, I am.* And this was the *Blasphemy*, for which they put him to death;
v. 64. as appears by the *Evangelists*. So that this ought to be a Dispute only between
Matth. 26. 66. *Jews* and *Christians*; since it was the very point, for which they condemned him to death. And in his last most divine Prayer just before his suffering, he owns the *Glory* which he had *with the Father* before the World had a being. *And now, O Father, glorifie thou me with the glory which*
Luk. 22. 71. Joh. 17. 5. *I had with thee, before the World was.* Was this nothing but the *Glory* which *God* had designed to give him? This is so far from being peculiar to Christ, that it is common to all whom *God* designs to glorifie; and takes away the distinction between the *Decree* and the *Execution* of it.

(2.) As to the *Apostles*, the Reason we believe their Testimony is, that they were Men of great Sincerity and Plainness, and of great Zeal for the Honour and Glory of God. And according to this

this *Character*, let us examine what they ſay concerning *Chriſt Jeſus*.

He that was moſt converſant with him, and beloved by him, and lived to ſee his *Divinity* conteſted by ſome, and denied by others, is moſt ample in ſetting it forth in his Admirable, Sublime, and Divine Introduction to his Goſpel. Which all the Wit of Mankind can never make tolerable Senſe of, if they deny *Chriſt's* being the *Eternal Son of God*; and it is he, that hath preſerved thoſe *Conferences* with the *Jews*, wherein he aſſerts his own *Divinity*. Joh. 1. 1, 2, &c.

S. *Paul* was a Stranger to him while he lived; but at the ſame time when he was ſo zealous to perſwade the *Gentiles* to the *Worſhip* of *God* and not of *Creatures*, he calls him *God over all, bleſſed for evermore*. Rom. 9. 5. And when he ſaith, that *the Eternal Power and Godhead are known by the Creation of the World*, he attributes *the Creation of all things* to *Chriſt*, applying to him thoſe words of the *Pſalmiſt*, *Thou Lord in the beginning haſt laid the Foundation of the Earth and the Heaven, the Work of thy hands*. Which cannot be underſtood of any *Metaphorical Creation*. Rom. 1. 20. Col. 1. 16. Heb. 1. 2, 10.

And after the ſtricteſt Examination

of Copies, those will be found the best, which have that Reading on which our Translation is grounded. *And without Controversie great is the Mystery of Godliness, God was manifest in the Flesh.* So that *God's being manifest in the Flesh* is made a great Part of the *Mystery* of *Christianity.*

1 Tim. 3. 16.

But here arises a Difficulty, which deserves to be considered; *i. e.* If there "were nothing in the Christian Do-"ctrine, but the Way of *Saving sinners* "by the Doctrine and Example of "Christ, there would be little Objecti-"on to be made to it; since the obtain-"ing Eternal Life is certainly the best "thing can be proposed to Mankind, and "the Precepts of Christ are Divine and "Spiritual, Plain and Easie to be Under-"stood, and Agreeable to the Reason of "Mankind; but many other things are "imposed on Men as necessary to be be-"lieved concerning *Christ Jesus*, as to his "*Divinity*, *Incarnation*, and the *Hypo-"statical Union* of both Natures, which "perplex and confound our Understand-"ings; and yet these things are not only "deliver'd as *Mysteries* of *the Christian* "*Faith*; but the Belief of them is re-"quired as necessary to the Salvation

"of

" of Sinners; whereas, if they are Re-
" vealed they are no longer *Myſteries*; and
" if they are not Revealed, how come
" they to be made Articles of Faith?
" The Scripture knows of no other *My-*
" *ſteries of Faith* but ſuch as were hid-
" den before the Revelation of them,
" but ſince they are Revealed they are
" plain and open to all mens Capacities;
" and therefore it is a great Injury to the
" Plainneſs and Simplicity of the Goſpel
" to impoſe ſuch incomprehenſible My-
" ſteries, as Neceſſary Articles of Faith;
" and it is abuſing the Credulity of Man-
" kind, to make ſuch things neceſſary
" to be believed, which are impoſſible
" to be underſtood. But thoſe who have
" ever loved to deceive and abuſe the
" reſt of the World, have been always
" fond of the Name of *Myſteries*; and
" therefore all ſuch things are to be ſuſ-
" pected, which come under that Name.
" For, all ſuch Points which will not
" bear Examination, muſt be wrapt up
" and Reverenced under the Name of
" *Myſteries*, that is, of things to be ſwal-
" low'd without being underſtood. *But*
" *the Scripture never calls that a Myſte-*
" *ry which is Incomprehenſible in it ſelf,*
" *though never ſo much revealed.*

Diſcourſe of the Word Myſtery, *&c.* P. 5.

This

This is the main force of the Objection, which I ſhall endeavour to remove by ſhewing,

(1.) That God may juſtly require from us in general, the Belief of what we cannot comprehend.

(2.) That which way ſoever the Way of Salvation by *Chriſt* be explained, there will be ſomething of that Nature found in it; and that thoſe who reject the Myſteries of Faith run into greater Difficulties than thoſe who aſſert them.

(3.) That no more is required as a Neceſſary Article of Faith than what is plainly and clearly Revealed.

(1.) That God may juſtly require from us in general, the Belief of what we cannot comprehend. It is to very little purpoſe to enquire whether the Word *Myſtery* in *Scripture* be applied to ſuch particular Doctrines, whoſe Subſtance is revealed, but the manner of them is incomprehenſible by us; for why may not we make uſe of ſuch a Word whereby to expreſs things truely revealed, but above our Comprehenſi-

on?

on? We are certain the Word *Myſtery* is uſed for things far leſs difficult and abſtruſe; and why may it not then be fitly applied to ſuch matters, which are founded on Divine Revelation, but yet are too deep for us to go to the bottom of them? Are there not *Myſteries* in Arts, *Myſteries* in Nature, *Myſteries* in Providence? And what Abſurdity is there to call thoſe *Myſteries*, which in ſome Meaſure are known, but in much greater unknown to us? Although therefore in the Language of Scripture it be granted, that the word *Myſtery* is moſt frequently applied, *to things before hidden, but now revealed*, yet there is no Incongruity in calling that a *Myſtery*, which being revealed, hath yet ſomething in it which our underſtandings cannot reach to. But it is meer Cavilling to inſiſt on a Word, if the Thing it ſelf be granted. The chief thing therefore to be done is, to ſhew that God may require from us the belief of ſuch things which are incomprehenſible by us. For, *God* may require any thing from us, which it is reaſonable for us to do; if it be then reaſonable for us to give Aſſent where the manner of what *God* hath revealed is not comprehended, then *God* may certainly require

require it from us. Hath not God revealed to us, that *in ſix days he made Heaven and Earth and all that is therein?* But is it not reaſonable for us to believe this, unleſs we are able to comprehend the manner of *God's* production of things? Here we have ſomething revealed and that plainly enough, *viz.* that *God created all things*, and yet, here is a *Myſtery* remaining as to the manner of doing it. Hath not God plainly revealed that there ſhall be a *Reſurrection* of the dead? and muſt we think it unreaſonable to believe it, till we are able to comprehend all the changes of the Particles of Matter from the *Creation* to the General *Reſurrection?* But it is ſaid *that there is no Contradiction in this, but there is in the Myſtery of the Trinity and Incarnation.* It is ſtrange Boldneſs in Men to talk thus of *Monſtrous Contradictions* in things above their Reach. The *Atheiſts* may as well ſay, *Infinite Power* is a *Monſtrous Contradiction*; and *God's Immenſity* and his other unſearchable Perfections are *Monſtrous Paradoxes* and *Contradictions.* Will Men never learn to diſtinguiſh between *Numbers* and the Nature of *Things?* For *three* to be *one* is a *Contradiction* in *Numbers*; but whether

Obſervations on Dr. Wallis *his four Letters*, p. 4.

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an Infinite Nature can communicate it ſelf to three *different Subſiſtences* without ſuch a *Diviſion* as is among Created Beings, muſt not be determined by bare *Numbers*, but by the Abſolute *Perfections* of the Divine Nature; which muſt be owned to be above our Comprehenſion.

For let us examine ſome of thoſe *Perfections* which are moſt clearly revealed and we ſhall find this true. The *Scripture* plainly reveals, that *God* is from *everlaſting to everlaſting; that he was and is and is to come*; but ſhall we not believe the Truth of this till we are able to fathom the *Abyſs* of God's *Eternity*? I am apt to think (and I have ſome thoughtful Men concurring with me) that there is no greater Difficulty in the Conception of the *Trinity* and *Incarnation*, than there is of *Eternity*. Not, but that there is great Reaſon to believe it; but from hence it appears that our Reaſon may oblige us to believe ſome things which it is not poſſible for us to comprehend. We know that either God muſt have been for ever, or it is impoſſible he ever ſhould be; for if he ſhould come into Being when he was not, he muſt have ſome Cauſe of his Being; and that which

Pſal. 90. 2. Revel. 1. 4. c. 11. v. 17.

Biſter field c. Crell. p. 50.

Petav. de Trinit. l. 3. c. 9. ſect. 15.

which was the firſt Cauſe would be God. But, if he was for ever he muſt be from himſelf; and what Notion or Conception can we have in our Minds concerning it? And yet, *Atheiſtical* men can take no Advantage from hence; becauſe their own moſt abſurd *Hypotheſis* hath the very ſame Difficulty in it. For ſomething muſt have been for ever. And it is far more reaſonable to ſuppoſe it of an Infinite and Eternal Mind, which hath Wiſdom and Power and Goodneſs to give Being to other things, than of dull, ſtupid and ſenſleſs Matter, which could never move it ſelf, nor give Being to any thing beſides. Here we have therefore a thing which muſt be owned by all; and yet ſuch a thing which can be conceived by none. Which ſhews the narrowneſs and ſhortneſs of our Underſtandings, and how unfit they are to be the Meaſures of the Poſſibilities of things. *Vain men would be wiſe*; they would fain go to the very bottom of things, when alas! they ſcarce underſtand the very Surface of them. They will allow no *Myſteries* in Religion; and yet every thing is a *Myſtery* to them. They cry out of *Cheats* and *Impoſtures* under the Notion of *Myſteries*; and yet there is not

not a Spire of Graſs but is a *Myſtery* to them; they will bear with nothing in *Religion* which they cannot comprehend, and yet there is ſcarce any thing in the World which they can comprehend. But above other things the *Divine Perfections*, even thoſe which are moſt Abſolute and Neceſſary are above their Reach. For let ſuch Men try their Imaginations about God's *Eternity*, not meerly how he ſhould be from himſelf, but how God ſhould coexiſt with all the Differences of Times, and yet there be no Succeſſion in his own Being. I do not ſay there is ſuch Difficulty to conceive a Rock ſtanding ſtill when the Waves run by it; or the *Gnomon* of a Dial when the Shadow paſſes from one Figure to another; becauſe theſe are groſs unactive things; but the Difficulty is far greater where the Being is Perfect and always Active. For, where there is Succeſſion there is a paſſing out of not being in ſuch a duration into being in it; which is not conſiſtent with the Abſolute Perfection of the Divine Nature. And therefore God muſt be all at once what he is, without any Reſpect to the Difference of Time paſt, preſent or to come. From whence *Eternity* was defined by *Boethius* to *be a*

perfect

De Consol. l. 3.

perfect and complete Poſſeſſion all at once of everlaſting Life. But how can we from any Conception in our Minds of that being all at once, which hath ſuch different Acts as muſt be meaſur'd by a long Succeſſion of Time? As, the Creating and Diſſolving the Frame of the World; the promiſing and ſending the *Meſſias*; the Declaring and Executing a general Judgment; how can theſe things be conſiſtent with a Permanent Inſtant, or a Continuance of being without Succeſſion? For, it is impoſſible for us in this Caſe, as to God's Eternity, to form a clear and diſtinct *Idea* in our Mind, of that which both *Reaſon* and *Revelation* convince us muſt be. The moſt we can make of our Conception of it is, that God hath neither Beginning of Being, nor End of Days; but that he always was and always muſt be. And this is rather a neceſſary Concluſion from Reaſon and Scripture, than any diſtinct Notion or Conception of Eternity in our Minds. From whence it evidently follows, that God may reveal ſomething to us, which we are bound to believe, and yet after that Revelation the Manner of it may be incomprehenſible by us, and conſequently a *Myſtery* to us.

Hath

Hath not God Revealed to us in *Scripture* the *Spirituality* of his own Nature? That *he is a Spirit*, and therefore will *be worſhipped in Spirit and in Truth*; For, that is a true Reaſon why Spiritual Worſhip ſhould be moſt agreeable to him. Now, if we could have a clear, diſtinct, poſitive Notion in our minds of God's Spiritual Nature, we might then pretend that there is nothing *myſterious* in this, ſince it is revealed. S. Joh. 4. 24.

But let ſuch men Examine their own thoughts about this matter; and try, whether the utmoſt they can attain to, be not ſomething *Negative*, viz. becauſe great Abſurdities would follow if we attributed any thing *Corporeal* to God; for, then he muſt be compounded of Parts, and ſo he may be diſſolved; then he muſt be confined to a certain place, and not every-where preſent; he cannot have the Power of Acting and Self-determining which a meer Body hath not. For the cleareſt Notion we can have of *Body*, is, that it is made up of ſome things as parts of it, which may be ſeparated from each other; and is confined to a certain place, and hath no Power to move or act from it ſelf. But ſome of theſe men who cry down *My-*

ſteries and magnifie Reaſon, to ſhew how ſlender their pretences to Reaſon are, have aſſerted a *Corporeal God*, with *Shape* and *Figure*. It was indeed, well thought of by thoſe who would make *a Man* to be *God*, to bring *God* down as near to *Man* as might be. But how to Reconcile the Notion of a Body with Infinite Perfections, is a *Myſtery* to me, and far above my Comprehenſion. But if it be no *Myſtery* to ſuch Men, they muſt either deny God's Infinite Perfections or ſhew how a bodily Shape can be capable of them. But ſome men can confound *Finite* and *Infinite*, *Body* and *Spirit*, *God* and *Man*, and yet are for no *Myſteries*; whereas theſe things are farther from our Reach and Comprehenſion, than any of thoſe Doctrines which they find fault with. But to proceed.

If we believe *Prophecy*, we muſt believe *God's fore-knowledge of future events:* For, how could they be fore-told if he did not fore-know them? And if he did fore-know thoſe which he did fore-tell, then it was either becauſe thoſe only were revealed to him which is inconſiſtent with the Divine Perfections; or that he doth fore-know all other Events and only thought fitting to Reveal theſe:

But

But how can they ſolve the Difficulties about *Divine Preſcience*? Is there no *Myſtery* in this? Nothing above their Comprehenſion? What then made their great Maſter deny it, as a thing above his Comprehenſion? Becauſe nothing can be fore-known but what hath a certain Cauſe, and therefore, if evil Actions be fore-told, God muſt be the Cauſe of them, and Men will not be free Agents in them. And yet it is moſt certain, that the Sufferings of Chriſt by the Wickedneſs of Men, were fore-told. What then? Muſt we make God the Author of Sin? God forbid. Will the righteous Judge of all the Earth, puniſh Mankind for his own Acts, which they could not avoid? Then we muſt yield, that there is ſomething in the manner of the *Divine Preſcience*, which is above our Comprehenſion. And the moſt Searching and Inquiſitive Men have been forc'd to yield it at laſt, as to the Connection between the Certainty of Preſcience and the Liberty of humane Actions. Is it not then much better to ſit down quietly at firſt, Adoring the Infiniteneſs of God's incomprehenſible Perfections, than after all the huffings and diſputings of Men to ſay, *In Ignorantiâ ſolâ*

Socin. Præl. c. 11.

Cajetan in 1. q. 22. art. 4.

ſolâ quietem invenio, as the great Schoolman did? Surely then, here is ſomething plainly revealed, and yet the manner of it is ſtill a *Myſtery* to us.

I ſhall not now inſiſt on any more of the particular Attributes of God, but only in general I deſire to know, whether they believe them to be *finite* or *infinite*? If to be *finite*, then they muſt have certain bounds and limits which they cannot exceed; and that muſt either be from the imperfection of Nature, or from a Superiour Cauſe, both which are repugnant to the very Being of God. If they believe them to be *infinite*, how can they comprehend them? We are ſtrangely puzled in plain, ordinary, finite things; but it is madneſs to pretend to comprehend what is *Infinite*; and yet if the Perfections of God be not *Infinite* they cannot belong to Him.

I ſhall only add, in Conſequence to this Aſſertion, *That if nothing is to be believed, but what may be comprehended*, the very *Being of God* muſt be rejected too. And therefore I deſire all ſuch who talk ſo warmly againſt any *Myſteries in Religion*, to conſider whoſe work it is they are doing; even theirs who under this

this pretence go about to overthrow all Religion. "For, ſay they, *Religion* is "a *Myſtery* in its own Nature; not this "or that, or the other Religion; but "*they are all alike*, all is *Myſtery*; and "that is but another Name for *Fraud* "and *Impoſture*. What were the *Hea-* "*then Myſteries* but tricks of *Prieſt-* "*craft*; and ſuch are maintained and "kept up in all kinds of Religion. If "therefore theſe men, who talk againſt "*Myſteries* underſtand themſelves, they "muſt in purſuance of their Principles "reject *one God*, as well as *three Perſons*; "For, as long as they believe an Infinite "and Incomprehenſible Being, it is "Nonſenſe to reject any other Doctrine, "which relates to an *Infinite Being*, be-"cauſe it is *Incomprehenſible*.

But yet theſe very Men, who ſeem to purſue the Conſequence of this Principle to the utmoſt, muſt aſſert ſomething more incomprehenſible than the *Being of God*. For, I appeal to any man of common Underſtanding, whether it be not more agreeable to Reaſon to ſuppoſe Works of Skill, Beauty and Order to be the Effects of a Wiſe and Intelligent Being, than of Blind Chance and Unaccountable Neceſſity; whether it

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be not more agreeable to the Senſe of Mankind to ſuppoſe an Infinite and Eternal Mind endued with all poſſible Perfections to be the Maker of this viſible World; than, that it ſhould ſtart out from it ſelf, without Contrivance, without Order, without Cauſe? Certainly ſuch men have no Reaſon to find fault with the *Myſteries of Religion* becauſe they are *incomprehenſible*, ſince there is nothing ſo Abſurd and Incomprehenſible, as their darling *Hypotheſis*; And, there is nothing which can make it prevail, but to ſuppoſe Mankind to be as Dull and Inſenſible as the firſt *Chaos*.

Thus I have ſhewn that it is not unreaſonable for *God* to require from us the Belief of ſomething which we cannot comprehend.

(2.) I now come to conſider, whether thoſe who are ſo afraid of *incomprehenſible Myſteries* in our *Faith*, have made it ſo much more eaſie in the Way they have taken. And notwithſtanding all the Hectoring talk againſt *Myſteries* and things incomprehenſible in Religion, I find more inſuperable Difficulties in point of Reaſon in their Way than in ours. As for inſtance. (1.) It

(1.) It is a more Reaſonable thing to ſuppoſe ſomething *Myſterious* in the Eternal Son of God's *being with the Father before the World was made by him*; (as *S. John* expreſſes it in the beginning of his Goſpel) than in ſuppoſing that although *John* the *Baptiſt* were born ſix Months before *Jeſus Chriſt*; that yet Chriſt was in Dignity before him. What a wonderful *Myſtery* is this? Can Men have the Face to cry down *Myſteries* in deep Speculations, and matters of a high and abſtruſe Nature, when they make ſuch *Myſteries* of plain and eaſie things? and ſuppoſe the *Evangeliſt* in profound Language and lofty Expreſſions to prove a thing, which was never diſputed, *viz.* although *Chriſt Jeſus* were born ſix Months after *John*, yet he was in Dignity before him?

(2.) It is a more Reaſonable thing to ſuppoſe that a *Divine Perſon* ſhould aſſume humane Nature, and ſo the *Word to be made Fleſh*; than to ſay, that an Attribute of God, his *Wiſdom* or *Power* is *made Fleſh*, which is a *Myſtery* beyond all Comprehenſion; There may be ſome Difficulties in our Conception of the other, but this is a thing beyond all Conception or Imagination; For an

Accident to be made a *Subſtance* is as abſurd, as to imagine it to *ſubſiſt* without one.

(3.) It is more Reaſonable to ſuppoſe that the Son of God ſhould *come down from Heaven* and take our Nature upon him, than that a man ſhould be rapt up into Heaven, that it might be ſaid that he came down from thence. For in the former Suppoſition we have many other places of Scripture to ſupport it, which ſpeak of his *being with God*, and *having Glory with him before the World was*; whereas there is nothing for the other, but only that it is neceſſary to make ſome tolerable Senſe of thoſe words.

(4.) It is more Reaſonable to believe that *God* ſhould become *Man* by taking our Nature upon him, than that *Man* ſhould become *God*. For in the former, there is nothing but the Difficulty of conceiving the Manner of the Union, which we all grant to be ſo between Soul and Body; but in the other there is a Repugnancy in the very Conception of a *Created God*, of an *Eternal Son of Adam*, of *Omnipotent Infirmity*, of an *Infinite finite Being*. In the former Caſe, an *Infinite* is united to a *Finite*; but

but in the other a *Finite* becomes *Infinite.*

(5.) It is more Reaſonable to believe that *Chriſt Jeſus* ſhould ſuffer as he did *for our ſakes* than *for his own.* We are all agreed that the *Sufferings* of *Chriſt* were far beyond any thing he deſerved at *God*'s hands; but what Account then is to be given of them? We ſay that he made himſelf a voluntary Sacrifice for Expiation of the Sins of Mankind; and ſo there was a great and noble End deſigned, and no Injury done to a willing Mind; and the *Scripture* as plainly expreſſes this, as it can do in Words. But others deny this, and make him to ſuffer as one wholly Innocent; for what Cauſe? To make the moſt Innocent Perſons as apprehenſive of Suffering as the moſt Guilty; and the moſt righteous God to put no difference between them, with Reſpect to Suffering.

(6.) It is more Reaſonable to ſuppoſe ſuch a Condeſcenſion in the Son of *God* to take upon him the Form of a Servant for our Advantage; than that a *meer Man* ſhould be Exalted to the *Honour* and *Worſhip* which belongs only *to God.* For, on the one ſide, there is nothing but what is agreeable to the Divine

vine Nature, viz. *Infinite Love* and *Condeſcenſion* and *Pity* to Mankind; on the other, there is the greateſt Deſign of *Self-Exaltation* that ever was in *Humane Nature*, viz. for a *meer Man* to have the moſt *Eſſential Attributes* and *Incommunicable Honour* which belongs to *God*. And whether of theſe two is more agreeable to the Spirit and Deſign of the New Teſtament, let any man of underſtanding judge. For as it is evident, that the great Intention of it is to magnifie the wonderful Love of God in the ſending of his Son; ſo it is as plain that one great End of the Chriſtian Doctrine was to take Mankind off from giving Divine Worſhip to Creatures; and can we then ſuppoſe that at the ſame time it ſhould ſet up the *Worſhip* of a *meer Man* with all the *Honour* and *Adoration* which belongs to *God*? This is to me an *incomprehenſible Myſtery* indeed, and far beyond all that is implied in the *Myſteries* of the *Trinity* and *Incarnation*. For it ſubverts the very Foundation of the Deſign of Chriſtianity as to the Reforming *Idolatry* then in being; it lays the Foundation for introducing it into the World again; for ſince the Diſtance between God and his Creatures is taken away,

away, in the matter of Worſhip, there is nothing left but the Declaration of his Will; which doth not exclude more *Mediators* of *Interceſſion* but upon this Ground, that the *Mediation* of *Redemption* is the Foundation of that of *Interceſſion*. And it is far more eaſie for us to ſuppoſe there may be ſome things too hard for us to underſtand in the Myſtery of our *Redemption by Jeſus Chriſt*, than that at the ſame time it ſhould be both *a Duty* and *a Sin* to worſhip any but the *true God* with proper Divine Worſhip. For if it be Idolatry to give it to a Creature, then it is a great Sin; for ſo the Scripture ſtill accounts it; but if we are bound to give it to Chriſt who is but a Creature, then that which in it ſelf is a Sin, is now become a Neceſſary Duty; which overthrows the Natural Differences of Good and Evil, and makes *Idolatry* to be a meer *Arbitrary* thing. And I take it for granted, that in Matters of Religion, *Moral* Difficulties are more to be regarded than *Intellectual*; becauſe Religion was far more deſigned for a Rule of our Actions, than for the Satisfaction of our Curioſity: And upon due Examination we ſhall find that there is no ſuch frightfull

full Appearances of Difficulties in the *Myſtery* of the *Incarnation*, as there is in giving *Divine Worſhip* to a *Creature*.

And it ought to be obſerved, that thoſe very Places which are ſuppoſed to exclude Chriſt from being the *true God*; muſt, if they have any force, exclude him from *Divine Worſhip*. For they are ſpoken of God, as the *Object* of our *Worſhip*; but if he be not excluded from *Divine Worſhip*, then neither is he from being the *true God*; which they grant he is *by Office*, but not *by Nature*.

S. Joh. 17. 3.

1 Cor. 6. 6.

Socin. ad *Eutrop.* p. 96. c *Wick.* c. 11. *Catech. Racov.* p. 65.

But a *God by Office* who is not ſo *by Nature* is a new and *incomprehenſible Myſtery*. A *Myſtery hidden from Ages and Generations* as to the Church of God; but not *made known by the Goſpel of his Son*.

This is ſuch a kind of *Myſtery* as the *Heathen* Prieſts had, who had *Gods many and Lords many*, as the *Apoſtle* ſaith, *i. e.* many by *Office* although but one *by Nature*. But if the Chriſtian Religion had owned *one God by Nature* and only *one by Office*, the Heathens had been to blame chiefly in the Number of their Gods by *Office*, and not in the Divine Worſhip which they gave to them. But *S. Paul* blames

1 Cor. 8. 5.

blames the Heathens for *doing Service to them which by Nature are no Gods*; not for doing it without Divine Authority, nor for miſtaking the Perſon who was God by Office, but in giving Divine Worſhip to them who *by Nature were no Gods*; which he would never have ſaid, if by the Chriſtian Doctrine, Divine Worſhip were to be given to one who was not *God by Nature*. Gal. 4. 8.

But theſe are indeed *incomprehenſible Myſteries* how a Man by Nature can be a God *really* and *truly* by *Office*; how the Incommunicable Perfections of the Divine Nature can be communicated to a Creature; how God ſhould *give his Glory to another*, and by his own Command require that to be given to a Creature, which himſelf had abſolutely forbidden to be given to any beſides himſelf. It is ſaid by a famous *Jeſuit* (I will not ſay how agreeably to their own *Doctrines* and *Practices* about Divine Worſhip) *that the Command of God cannot make him worthy of Divine Worſhip, who without ſuch a Command is not worthy of it. And it is very abſurd to ſay, that he that is unworthy of it without a Command, can become worthy by it; for it makes God to command Divine Honour to be given to one who* *Smiglec.* de Divin. Verb. Incarn. Nat. p. 45.

who cannot deſerve it. (For no meer Man can deſerve to be made God.) *But it is more agreeable to the Divine Nature and Will not to give his Honour to a Creature.*

Nova Monſtra, &c. p. 42.

(3.) But after all the Invectives of theſe Enemies to *Myſteries*, we do not make that which we ſay is *Incomprehenſible* to be a *Neceſſary Article of Faith* as it is *Incomprehenſible*; but we do aſſert that what is *Incomprehenſible* as to the *Manner*, may be a *Neceſſary Article* as far as it is plainly Revealed. As in the Inſtances I have already mentioned of the *Creation* and *Reſurrection of the Dead*; would they in earneſt have Men turn *Infidels* as to theſe things till they are able to comprehnd all the difficulties which relate to them? If not, why ſhould this ſuggeſtion be allow'd as to the *Myſteries* which relate to our *Redemption* by *Jeſus Chriſt*? If it be ſaid, *the Caſe is not alike for thoſe are clearly Revealed and theſe are not*; this brings it to the true and proper Iſſue of this matter, and if we do not prove a *clear Revelation*, we do not aſſert their being *Neceſſary Articles of Faith*; but my preſent buſineſs was only to take off this Objection, That the *Myſteries* were Incomprehenſible and

and therefore not to be received by us.

II. And ſo I come to the ſecond Way, by which we are to Examine the ſeveral Senſes of *Chriſt Jeſus coming to ſave Sinners:* Which of them tends more to the Benefit and Advantage of Mankind; or which is *more worthy of all Acceptation.*

And that will appear by conſidering theſe things;

(1.) Which tends moſt to the raiſing our *Eſteem* and *Love* of *Chriſt Jeſus.*

(2.) Which tends moſt to the begetting in us a greater *Hatred of Sin.*

(3.) Which tends moſt to the ſtrengthening our *Hope* of *Salvation by Jeſus Chriſt.*

(1.) As to the raiſing in us a greater *Eſteem* and *Love of Chriſt.* We are certain that the Infinite Love and Condeſcenſion of *Chriſt Jeſus* in undertaking ſuch a Work as *the ſaving of Sinners* makes it moſt worthy of all Acceptation. Some Men may pleaſe themſelves in thinking that by taking away all *Myſte-*

ries

ries they have made their *Faith* more eaſie, but I am certain they have extremely leſſen'd the Argument for our *Love*, *viz.* the Apprehenſions of the wonderfull Love and Condeſcenſion of Chriſt in coming into the World *to ſave Sinners*. And yet this is the great Argument of the New Teſtament to perſwade Mankind to the *Love of God* and of his Son;

Joh. 3. 16. *God ſo loved the World that he gave his only begotten Son*, &c. This is indeed a mighty Argument of Love, if by *the only begotten Son* be meant the Eternal

v. 13. Son of God, *who came down from Heaven*, as S. *John* ſpeaks juſt before; but if no more be meant but only that God made a *meer Man* to be his Son, and after he had preached a while here on Earth and was ill uſed and crucified by his own People, he Exalted him to be *God* and gave him Divine Attributes and Honours; this were an Argument of great Love to the Perſon of Chriſt, but not to the reſt of Mankind. But *God's Love* in *Scripture* is magnified with Reſpect to *the World* in

1 Joh 4. 9. the ſending of his Son. *In this was manifeſted*, ſaith the Apoſtle, *the Love of God towards us, becauſe that God ſent his only begotten Son into the World that we ſhould*

v. 10. *live through him. Herein is love, not*

that

that we loved God, but that he loved us, and ſent his Son to be a Propitiation for our Sins. The great Love we ſtill ſee is *towards us, i. e.* towards Mankind; but according to the other Senſe it muſt have been, Herein was the Love of God manifeſted to his Son, that for his Sufferings he exalted him above all Creatures. *He that ſpared not his own Son,* ſaith S. *Paul,* Rom. 8. 32. *but delivered him up for us all.* If he were the *Eternal Son of God* who came to ſuffer for us, there is a mighty force and *Emphaſis* in this Expreſſion, and very apt to raiſe our Admiration and our Love; But what *not ſparing his own Son* is there, if nothing were meant but that he deſigned by Sufferings to Exalt him? For *not Sparing him* ſuppoſes an Antecedent Relation of the higheſt Kindneſs, but the other is only deſigning extraordinary Kindneſs for the ſake of his Sufferings. Therefore, the Argument for the *Love* of *God* is taken from what his *Son* was, when he deliver'd him up for us all; he was his *own Son*; not by *Adoption* as others are; S. *John* calls him, his *only begotten Son*; and God himſelf, *his beloved Son* in the Voice from Heaven; and this before his Sufferings, immediately after his Baptiſm, when as yet, there was no-

John 1. 14. ch. 3. v. 16. Luk. 3. 22.

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John 1. 14. ch. 3. v. 16. Luk. 3. 22.

thing extraordinary done by him, as to the great Deſign of his coming. Which ſhews, that there was an Antecedent Relation between him and the Father; and that therein the Love of God and of Chriſt was manifeſted, that being the *only begotten Son of the Father*, he ſhould take our Nature upon him and for our ſakes do and ſuffer what he did. This is indeed an Argument great enough to raiſe our Admiration, to excite our Devotion, to inflame our Affections; but how flat and low doth it appear, when it comes to no more than this, that there was a *Man*, whom, after his Sufferings *God* raiſed from the Dead and made him a *God by Office*? Doth this carry any ſuch Argument in it for our Eſteem and Love and Devotion to him as the other doth upon the moſt ſerious Conſideration of it?

(2.) Which tends moſt to beget in us a greater *Hatred of Sin.* For that is ſo contrary to the Way of our *Salvation* by *Jeſus Chriſt*, that what tends moſt to our *Hatred* of it, muſt conduce moſt to our Happineſs, and therefore be *moſt worthy of all Acceptation.* It is agreed on all hands, that *Chriſt* did ſuffer very much both in his Mind and in his Body.

Joh. 13. 21. In his Mind, when it is ſaid, *that he was troubled*

troubled in Spirit; that *he began to be ſorrowfull and very heavy*; and ſoon after, *My Soul is exceeding ſorrowfull, even unto death.* S. *Luke* ſaith, *that he was in an Agony*; wherein he not only *prayed more earneſtly, but his ſweat was as it were great Drops of Blood falling to the Ground.* What made this Amazement, and dreadfull Agony in the mind of the moſt innocent Perſon in the World? Was it meerly the Fear of the Pains of Death which he was to undergo? That is impoſſible, conſidering the Aſſurance which he had of ſo glorious a Reward ſo ſoon following after; when ſo many Martyrs endured ſuch exquiſite Torments for his ſake without any ſuch Diſturbance or Conſternation. But the Apoſtles give us another Account of it. S. *Peter* ſaith, he was *to bear our Sins in his own body on the tree*; that *Chriſt ſuffered for Sins, the juſt for the unjuſt.* S. *Paul, that God made him to be Sin for us who knew no Sin, that he might be made the righteouſneſs of God in him.* Hereby we underſtand how ſo innocent a Perſon came to ſuffer; *he ſtood in our ſtead*; *he was made Sin for us*; and therefore was to be treated as a Sinner; and to ſuffer that on our Account, which he could not de-

Matt. 26. 37, 38.
Mark 14. 33, 34.
Luke 22. 44.
1 Pet. 2. 24.
3. 18.
2 Cor. 5. 21.

ſerve on his own. If he ſuffer'd on his own Account, this were the way to fill our Minds with perplexity concerning the Juſtice of Providence with Reſpect to his dealings with the moſt innocent and holy Perſons in this World; If he ſuffer'd on our Account, then we have the Benefit of his Sufferings, and therein we ſee how diſpleaſing to God ſin is, when even his own Son ſuffer'd ſo much by taking the guilt of our Sins upon him. And what can tend more to the begetting in us a due hatred of ſin, than to conſider what *Chriſt* himſelf ſuffer'd on the Account of it? What can make us have more dreadful thoughts of it, than that the great and merciful God, when he deſigned *to ſave ſinners*, yet would have his own Son to become *a Propitiation for the Sins of Mankind?* And unleſs we allow this, we muſt put force upon the plaineſt Expreſſions of *Scripture*; and make *Chriſt* to ſuffer meerly to ſhew God's Power over a moſt innocent Perſon, and his Will and Pleaſure to inflict the moſt ſevere Puniſhment without any Reſpect to *Guilt*. And ſurely ſuch a Notion of *God*, cannot be *worthy of all Acceptation.*

(3.) Which

(3.) Which tends moſt to ſtrengthen our *Hope* of *Salvation by Chriſt Jeſus.* If we believe that he ſuffer'd for our Sins, then we have great Reaſon to hope for the Forgiveneſs of them; although they have been many and great, if we ſincerely Repent; becauſe the moſt prevailing Argument for Deſpair will be removed; which is taken from the *Juſtice of God*, and his declared *Hatred* of *Sin* and *Diſpleaſure* againſt *Sinners.* If God be ſo much in earneſt diſpleaſed with the Sins of Mankind, and his Juſtice be concerned in the Puniſhment of Sinners, how can they ever hope to eſcape, unleſs there be a way for his Diſpleaſure to be removed, and his Juſtice to be ſatisfied? And this the *Scripture* tells us is done by *Chriſt*, who died that he might be a *Sacrifice of Atonement to Reconcile us to God by his Death*; as S. *Paul* expreſly affirms. And by this means, we may have ſtrong Conſolation from the Hopes of Forgiveneſs of our Sins. Whereas, if this be taken away, either Men muſt believe that *God* was not in earneſt diſpleaſed with the Sins of Mankind; which muſt exceedingly leſſen our Eſteem of the *Holineſs* and *Juſtice of God*; or if he were ſo diſpleaſed,

Rom. 5. 10. 2 Cor. 5. 19. Heb. 9. 15.

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FINIS.

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Matt. 26. 37, 38.
Mark 14. 33, 34.
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